Hicks v. Jackson County Com'n

374 F.Supp.2d 1084

Robert HICKS, Plaintiff, v. JACKSON COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.CV-03-S-2858-NE.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division.

June 23, 2005.

Sterling L Deramus, Birmingham, AL, Robert J Hayes, Hayes & Swinford PC, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.

Robbie Alexander Hyde, Ashley Hawkins Freeman, Webb & Eley PC, Montgomery, Al, John F Porter, III, John F Porter III PC, Scottsboro, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SMITH, District Judge.

Plaintiff Robert Hicks filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking redress for alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the laws.¹ He named as defendants his employer, the Jackson County, Alabama, Commission ("the Commission"), and the individual members of the Commission: Robert E. Smith; Ed Tubbs; and Glenda Hodges. Each individual defendant was sued both in his or her respective individual capacity, and in his or her official capacity as a County Commissioner.² All defendants filed a collective motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint³ and, because the motion was accompanied by matters outside the pleadings, the court converted the motion to one for summary judgment.⁴ Upon consideration of the motion, briefs,⁵ and evidentiary submissions,⁶ the court finds the motion is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides, in part, that summary judgment not only is proper, but "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis supplied). Thus, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995)); see also United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts either are not disputed, or are stated in the light most favorable to plaintiff.⁷

Plaintiff was employed by the Public Works Department (sometimes referred to as "the Department") of the Jackson County Commission from approximately March of 2002, to April of 2003.⁸ He was not a probationary employee and, thus, his employment could only be terminated for just cause.⁹ He commenced his employment in the position of "general laborer," but at the time of the incidents made the basis of this lawsuit he served in the position of "Highway Maintenance Technician 1st Class."¹⁰ His duties included working on crews to repair roads maintained by Jackson County and, on occasion, repairing the driveways of county residents.¹¹

The Public Works Department possesses the authority to pave or repair the driveways of county residents, as long as the repairs do not extend beyond the county's right of way.¹² The Department does not possess the authority to pave or repair any driveway located within the limits of a municipality in Jackson County.¹³ Even so, plaintiff states that the Department does not always operate within its limitations. According to plaintiff, the Department often repairs private driveways beyond the edge of the county's right of way, and it also repairs the driveways of county employees who live within the limits of a municipality.¹⁴

Plaintiff does not live within the limits of a municipality,¹⁵ and on at least three occasions he has used county materials and/or labor to repair his own driveway. First, in approximately March of 2002, plaintiff requested that the Public Works Department repair portions of his driveway that had been washed away by rain.¹⁶ Plaintiff's supervisor approved the request, and a crew from the Public Works Department repaired plaintiff's driveway.¹⁷ Plaintiff was not a member of that crew.¹⁸

The following week, portions of plaintiff's driveway were again washed away by rain.¹⁹ Plaintiff requested that the Public Works Department repair the driveway, and his supervisor approved the request.²⁰ In April of 2002, a crew from the Public Works Department made additional repairs to plaintiff's driveway.²¹ Plaintiff was a member of that crew.²²

Finally, in February of 2003, portions of plaintiff's driveway were, for yet a third time, washed away by rain.²³ Plaintiff and other members of his work crew used county materials to repair the driveway while they were working near plaintiff's home.²⁴ There is no indication that plaintiff obtained the approval of his supervisor, or any other Public Works Department official, prior to making this repair.

This series of events eventually led to the institution of disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff. In early February of 2003, the Commission received an anonymous letter that plaintiff "had misappropriated County Public Works monies and labor by having his driveway paved beyond the County's right of way."²⁵ On February 20, 2003, plaintiff received notice that a disciplinary hearing, which could lead to his termination, would be held on March 6, 2003.²⁶ At the hearing, plaintiff's supervisors testified that they had approved certain of the repairs to his driveway,²⁷ but they nevertheless recommended that he be "suspended for two weeks without pay and be required to reimburse the county for the work and materials expended in the repair of his driveway."²⁸ Following the hearing, the Commission voted to terminate plaintiff's employment with the county.²⁹ Plaintiff does not claim that any violation of his rights resulted from this hearing process.

The Jackson County Employee Manual establishes a two-step appeal process for employees who receive adverse employment decisions. First, the aggrieved employee may appeal to the Jackson County Personnel Board (the "Personnel Board"), which will hold a hearing on the employee's claims.³⁰ Then, "[a]ny person aggrieved by the decision of the [Personnel Board] may appeal such decision to the Circuit Court of Jackson County."³¹

In accordance with these procedures, plaintiff appealed the Commission's decision to the Personnel Board, which held a hearing on March 27, 2003.³² At this hearing, plaintiff's supervisors again testified that they had approved the repairs to plaintiff's driveway, and recommended that plaintiff be suspended rather than terminated.³³ Following the hearing, the Personnel Board found "that the Commission had violated Section VIII of the Personnel Handbook by preempting the responsibility of the County Engineer," and reported its decision to the Commission on April 3, 2003.³⁴ Plaintiff did not clarify the effect of the Commission's "violation" of Section VIII, and he did not provide the court with a copy of that section of the Employee Manual.³⁵ Nonetheless, the court concludes that the ultimate effect of the Personnel Board's decision was to overturn the termination of plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff does not claim that any violation of his rights resulted from the Personnel Board's hearing and decision.

Soon thereafter, members of the Commission requested the Personnel Board to change its decision that plaintiff should not be terminated, but the Personnel Board refused to do so.³⁶ On April 8, 2003, the Commission met again to consider plaintiff's employment status, but neither plaintiff nor his attorney was given notice of the meeting.³⁷ At the April 8 meeting, in plaintiff's absence, the Commission considered a written recommendation from plaintiff's supervisor that plaintiff be terminated.³⁸ This recommendation was contrary to the supervisor's prior recommendation that plaintiff merely be suspended. After hearing this evidence, the Commission again voted to terminate plaintiff's employment with the County, and it informed plaintiff of its decision in a letter dated April 9, 2003, upon the recommendation of the County Engineer.³⁹ Plaintiff does not explain the significance of obtaining the recommendation of the County Engineer, but the court presumes that the Engineer's recommendation would cure the deficiency found by the Personnel Board in its prior review. It is the process followed (or, perhaps more accurately stated, the process that was not followed) in conjunction with this April 8, 2003, meeting which forms the basis of plaintiff's due process claim.⁴⁰

Plaintiff did not appeal the Commission's April 8, 2003, decision to the Personnel Board. Instead, he appealed directly to the Circuit Court of Jackson County on August 7, 2003.⁴¹ He then filed this federal lawsuit on October 22, 2003, on which date the state court suit still was pending.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the Jackson County Commission and its individual members violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the law. The court will consider each of plaintiff's claims in turn.

A. Procedural Due Process

"The Due Process Clause is the...