Gonzales v. State

492 P.3d 556

Melvin Leroy GONZALES, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 78152

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED JULY 29, 2021

Karla K. Butko, Verdi, for Appellant.

Michael Macdonald, District Attorney, and Anthony R. Gordon, Deputy District Attorney, Humboldt County, for Respondent.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Charles L. Finlayson, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Attorney General's Office.

Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender, and Ellesse D. Henderson and Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Las Vegas; Brown Mishler, PLLC, and William H. Brown, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

NRS 34.810(1)(a) requires a district court to dismiss a postconviction habeas corpus petition if "[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." This case requires us to decide whether a defendant who pleads guilty may challenge his sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the post-plea sentencing hearing. We hold that NRS 34.810(1)(a) does not bar a claim that a petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Because we further conclude that appellant in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Finally, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying appellant's remaining claims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2013, appellant Melvin Gonzales was charged with burglary, receiving stolen property, possession of methamphetamine, and four counts of aggravated stalking. The stalking counts arose from disturbing and threatening text messages he sent to his ex-wife and her parents. Gonzales agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated stalking. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Further, while the State reserved the right to argue at sentencing, it expressly agreed to recommend that the sentences for each count run concurrently.

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor exercised his right to argue by emphasizing the serious nature of the crimes. But instead of recommending that those sentences run concurrently as required by the plea agreement, he stated only that he concurred with the recommendation contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation. The PSI recommended that two of the three sentences should run consecutively. Gonzales's counsel did not object. The district court ultimately sentenced Gonzales to three consecutive prison terms of 62 to 156 months. Gonzales appealed but did not argue the State breached the plea agreement, and this court affirmed his conviction. Gonzalez v. State, Docket No. 65768, 2014 WL 6090812 (Order of Affirmance, Nov. 12, 2014).

Gonzales filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he supplemented twice. Among the grounds for the petition, and central to this appeal, was a claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the State's breach of the plea agreement. During the hearing on the petition, Gonzales's postconviction counsel questioned trial counsel, who acknowledged that he did not object, explaining that he was unsure whether the State had in fact breached the plea agreement. He stated that when the State concurred with the PSI, he did not know which specific recommendation the State was concurring with. The district court denied the petition in its entirety. While it denied some claims on the merits, it concluded that any "[i]ssues regarding [the] sentence are outside the scope of NRS 34.810(1)(a)" and thus declined to address those issues at all. Gonzales appealed.

DISCUSSION

NRS 34.810 does not bar claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing

Gonzales challenges the district court's determination that NRS 34.810(1)(a) precludes his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. NRS 34.810(1)(a) limits the types of claims that may be raised in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a conviction based upon a guilty plea:

1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

The district court's application of NRS 34.810 is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).

In construing a statute, we seek "to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Williams v. State, Dep't of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 596, 402 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written." Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). But if a "statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, ... we ‘look beyond the language [of the statute] to consider its meaning in light of its spirit, subject matter, and public policy.’ " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 893, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004) ). In doing so, we construe statutes "in light of their purpose and as a whole," and thus look to the "entire act" to reconcile any apparent inconsistencies. White v. Warden , 96 Nev. 634, 636, 614 P.2d 536, 537 (1980).

The State contends that an allegation "that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel," NRS 34.810(1)(a), must necessarily contend that counsel's advice to enter the plea was deficient. In the State's view, adopted by the district court, an allegation of deficient performance at sentencing does not relate to the entry of the plea and is thus not cognizable in state habeas proceedings following a guilty plea. This is undoubtedly one facially reasonable reading of the statute, but it is not the only reasonable reading. Another reasonable interpretation is that NRS 34.810(1)(a) limits the types of claims arising before entry of the guilty plea to only those claims that relate to the validity of the guilty plea and the effective assistance of counsel in entering a plea. But NRS 34.810(1)(a) does not limit ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims arising after entry of the guilty plea, as there is no express language doing so and those claims are naturally not known at the time the guilty plea is entered. As there are two reasonable interpretations, NRS 34.810(1)(a) is ambiguous, and we look to the "spirit, subject matter, and public policy" behind NRS Chapter 34 and NRS 34.810(1)(a) in particular. Butler, 120 Nev. at 893, 102 P.3d at 81. In this context, we conclude that the second reading—which permits Gonzales's claim here—is clearly the better one.

First, considering the chapter as a whole, our Legislature created a remedy to challenge the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence for a person "under sentence of death or imprisonment who claims that the conviction was obtained, or that the sentence was imposed, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State." NRS 34.724(1). This remedy was made exclusive, supplanting the common-law writ and other procedures formerly available to challenge a conviction or sentence. NRS 34.724(2)(b). Because a defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing, Cunningham v. State, 94 Nev. 128, 130, 575 P.2d 936, 938 (1978) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) ), the context of NRS Chapter 34 strongly suggests that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy when "the sentence was imposed," NRS 34.724(1), without the effective assistance of counsel.

To be sure, it is clear that the Legislature meant to provide one remedy, not more, and thus barred petitioners from raising most claims that were or should have been raised earlier. See NRS 34.810(2) ; see also Harris v. State , 130 Nev. 435, 446-48, 329 P.3d 619, 626-28 (2014) (recognizing the Legislature's goal of creating a single postconviction remedy to challenge the validity of a judgment of conviction for a person in custody). This court has further recognized that claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are waived in subsequent proceedings. See Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). And of course, the Legislature can impose procedural limitations on statutory postconviction petitions. See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 878, 34 P.3d 519, 531 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.12 (2018).

But it is equally clear that the Legislature did not mean to provide zero remedies, and the State candidly admits that its interpretation will provide no state-law remedy whatsoever for violations of a defendant's rights that take place after the entry of a guilty plea. We are not persuaded that the potential availability of a federal remedy for such claims means that our Legislature did not provide its own remedy for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims arising after entry of the guilty plea. The lack of any state remedy weighs heavily against the State's interpretation. The vast majority of convictions in our system are obtained through guilty pleas. To hold that defendants who plead guilty have no remedy for such constitutional violations at sentencing would...