Headspeth v. United States

285 A.3d 1236

Justin HEADSPETH, Appellant

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 19-CF-482

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted June 3, 2021

Decided December 8, 2022

Nancy Allen was on the brief for appellant.

Channing Phillips, Acting United States Attorney (at the time of submission), and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, Laura R. Bach, Ellen D'Angelo, and Anne Y. Park, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, Beckwith & Easterly, Associate Judges.

Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge:

Appellant Justin Headspeth was indicted on seventeen assault and gun possession charges related to his shooting of Otis Grandson and Eugenia Young in the Parkchester community in the southeast quadrant of Washington, D.C. Following a trial, the jury found appellant guilty of thirteen of those counts. Specifically, the jury found appellant guilty of one count of assault with the intent to kill while armed ("AWIKWA"), one count of aggravated assault while armed ("AAWA"), one count of assault with significant bodily injury while armed ("ASBIWA"), and three related counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or a dangerous offense ("PFCV") as to Otis Grandson. The jury also convicted appellant of the same as it relates to Eugenia Young, as well as one additional count of unlawful possession of a firearm ("UPF"). Appellant challenges his conviction of AAWA against Mr. Grandson, claiming there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial based on alleged jury misconduct. Appellant also argues for merger of certain convictions. We affirm, and remand on the merger issue, which the government concedes.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Appellant (also known as Goobs¹ ) and Mr. Grandson have known each other for several years, previously as neighbors in the Parkchester community, which is adjacent to the 1500 block of Eaton Road in Southeast Washington, D.C., the location of the shooting. Mr. Grandson moved away from Parkchester in 2007, but visits the community periodically.²

On January 25, 2016, Mr. Grandson, accompanied by Eugenia Young, was driving through Parkchester when he saw appellant. The two men locked eyes, which prompted Mr. Grandson to tell Ms. Young that if appellant had a gun, he believed appellant would try to kill him. As Mr. Grandson turned onto Eaton Road, his vehicle became lodged in the snow. Mr. Grandson remained in the driver's seat while Ms. Young exited the vehicle to try to remove snow from around the tires.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Grandson saw appellant approaching on foot. Appellant then shot Ms. Young four times in the abdomen, causing her to collapse in the snow. Mr. Grandson opened his door in an attempt to exit the vehicle, and appellant shot him twice through the open door — once in the back of the head and once in the left hand. Both Mr. Grandson and Ms. Young were transported to emergency rooms and survived with immediate injuries and long-term health complications, all directly attributable to the gunshot wounds inflicted by appellant. Mr. Grandson, in particular, testified to his physical pain and several injuries, including the protracted impairment of the function of blood vessels as well as nerves in his head, neck, back, left hand, and the left side of his body generally. Many of his injuries required immediate and ongoing medical treatment, including a follow-up appointment to remove the bullet from his scalp and follow-up neurology appointments to monitor the healing of his vertebrae because of the concerns of potential damage to his spinal cord.

A jury trial commenced on February 5, 2019. Approximately seven days after the trial began, the government notified the trial court that it discovered a photograph on a social media website, Instagram, of appellant sitting in the courtroom. The photograph was posted by Instagram user account "fatyee_lm3ent." The photograph was posted with the caption "Free goobs_ He innocent!!"³ To minimize the risk of similar photographs being taken during the trial, the government requested that all cell phones be checked at the door. The trial court granted this request.

On February 12, 2019, after the close of evidence, appellant, through counsel, informed the trial court that other persons had commented on the Instagram post. One of these posters was Instagram user account "pr3miumsupply," which, according to the account's description, is associated with a company called Premium Supply. The trial court identified the following comments on the post as troubling:

Small [world] my auntie on jury duty for that[.⁴ ]

...

I ain't been d[o]wn there since last week ask her how it's looking[.⁵ ]

...

make sure she say not guilty n Iont even no bra but free em[.⁶ ]

...

She said it's not looking too good, but she wit[h] him[.⁷ ]

The trial court discussed with both parties the potential of extra-judicial contact with a jury member, and ordered the government to investigate the matter.⁸ The trial court then excused the jury for two days to allow the government to investigate the situation surrounding the social media posts.

The next day, the government advised the trial court that two individuals, whose names were not disclosed to the trial court and are not included in the record, were identified as the Instagram account holders for Premium Supply. Both knew appellant personally. The government advised that one of the individuals had been in court to watch the trial. Both individuals indicated to the government that they did not create the original Instagram comment authored by Premium Supply, and provided information of four other individuals allegedly with administrative access to Premium Supply's social media account. The government advised the trial court that it would continue investigating potential connections between any juror and the individuals with administrative access to the Premium Supply Instagram account.

Appellant then moved for a mistrial due to alleged jury misconduct for extra-judicial communications. The trial court, however, withheld ruling on appellant's motion at that time to allow the government to continue its investigation into the matter.

The following day, the government advised the trial court that its investigation did not produce evidence that any of the individuals associated with the Premium Supply account had contact with any member of the jury. The trial court, at that point, stated he was not inclined to grant appellant's motion due to a lack of any evidence supporting misconduct. The trial court then conducted a voir dire of each juror individually, inquiring whether they recognized a company called Premium Supply or any of the names associated with the "pr3miumsupply" account, and whether they had spoken to anyone about the case. All fourteen jurors responded that they had no such knowledge and had not spoken to anyone about the case.

Appellant renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing his right to an impartial jury had been impinged, and the government's investigation had neither confirmed nor disproved any connection or contact between a member of the jury and the individuals associated with Premium Supply. When asked if there was anything the defense would request the government do further, defense counsel responded, "I cannot think of what I would ask them specifically to do. ... So, Your Honor, I really can't." The trial court then denied appellant's motion for a mistrial, concluding there was no instance of jury tampering. The trial court found nothing more than an unverifiable, anonymous claim that a juror had disclosed something about the case to a third party, and had revealed a bias in favor of acquitting appellant. It also found that appellant acknowledged that the government had exhausted its investigative measures while delaying the trial for forty-eight hours.⁹

Following closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict convicting appellant on thirteen of the seventeen counts. The jury found appellant guilty of one count of AWIKWA, one count of AAWA, one count of ASBIWA, and three related counts of PFCV as to Mr. Grandson. The jury also convicted appellant of the same as it relates to Ms. Young, as well as one additional count of UPF. Following sentencing, this timely appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for aggravated assault while armed as to Mr. Grandson. We disagree and affirm the defendant's convictions. Appellant also argues that some of his convictions merge. We agree and remand to the trial court on that issue.

A. Denial of Motion for Mistrial

Appellant raises two related arguments in challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial: (1) that the trial court's inquiry of the jurors was inadequate; and (2) that the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating there was no jury tampering. We address these arguments in turn.

"[A] mistrial is a severe remedy, one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor[e]," and given to the broad discretion of the trial court. Bost v. United States , 178 A.3d 1156, 1191 (D.C. 2018) (cleaned up). Relatedly, "the determination of juror bias or prejudice," the premise of the motion for mistrial, "lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court." Bellamy v. United States , 810 A.2d 401, 408 (D.C. 2002) (cleaned up). "The remedy for allegations of juror partiality," including juror tampering, "is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." Young v. United States , 694 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted). Such a determination is "reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion, and the findings of fact underlying that determination are entitled to great deference." Bellamy , 810...