Henrichs v. Ill. Law Enforcement Training & Standards Bd.

306 F.Supp.3d 1049

William J. HENRICHS, Myron S. Alexander, Robert Peluso, Joseph Rizzo, and Jeffrey L. Spicer, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND STANDARDS BOARD, Valerie L. Salmons, Patrick Hartshorn, John H. Schlaf, Tim Becker, Timothy Nugent, Laurel Lunt Prussing, Richard Watson, Brent Fischer, Tim Gleason, Darryl Stroud, Paul D. Williams, Jan W. Noble, Lisa Madigan, Garry McCarthy, Thomas Dart, Sean M. Cox, Dorothy Brown, Michael Schlosser, Leo Schmitz, and Donald Stolworthy, Defendants.

15 C 10265

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed January 26, 2018

Lucy Kirschinger, Attorney Consumer Counseling, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

T. Andrew Horvat, Chad Michael Skarpiak, Marie D. Spicuzza, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

In this putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, William Henrichs, Myron Alexander, Robert Peluso, Joseph Rizzo, and Jeffrey Spicer—all retired Cook County or DuPage County Sheriff’s Deputies—allege that the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board and Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 926C, by refusing to verify that they qualify for concealed carry permits as retired law enforcement officers. Doc. 54. The Board and Dart move under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. Docs. 58, 63. The complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), and because the grounds for dismissal cannot be cured, the dismissal is with prejudice.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion asserting a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, as in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept the operative complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations, with all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiffs' favor, but not its legal conclusions. See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States , 761 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2014) ; Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Plaintiffs' briefs opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts are set forth as favorably to Plaintiffs as those materials permit. See Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll. , 770 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act ("LEOSA"), 18 U.S.C. § 926C, gives retired law enforcement officers satisfying certain requirements the right, notwithstanding any state or local law to the contrary, to carry a concealed weapon. One such requirement is that the retired officer meet LEOSA’s definition of "qualified retired law enforcement officer." See id. § 926C(a), (c)(2). The other is that the retired officer possess an "identification," issued by the officer’s former law enforcement agency, that "identifies the person as having been employed as a police officer or law enforcement officer" and that certifies that the officer has recently had the requisite training. See id. § 926C(a), (d).

Illinois law commits to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board ("Board") the responsibility under the Illinois Retired Officer Concealed Carry ("IROCC") program to certify—or, as the case may be, to decline to certify—"qualified retired law enforcement officer[s]" for eligibility under the program. 50 ILCS 705/10 ; 20 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 1720.200 et seq. The term "qualified retired law enforcement officer" under the Board’s regulations incorporates the term "law enforcement officer" from the same regulations, which is defined to mean "any police officer of a governmental agency who is primarily responsible for prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of a criminal code or traffic or highway laws of any state or any political subdivision." 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1720.220. This definition of "law enforcement officer" mirrors the definition set forth in the Illinois Police Training Act, 50 ILCS 705/2, although, as will be seen shortly, it is narrower than LEOSA’s definition of "qualified retired law enforcement officer."

Henrichs, Alexander, Peluso, and Rizzo ("Cook County Plaintiffs") retired in good standing after at least ten years' service as Cook County Deputy Sheriffs. Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 10–16, 46. Each was assigned to correctional or court service. Id. at ¶ 44. In 2013 and 2014, each applied to the Board for IROCC eligibility. Id. at ¶¶ 157–165. The Board denied their applications in October 2015, explaining as to each that the Cook County Sheriff’s Office "indicated that he did not attend an approved law enforcement academy and therefore, he was not issued a law enforcement certificate" and could not "verify that he was a police officer under the definition of the [Illinois] Police Training Act and the corresponding IROCC rules." Docs. 54–2, 54–3, 54–4, 54–5.

Spicer retired in good standing after at least ten years' service as a DuPage County Deputy Sheriff, after having been assigned to correctional or court service. Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 18, 44, 46. The Board revoked Spicer’s IROCC eligibility in April 2016, informing him that "[s]ervice as a Correctional Officer does not meet the definition of law enforcement under Illinois law and Administrative Rules." Doc. 54–6.

Plaintiffs allege that the Board deprived them of their LEOSA right to carry a concealed firearm by refusing to verify that they are "qualified retired law enforcement officers." Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 181–195, 211–220. They also allege that the Board’s refusal violated their procedural due process rights by depriving them of their property interest in the concealed carry permits for which they applied. Doc. 67 at 7–15. Plaintiffs further allege that the Board violated the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily treating them differently from other Sheriff’s Deputies who received IROCC certification. Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 235–240. Finally, Cook County Plaintiffs allege that the Board and Dart conspired to deprive them of their federal rights. Id. at ¶¶ 241–254. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they qualify for concealed carry permits, an injunction directing Defendants to issue certifications to that effect, and damages. Id. at ¶¶ 210, 220, 237, 240, 254.

Discussion

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs premise federal jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives the district courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Doc. 54 at ¶ 4. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' LEOSA claims actually arise under state law because the crux of the suit is whether correctional and court officers like Plaintiffs qualify as "law enforcement officers" under Illinois law. Doc. 58 at 5; Doc. 63 at 7.

As an initial matter, Defendants' jurisdictional argument is of no moment. Plaintiffs' federal equal protection and procedural due process claims indisputably arise under § 1331, so even if their LEOSA claim were a state law claim, the court could entertain it under the supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The LEOSA claim is a federal claim in any event. Plaintiffs allege not that they meet the definition of "qualified retired law enforcement officer" under Illinois law, but rather that the Board’s refusal to certify them as qualified retired law enforcement officers for a concealed carry permit—whether or not correct as a matter of Illinois law—violates LEOSA. Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 34–35. A claim that a defendant violated a plaintiff’s federal rights gives rise to federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. , 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) ("In order to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the district courts original jurisdiction in federal-question cases....").

II. Merits

A. LEOSA Claim

The gist of Plaintiffs' LEOSA claim is that the Board (Dart can be ignored for present purposes) has adopted a narrower definition of "qualified retired law enforcement officer" than has LEOSA, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of the "right to carry concealed firearms" that LEOSA guarantees them. Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 70–72. LEOSA defines "qualified retired law enforcement officer," in relevant part, as "an individual who ... was authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any person for , any violation of law...." 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(2) (emphasis added). The emphasized language includes those individuals, like Plaintiffs, who served in corrections. The definition of "qualified retired law enforcement officer" under Illinois law is narrower; as noted above, it incorporates Illinois’s definition of "law enforcement officer," which in turn means "any police officer of a governmental agency who is primarily responsible for prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of a criminal code or traffic or highway laws of any state or any political subdivision." 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1720.220. Unlike the federal definition, the Illinois definition does not include officers who worked in a correctional environment.

That is precisely the ground on which the Board rested its denial of Plaintiffs' IROCC applications—Plaintiffs worked as Sheriff’s Deputies in corrections, not in any of the capacities referenced by the Illinois definition. Plaintiffs allege that the Board’s exclusion of them from the IROCC program violated...