Hendrix v. Pactiv LLC

488 F.Supp.3d 43

Walter J. HENDRIX, Plaintiff,

v.PACTIV LLC, et al., Defendants.

19-CV-6419L

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 21, 2020

Walter J. Hendrix, Rochester, NY, pro se.

Stacey A. Bentley, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants Pactiv LLC, Alan Bellis, Larissa Willis.

Amy Habib Rittling, Vincent M. Miranda, Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants Masis Staffing Solutions, LLC, Todd Comfort, Jaye Diaz, Otto Pina.

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, United States District Judge Plaintiff Walter J. Hendrix, appearing pro se , instituted two actions in this Court: Hendrix v. Pactiv LLC , No. 6:19-cv-6419, and Hendrix v. Masis Staffing Solutions LLC, et al. , 6:19-cv-6624. Though the two actions named different defendants, both asserted various employment-related claims against his former employers, Pactiv LLC ("Pactiv") and Masis Staffing Solutions LLC ("Masis").

On February 5, 2020, District Judge Michael A. Telesca issued a Decision and Order in both cases ("Screening Decision"), following the Court's initial screening of the complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In that decision, Judge Telesca ordered that the two actions be consolidated, dismissed some of plaintiff's claims (either in their entirety or against certain defendants), and permitted four claims to go forward against seven defendants. Specifically, the Court allowed plaintiff to proceed on his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. ("ADA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq. ("HRL"). 2020 WL 562748, at *12-*13. The defendants who remained in the case were Pactiv, Masis, and five individuals: Alan Bellis, Larissa Willis, Todd Comfort, Jaye Diaz, and Otto Pina. Pursuant to Judge Telesca's order, plaintiff's consolidated amended complaint ("CAC") was filed on February 6, 2020. (Dkt. #8.)¹

Pactiv, Bellis and Willis have now moved (Dkt. #25) to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The other four defendants, who are represented by separate counsel, have not moved at this time. Plaintiff has filed papers in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the present Decision and Order, familiarity with Judge Telesca's February 5 Decision and Order is assumed. That decision sets forth the underlying facts, which will not be repeated here at length.

Plaintiff alleges that in late 2017, he began working for Pactiv, a manufacturing company. He apparently obtained the job through Masis, an employment agency.

During his time at Pactiv, plaintiff experienced several problems. These include an incident on January 19, 2018, in which plaintiff was allegedly injured in a workplace accident, and an incident on May 9, 2018 in which the machine on plaintiff's production line repeatedly malfunctioned. Plaintiff alleges that in both incidents, his supervisors refused to help him and behaved hostilely toward him.

On Saturday, July 7, 2018, plaintiff's wife was hospitalized. Plaintiff, who had signed up to work overtime that day, called in and left a voice message saying that he would not be in to work that day. On the morning of Monday, July 9, 2018, defendant Diaz, the work site coordinator for Masis, called plaintiff and told him that Pactiv had fired him.

As stated, the present motion is brought by Pactiv, Bellis and Willis. At all relevant times, Bellis was Pactiv's operations manager. Willis was plaintiff's immediate supervisor at Pactiv.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards on a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)

The moving defendants (hereinafter referred to simply as "defendants") have moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is addressed to the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court "must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, but jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it." Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. , 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd , 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). "The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc. , 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint and requires a court to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See , e.g. , Holmes v. Grubman , 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). To survive such a motion, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Those standards apply regardless of whether the plaintiff is represented by counsel, or appearing pro se. Although a pro se litigant's papers are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980), giving due regard to the plaintiff's lack of legal training, a plaintiff's pro se status does not render his pleadings immune from scrutiny. Even allowing for some liberality in the construction of the litigant's papers, "a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief." Meadows v. United Services, Inc. , 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Hogan v. Fischer , 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) ). "In other words, the ‘duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.’ " Stone v. 23^rd Chelsea Associates , 18-CV-3869, 2020 WL 1503671, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll. , 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ).

In addition, a court's decision allowing some claims to go forward at the initial screening stage does not insulate those claims from later review on a motion to dismiss. The court retains an inherent power to dismiss an action if it becomes apparent that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or that the action is meritless on its face. An initial screening decision permitting some claims to proceed does not amount to a judicial imprimatur endorsing the validity of those claims. See Sawyer v. NYSDOCS , No. 11-CV-152, 2015 WL 6641471, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015) ("dismissal of this claim is not barred by [its] earlier decisions" on initial screening); Wilson v. Medical Unit Officials , No 10-CV-1438, 2011 WL 6780934, at n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011) ("an initial screening does not preclude a later dismissal of the complaint, in whole or part, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). See also Cusamano v. Sobek , 604 F.Supp.2d 416, 435 n. 29 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), and cases cited therein.

II. ADA Claim

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability because of the disability" in the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A plaintiff asserting an ADA claim must allege and prove four elements: (1) the defendant is covered by the ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is regarded as suffering from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability or perceived disability." Capobianco v. City of N.Y. , 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff's ADA claim relates to the May 9, 2018 incident. He alleges that when the machine he was working on malfunctioned, he told a team leader that the machine had malfunctioned, that his trainer refused to help him, and that he, plaintiff, was legally blind, that his blood pressure was elevated, and that he had a headache. The team leader left and returned with Bellis, who said to him, "What's the problem?" Plaintiff told Bellis that he had disabilities, that he could not fix the machine because of his impaired vision, and that he was not getting any help. Essentially, plaintiff alleges that Bellis's response was to yell at plaintiff and tell him to "lose the attitude." Plaintiff alleges that he later told Willis what had happened, but his complaints went unaddressed.

In the initial screening decision, Judge Telesca stated, "The Court assumes for the sake of screening that Hendrix has plausibly alleged the first two elements of an ADA claim," and with regard to the third element, that "the Court has construed Hendrix's allegations broadly to assert that he requested assistance with repairing the tape machine when it malfunctioned on May 9, 2018, because he was unable to do it himself due to his vision impairment." 2020 WL 562748, at *6. As to the fourth...