Gore v. Dist. of Columbia

67 F.Supp.3d 147

Gloria Gore, Plaintiff

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:13–CV–00233 BJR

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 10, 2014

Domiento Cornelius Hill, Law Offices of Domiento C.R. Hill, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Plaintiff.

Victoria Lynne Healy, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [15] and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [13]

BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment [13] and [15]. Plaintiff Gloria Gore brings this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq., on behalf of Y.G., her sixteen-year-old granddaughter. Plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) denied Y.G. a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) when it changed Y.G.'s assigned school from The Monroe School to one of the High Road schools, and in doing so, failed to convene a multidisciplinary team meeting to discuss the change, or otherwise include Plaintiff in the decision-making process. Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, the relevant case law, and the entire record, the Court denies the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grants the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gloria Gore is the legal guardian and grandmother of Y.G., a student with specific learning disabilities. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 3, 5. In September 2010, a hearing officer determined that DCPS denied Y.G. a FAPE when it failed to act in accordance with Y.G.'s individualized education plan (“IEP”), developed in 2009, and prior hearing officer determinations requiring that Plaintiff be provided with written progress reports and that Y.G's IEP include measurable annual goals. Id. at 18, 23–24. Noting that DCPS had “repeatedly failed to adhere to the requirements of the law[,]” the hearing officer ordered Y.G.'s immediate placement at The Monroe School (“Monroe”),¹ and ordered that all expenses be paid by DCPS. Id. at 24. In addition, the hearing officer “effectively removed” from DCPS the “right to dictate what services will or will not be provided.” Id. Specifically, the September 2010 HOD provided that:

If the Student is, for any reason but for graduation or aging out, no longer able to attend Monroe School, the Student will again become the direct responsibility of the Respondent and all of the procedures and obligations under IDEA will become applicable. Nothing in this order requires placement at another non-public placement, unless the IEP team determines that such a placement is necessary for the Student.

Id.

Subsequently, on two separate occasions, DCPS attempted to transfer Y.G. from Monroe to another nonpublic school. In response, Plaintiff filed two administrative due process complaints in December 2011 and February 2012, challenging Y.G's reassignment from Monroe to Spectrum Academy at Roosevelt High School. Id. at 69–71, 75–78. The hearing officer found in favor of the Plaintiff on both occasions, finding that the September 2010 HOD remained in effect and that DCPS was required to provide transportation services for Y.G. to Monroe. Id. at 70, 79.

On August 22, 2012, DCPS issued a Prior Written Notice² indicating a change in Y.G's location of services and that Y.G. would be transferred from Monroe to one of the High Road Schools (“High Road”). Id. at 87–89. Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint on September 14, 2012, alleging that DCPS denied Y.G. a FAPE by changing her assigned school from Monroe to High Road and failing to include Plaintiff in the decision-making process that resulted in that change. Id. at 105–114.

In November 2012, an independent hearing officer held a due process hearing. The hearing officer focused on two issues in resolving Plaintiff's due process complaint: first, whether Y.G. was denied a FAPE when DCPS changed her educational placement and failed to include Plaintiff in the decision-making process regarding this change in placement, and second, whether DCPS changed Y.G.'s educational placement when it transferred Y.G. from Monroe to High Road, and whether that change in placement violated the September 2010 HOD.Id. at 5. With respect to the first issue, the hearing officer determined that DCPS did not deny Y.G. a FAPE because Y.G.'s transfer did not result in a change in her educational placement, and therefore, DCPS was not required to provide prior written notification to the Plaintiff. Id. at 9–10. With respect to the second issue, the hearing officer again concluded that DCPS did not violate the September HOD because there was no change in Y.G.'s educational placement. Id. at 11. The hearing officer also concluded that DCPS did not violate the September 2010 HOD. As the hearing officer reasoned, there was a justification for the transfer under the September HOD because it permitted DCPS to assume responsibility if, for any reason except graduation or aging out, Y.G. was no longer able to attend Monroe. In particular, the hearing officer found that Monroe's failure to comply with the “requirements that its teachers be certified to provide specialized instruction and content area instruction in the District of Columbia[,]” provided a valid reason justifying DCPS' decision to change Y.G.'s location of services. Id.

Plaintiff filed a complaint under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) seeking review of the November 2012 hearing officer determination.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review for IDEA Claims

“Congress enacted the IDEA ‘to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.’ ” Petties ex rel. Martin v. District of Columbia, 662 F.3d 564, 566 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) ). An IEP is the mechanism through which a student receives a FAPE under the IDEA. Individualized education programs are developed and implemented by a multidisciplinary team (MDT), or IEP team, that includes the parents of the student, a regular education teacher, a special education teacher, a representative from the local education agency (LEA) who will supervise the student's educational program, an individual that can interpret the evaluation results, other individuals with knowledge or expertise about the student, and, if appropriate, the student. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Each IEP must include a statement of the student's current academic achievement levels, academic and functional goals, how the student's progress will be measured, special education services and supplementary aids, and the extent to which the student will participate in regular classroom activities and other activities with nondisabled students. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).

Under the IDEA, parties may “present a complaint with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child[.]” Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). Once a complaint is received, parties have an opportunity to participate in an impartial due process hearing, wherein a hearing officer must determine whether the student received a FAPE. Id. §§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (f)(3)(E)(i). Aggrieved parties may challenge a hearing officer's decision in federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). After receiving and reviewing the administrative record,³ as well as any additional evidence submitted by the parties, the reviewing court must “bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,” and grant the appropriate relief. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

Where no additional evidence is presented by either party, “ ‘a motion for summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence compromising the record.’ ” D.K. v. District of Columbia, 983 F.Supp.2d 138, 144 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Parker v. Friendship Edison Public Charter Sch., 577 F.Supp.2d 68, 72 (D.D.C.2008) ). The party challenging the hearing officer's decision bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“[I]t is true that under our precedent ‘a party challenging the administrative determination must at least take on the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was wrong, and that a court upsetting the officer's decision must at least explain its basis for doing so.’ ” (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C.Cir.1989) )). “Under the IDEA, the hearing officer's decision is afforded ‘less deference than is conventional in administrative proceedings.’ ” District of Columbia v. Nelson, 811 F.Supp.2d 508, 511 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 ). However, judicial review is “by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities,” but rather courts must give “due weight” to the determination by the hearing officer in the administrative proceedings under review. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

B. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff argues that the hearing officer erred in concluding that Y.G.'s transfer from the Monroe School to High Road was a change in the “location of services” rather than a change in educational placement. Pl.'s Mot. at 6. Plaintiff relies principally on Letter to Fisher, 21 IDELR 992 (1994), a policy letter written by the former director of the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), to support her argument that the change in Y.G.'s...