Hardy v. Superior Court, Judicial Dist. of Fairfield

305 Conn. 824

48 A.3d 50

Jermaine HARDY

v.SUPERIOR COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD, Geographical Area Number Two.

No. 18527.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 27, 2011.

Decided Aug. 7, 2012.

Bradford Buchta, assistant public defender, for the plaintiff in error.

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state's attorney, for the defendant in error.

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.

PALMER, J.

This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error, Jermaine Hardy (plaintiff), who seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment, pursuant to which the plaintiff was summarily convicted of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to a term of 120 days incarceration. ¹ The plaintiff claims that, because the trial court did not inform him of the charge against him or afford him an opportunity to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence, his conviction and sentence for summary criminal contempt are illegal under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution,² article first, §§ 8 ³ and 9,⁴ of the Connecticut constitution, and Practice Book § 1–16.⁵ The defendant in error, the Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, geographical area number two, represented in this case by the office of the chief state's attorney (state), counters that (1) this court may not review the plaintiff's claim because it falls outside our scope of review of a writ of error, (2) the proceeding in which the trial court found the plaintiff in contempt and sentenced him substantially complied with Practice Book § 1–16, and (3) the state and federal constitutions do not guarantee a right of allocution in summary criminal contempt proceedings. We reject the state's contention that we may not review the plaintiff's claim, but, upon considering the merits of that claim, we conclude that the plaintiff's conviction was proper and, therefore, dismiss the writ of error.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On June 12, 2009, the plaintiff appeared in court for a pretrial hearing in connection with two pending criminal cases in which he was the defendant.⁶ The trial court agreed to continue the matter until June 17 so that the plaintiff could discuss with his attorney (defense counsel) the plea offer that the assistant state's attorney (prosecutor) presumably had just conveyed. Speaking to defense counsel, the plaintiff voiced his displeasure with the continuance, saying: “You ain't telling me nothing. You told me June [3]. What are they talking about?” Meanwhile, the trial court indicated that it was “done” with the plaintiff's case and was ready to proceed to the next matter. Immediately thereafter, something occurred that prompted the trial court to exclaim to the plaintiff, “Sir? Sir? Excuse me. Out. Out of the courtroom.” The judicial marshal told the plaintiff to “[k]nock it off,” and the plaintiff replied, “[d]on't treat me like that.... Why are you treating me like that?” Hearing this statement and observing whatever else was occurring in the courtroom, the trial court ordered the marshal to “[b]ring him back.” Then, an extended exchange ensued between the plaintiff, the marshal, defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court, during which the trial court summarily convicted and sentenced the plaintiff for criminal contempt. Because what occurred during this exchange is critical to our resolution of the plaintiff's claim, we set forth the exchange in its entirety.

“The Marshal: Go on back.

“[The Plaintiff]: Why are you pushing me like that?

“The Marshal: Go on back.

“[The Plaintiff]: This dude, man. Hey, yo, don't push me like no more, man. You want to walk with us, you don't have to push.

“The Marshal: You listen to him.

“[The Plaintiff]: Get your hands off of me.

“The Court: Excuse me.

“[The Plaintiff]: Get your hands off.

“The Court: Excuse me.

“[The Plaintiff]: This dude [has] got his hands on me, for what?

“The Court: Excuse me. You're in court.

“[The Plaintiff]: I know, but he's pushing me for no reason at all. I'm walking back slowly. Come on, man. I'm a human being like him, man. Fuck, ‘cause I mean, I'm in chains, because I'm different? Come on, man.

“The Court: [Defense counsel]?

“[The Plaintiff]: This dude, man.

“The Court: [Defense counsel]?

“The Marshal: Stop talking. Look at the judge.

“[The Plaintiff]: [I've] got so much anger in me right now, man.

“The Court: All right. All right.

“[The Plaintiff]: I'm telling you, man.

“The Court: I've heard enough. I've heard enough. Sir, you're represented by counsel, and normally I would say—

“[The Plaintiff]: Yo. The cuff, hold on my cuff.

“The Marshal: Relax.

“[Defense Counsel]: Stop.

“The Court: Normally, I would say that your attorney should—sir, I excused you from the courtroom. Thank you. Normally, I would allow a chance for your attorney to talk to you. However, based on your continued conduct, I'm going to find you in contempt.

“[The Plaintiff]: Whatever, man. Put me back.

“The Court: I'm going to find you in contempt of this court. You have prevented the orderly processes of this court. You've interrupted the orderly processes of this court.

“[The Plaintiff]: I did what?

“The Court: And, sir, if you wish to keep it up, sixty days, dead time.

“[The Plaintiff]: You see what this dude just did to me, man.

“The Court: See you in sixty days. You're committed to the commissioner of correction for sixty days.

“[The Plaintiff]: You see what this dude just did to me.

“The Court: Thank you. Thank you.

“[The Plaintiff]: I'm what? I'm what for sixty days? Fuck you, sixty days, motherfucker.

“The Court: Back.

“[The Plaintiff]: Ain't that nothing.

“The Court: Back.

“[The Plaintiff]: Yo, get the fuck off of me. Yo, get the fuck off of me, man. Wait until I get off these cuffs, yo. Wait until I get off these cuffs, man.

“The Marshal: I can't wait.

“[The Plaintiff]: Wait until I get off these cuffs, man. Yo.

“The Court: I'll vacate the prior sentence—

“[The Plaintiff]: Man, get the fuck out of here, man.

“The Court: You're committed to the custody of [the] commissioner of correction for a period of one hundred—

“[The Plaintiff]: Hey, yo, I don't give a fuck, man.

“The Court: One hundred twenty days.

“[The Plaintiff]: Fuck you. Fuck you. Fuck you. I don't give a fuck, motherfucker.

“The Court: We'll see you in a hundred—

“[The Plaintiff]: Fuck you. You don't see me nothing, motherfucker. Fuck all of you.

“The Court: See you—see you in six months, sir.

“The Plaintiff: You won't see me, shit, motherfucker. Dick head, motherfucker. Fucking bitch. You, I want you bad. I want you bad.

“[The Marshal]: All right.”

The trial court then continued the case for six months.

The plaintiff filed a writ of error, seeking reversal of the trial court's judgment, pursuant to which he was summarily convicted of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to a term of 120 days incarceration. The plaintiff claims that, because the trial court did not inform him of the charge against him or afford him an opportunity to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence, his conviction and sentence for summary criminal contempt are illegal under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, and Practice Book § 1–16.⁷

Before considering the merits of the plaintiff's claim, we first must address the threshold question of whether it is subject to our review. The state contends that, under existing precedent of this court, we may not review the claim because the plaintiff, in challenging a summary contempt conviction on procedural grounds, asserts a claim that cannot be adjudicated by means of a writ of error. Although the state acknowledges that we previously have reviewed writs of error involving claims that a summary contempt proceeding did not comport with due process or our rules of practice; see Jackson v. Bailey, 221 Conn. 498, 513–15, 605 A.2d 1350, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S.Ct. 216, 121 L.Ed.2d 155 (1992); In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 362–76, 572 A.2d 328, cert. denied sub nom. Dodson v. Superior Court, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990); the state maintains that, in Jackson and In re Dodson, we did not specifically consider, and therefore did not decide, whether such review is proper. In support of the claim that such review is not proper under our prior case law, the state relies primarily on Jackson, in which we stated that, “[i]n a review of summary criminal contempt, the inquiry is limited to a determination of the jurisdiction of the court below. Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 393, 413 (1877). Subsumed in this inquiry are three questions, namely, (1) whether the designated conduct is legally susceptible of constituting a contempt; Goodhart v. State, [84 Conn. 60, 63, 78 A. 853 (1911) ]; (2) whether the punishment imposed was authorized by law; State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 169, 158 A.2d 166 (1960); and (3) whether the judicial authority was qualified to conduct the hearing. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971).” ⁸ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Bailey, supra, at 500, 605 A.2d 1350.

Although this passage from Jackson v. Bailey, supra, 221 Conn. at 500, 605 A.2d 1350, undoubtedly expresses the scope of review as we typically have described it; see, e.g., Rowe v. Superior Court, 289 Conn. 649, 654, 960 A.2d 256 (2008); In re Dodson, supra, 214 Conn. at 346, 572 A.2d 328;Moore v. State, 186 Conn. 256, 257, 440 A.2d 969 (1982); we take this opportunity to clarify that we may undertake a broader review, one that encompasses the plaintiff's claim that his summary contempt adjudication was procedurally defective. We reject as both unjust and unfounded the proposition that, upon reviewing a summary contempt proceeding, we may...