Grant v. Kia Motors Corp.

185 F.Supp.3d 1033

Trisha Grant, individually and as next friend of Hudson Knost, Gabriel Knost, and Grace Knost, Plaintiffs,

v.Kia Motors Corporation; and Kia Motors America, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 4:14-cv-79

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

Signed May 10, 2016

Benjamin E. Baker, Jr., R. Graham Esdale, Jr., Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Jonathan P. Farmer, Farmer, Purcell, White & Lassiter, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.

John Randolph Bibb, Jr., R. Dale Bay, Whitney Henry Kimerling, Ryan Nelson Clark, Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Kia Motors Corporation's ("KMC") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 74), and Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.'s ("KMA") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76). For the reasons stated herein, KMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part , and KMA's Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2014, then-minor Hudson Knost and his minor siblings were involved in a single vehicle rollover accident. The Parties agree that Plaintiffs' expert report accurately portrays the relevant facts, which are summarized as follows:

Mr. Hudson Knost was driving a 2001 Kia Sportage eastbound in the #1 lane of I-24 when he apparently lost control of the vehicle, rolled over in the median and came to rest in the westbound lanes of I-24. His siblings, Gabriel Knost and Grace Knost were also in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Hudson Knost was found partially ejected out the open driver's door, suspended at the abdomen by his seatbelt. Gabriel Knost was completely ejected from the vehicle, while Grace Knost was found moving, in the left rear seat of the vehicle.

(Doc. 75 at 2). It is also undisputed that the 2001 Kia Sportage ("the Sportage") rolled over seven times before coming to a stop on the westbound lanes of I-24.

On July 2, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee. Defendant KMC removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on August 4, 2014, and the case was ultimately transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (See Doc. 31). On February 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. (Doc. 46). Therein, Plaintiff Trisha Grant, individually¹ and as next friend of her three minor children, brings causes of action for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.² Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "the 2001 Kia Sportage was unreasonably dangerous and defective in that the door latch system was inadequate to retain occupants during an accident, the restraint system failed to contain the occupants in the vehicle, and the vehicle was defective in its handling and stability." (Id. at 6). Furthermore, Plaintiffs, without specifying whether Trisha Grant individually or her children individually are entitled thereto, seek

monetary damages from Defendants to compensate them for the following elements of damage:

(a) Past and future medical expenses;

(b) Future loss of earnings capacity;

(c) Past and future mental anguish and emotional distress;

(d) Past and future pain and suffering;

(e) Loss of society and companionship;

(f) Lost value of life and life enjoyment;

(g) Property damage;

(h) Pain and suffering.

(Doc. 46 at 9). Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' actions warrant the imposition of punitive damages. (Id. at 9–10).

On February 16, 2016, Defendants filed separate dispositive motions. Defendant KMA moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it is not a "manufacturer," but rather is a "seller." Accordingly, KMA claims that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–28–106 bars product liability actions against KMA.³ (Doc. 76 at 2). In the alternative, KMA joins KMC's motion for partial summary judgment. (Id. at 2–3). Defendant KMC moved for partial summary judgment on the following claims: (1) Plaintiff Trisha Grant's individual claims; (2) Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages; (3) Plaintiffs' defect claims relating to the driver's door latch system; and (4) Plaintiff Hudson Knost's claims relating to his alleged psychological conditions arising from the crash. (Doc. 74 at 2). The Court will discuss each motion in turn.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs the Court to grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply "by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot "rest upon its ... pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). The nonmoving party must present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over material facts remain and must be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co ., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ); see also White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. , 617 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2010). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Moldowan , 578 F.3d at 374. If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. KMA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant KMA argues that because it is only a "seller" of the Sportage, Tennessee law bars Plaintiffs' products liability claims against Defendant KMA.⁴ Tennessee law provides that

[n]o product liability action, as defined in § 29-28-102, shall be commenced or maintained against any seller, other than the manufacturer, unless:

(1) The seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–28–106.⁵ The term "seller" is statutorily defined to include "a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or consumption," Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–28–102(7), whereas the term "manufacturer" includes "the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component parts." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–28–102(4). KMA argues that because "KMA's role was limited to importing the subject Sportage to the United States and distributing it to dealers for resale," and because "KMA did not design, engineer, or manufacture the 2001 Sportage," it is entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. 77 at 3). Plaintiffs present two principal arguments in response, which the Court will discuss in turn.

A. Preemption

First, Plaintiffs claim that because KMA is a "manufacturer" under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("NTMVSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. , KMA "cannot now seek immunity under Tennessee's Innocent Seller Statute." (Doc. 79 at 6). Plaintiffs devote the vast majority of their argument to outlining KMA's responsibilities as a "manufacturer" under the NTMVSA. (Id. at 4–5). Only in a footnote do Plaintiffs make any legal argument whatsoever. Therein, Plaintiffs argue in a conclusory fashion that the definition of "manufacturer" in the NTMVSA preempts the definition of "manufacturer" found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–28–102(4). (Doc. 79 at 6 n.1).

It is elementary that state law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with federal law. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that such a conflict arises "where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, and where under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and...