Harris v. State

956 A.2d 1273

Clinton N. HARRIS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

No. 125, 2008.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: July 18, 2008.

Decided: August 28, 2008.

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, DE, for appellant.

Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.

RIDGELY, Justice:

Defendant-Appellant Clinton N. Harris appeals his conviction and sentence for a crime to which he pled guilty on January 3, 2001, for which he was not sentenced until February 8, 2008. Harris argues that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted because the delay in sentencing violated his right to a speedy trial and due process. He further argues that, in the alternative, he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it was plain error for the Superior Court to sentence him in excess of the sentencing recommendation. In denying his motion to dismiss, the Superior Court characterized this case as one which "fell through the cracks."¹ We continue to assume that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a speedy sentencing and find that the sentencing delay in this case violated Harris's rights under that Amendment. Because we reverse on that ground, Harris's remaining arguments are moot.

Facts

Harris, with the assistance of his counsel, pled guilty to unlawful sexual contact in the first degree on January 3, 2001. Following a pre-sentence investigation, Harris was scheduled to be sentenced on March 16, 2001. The sentencing was continued at Harris's request because he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. According to his defense counsel, Harris "became unhappy subsequent to the entry of the plea and wanted to withdraw the guilty plea." Because he was the one who negotiated the plea, Harris's counsel suggested Harris contact other counsel. The State did not seek a new sentencing date, and nothing happened with Harris's case for six years, until October 22, 2007, when a summons was mailed to Harris informing him that he was to be sentenced on November 2, 2007. Both Harris and his same counsel from 2001, appeared and requested a continuance to file a motion to dismiss the indictment. A continuance was granted. In his motion to dismiss, Harris argued that the delay in his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy sentencing and due process. He argued that in deciding whether his rights to a speedy sentencing were violated,² the Court should apply the same four-factor test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo,³ and recognized by this Court in Middlebrook v. State.⁴ The Superior Court applied the four-factor Barker test and denied Harris's motion. On February 8, 2008, the Superior Court sentenced Harris to two years at Level V, suspended for eighteen months at Level I probation.⁵ This appeal followed.

Discussion

Harris first argues that the nearly seven year delay in his sentencing violated his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial. We review an alleged infringement of a constitutional right de novo.⁶ In 1973, this Court in Johnson v. State noted that there was no United States Supreme Court decision concerning whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial encompasses the right to a speedy sentencing.⁷ That situation has not changed.⁸

Assuming that the Sixth Amendment requires speedy sentencing, as we did in Johnson, we analyze an allegedly unconstitutional delay in sentencing the same way as the asserted denial of the right to a speedy trial.⁹ The "right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights" and it is "impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied."¹⁰ Thus, "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right" on a case-by-case basis.¹¹ A case-by-case analysis also applies to an inquiry into a speedy sentencing claim. Examination of an alleged infringement of the right to a speedy sentencing requires considering the conduct of both the State and the defendant, looking primarily at (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the delay.¹² These factors are related and "must be considered together with other circumstances as may be relevant."¹³ Unlike a speedy trial claim, however, "a delay in sentencing involves considerations different from those related to pre-trial delay. The alteration of defendant's status from accused and presumed innocent to guilty and awaiting sentence is a significant change which must be taken into account in the balancing process."¹⁴ The Superior Court correctly recognized that the four Barker factors must balance in Harris's favor to find an infringement of the right to a speedy sentencing. After balancing the factors, the Superior Court decided that Harris's right to a speedy sentencing was not infringed in this case. We disagree.

The threshold factor, the length of the delay, strongly weighs in Harris's favor because he pled guilty on January 3, 2001 and was not scheduled to be sentenced until November 2, 2007.¹⁵ The State does not dispute that this extraordinary delay from Harris's guilty plea to his sentencing warrants an inquiry into the other factors. The Superior Court found that this factor weighed in Harris's favor. We agree.

The second factor, the reason for the delay, also weighs in Harris's favor. In examining this factor, this Court has explained that the spectrum of reasons the State asserts for the delay may range from inadvertence to deliberate acts, and in the case of the former, judicial tolerance is often appropriate.¹⁶ "Different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay."¹⁷ "[B]enign reasons for trial delays weigh less heavily against the State."¹⁸ "[A] valid reason may justify appropriate delay and will not weigh against the State at all."¹⁹ If the defendant is the primary cause for the delay, this factor will weigh against him, in part because a defendant may be in a better negotiating position as witnesses (for the State or the defense) become unavailable or their memories fade.²⁰

Here, the record is devoid of any reason for why no activity occurred in Harris's case from March 16, 2001, when the Superior Court granted Harris's request for a continuance, until October 22, 2007, when the court mailed a summons to Harris advising him of his November 2, 2007 sentencing date. His case, as noted by the Superior Court, simply "fell through the cracks." Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 contemplates the imposition of a sentence "without unnecessary delay." The Rule also gives the court discretion to "postpone the imposition of sentence for a reasonable time" when necessary to resolve "a factor important to the sentencing determination that is not then capable of being resolved" at the time of sentencing.²¹ Although Harris's request for a continuance permitted some reasonable postponement in his sentencing date,²² the remaining delay here was unreasonable. Nothing in the record indicates that the six and one-half year delay, extraordinary as it was, resulted from a deliberate attempt by the Superior Court or the State to delay Harris's sentencing date. A deliberate attempt to do so would weigh even more heavily in Harris's favor. Responsibility for this delay in scheduling rests with the court because sentencing calendars are established by the court, not the defendant.²³ In weighing this factor against Harris, the Superior Court erred.²⁴

The third factor, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy sentencing, weighs against Harris. "This factor is `of considerable significance in determining whether there has been a speedy [sentencing] violation.'"²⁵ The defendant also has some responsibility "to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement."²⁶ Further, "a defendant who prolongs a matter cannot then blame the result solely on the acts or omissions of the prosecution."²⁷ Although a failure to demand a speedy sentencing does not bar the defendant from raising the issue or operate as a waiver,²⁸ his acquiescence in the delay and his silence until his 2007 motion are significant.²⁹ Lack of protest will make it difficult for a defendant to prove he was denied a speedy sentencing.³⁰ Harris admitted that he did not demand a speedy sentencing and this factor should weigh against him.³¹ The Superior Court noted that Harris prompted the initial delay and did not call attention to it until after he received the notice of his new sentencing date. We agree with the Superior Court that his lack of demand and silence on the delay weigh against him.

The fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, is neutral on the facts of this case. In the speedy trial analysis, we analyze this factor "with consideration of the interests of a defendant `that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.'"³² Although we apply the same analysis in light of the interest of the defendant in a speedy sentencing,³³ in speedy sentencing cases the consideration of these particular interests is diminished.

Here, Harris was not incarcerated during any period of the delay. Harris argued that he suffered prejudice because he "has remained under the supervision of pre-trial services over the past 6 1/2 years being required to check in with his officer once a month and has done so" and "has been hampered in his employment and his family life has suffered given the uncertainty surrounding his situation." The Superior Court rejected his argument, finding the "inconvenience" to be insubstantial considering the potential of a prison...