In re B.E.

375 N.C. 730

851 S.E.2d 307

In the MATTER OF: B.E., J.E.

No. 11A20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed December 11, 2020

Perry, Bundy, Plyler & Long, LLP, Monroe, by Ashley J. McBride, for petitioner-appellee Union County Division of Social Services.

Winston & Strawn LLP, by John H. Cobb, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Sydney Batch, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant mother.

Jeffrey William Gillette, for respondent-appellant father.

BEASLEY, Chief Justice.

Respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal from the trial court's orders terminating their parental rights in the minor children "Justin"¹ and "Billy." We affirm.

I. Procedural History

Respondents have three children together: Justin, born in 2006; Billy, born in 2004; and Chaz, born in 2003. In November 2016, the Union County Division of Social Services (DSS) obtained nonsecure custody of respondents’ children and filed juvenile petitions alleging they were neglected and dependent. The petitions cited a Child Protective Services (CPS) report received on 29 September 2016 stating that Chaz came to school with a "busted lip" and said respondent-father had "backhanded him in the face and repeatedly hit him in the head with a fist" while intoxicated. The report indicated respondent-father regularly drank alcohol and became angry. It also described respondents’ children as frequently hungry due to the "minimal food" in the home and described the home as rat-infested and unkempt.

DSS's petitions further alleged that respondent-father admitted striking Chaz and agreed to refrain from physical discipline as part of a safety agreement. However, respondent-father refused to obtain a substance abuse assessment and failed to attend an assessment scheduled for 28 October 2016. After a social worker met with respondents, respondent-father participated in a substance abuse assessment on 3 November 2016 but refused to engage in the recommended treatment to address "his intensive history of abusing alcohol."

Finally, the petitions alleged DSS received another CPS report of respondent-father repeatedly striking Chaz on the head and knocking him to the ground while drinking alcohol on 7 November 2016. When a social worker met with respondents about the report, respondent-father refused to enter into a safety agreement to refrain from physical discipline, abstain from alcohol, or participate in substance abuse treatment. Respondents told DSS that they had no family support or alternative placement options for the children.

Upon the parties’ stipulation to facts consistent with the petitions’ allegations, the trial court adjudicated respondents’ children neglected and dependent juveniles on 7 February 2017. The court maintained the children in DSS custody and ordered respondent-father to abstain from alcohol, attend Alcoholics Anonymous, engage in substance abuse treatment through Daymark Recovery, attend parenting classes, complete the activities in his Out of Home Services Agreement with DSS, maintain a residence separate from respondent-mother, and submit to random alcohol screens. Respondent-mother was ordered to attend parenting classes, complete the activities in her Out of Home Services Agreement, and obtain a psychological and mental health evaluation and comply with any treatment recommendations. The court forbade both respondents to discuss the case with the children "at any time."

While awaiting an appropriate therapeutic placement for Chaz, the trial court authorized a trial home placement for the child with respondent-mother beginning in March 2017. At the initial review hearing on 3 May 2017, however, the court ordered Chaz removed from respondent-mother's home and returned to foster care. In its review order, the trial court found respondent-mother "was unable to get [Chaz] to the [school] bus on time" and had failed to administer the child's medication properly despite "multiple instructions" and DSS's provision of "medication bags ... with the correct amount of medication she needed to administer the medication each night." The court further found that, despite receiving food stamps and additional financial assistance, respondent-mother "cannot keep food in the home" and "has demonstrated an inability to manage her finances" to the detriment of the children; that respondent-mother's home "is in poor condition," infested with insects and rodents, and strewn with trash and soiled clothing; that "the clothing in [Chaz's] bedroom had dog feces mixed within it"; and that respondent-mother "sends [Chaz] to school in clothes that are dirty and too small for him." Although respondent-mother had completed a series of parenting classes, the court found she continued to make inappropriate promises and other statements about the case to the children and had otherwise failed to show "she is able to put what she has learned into effect."

With regard to respondent-father, the trial court found that he continued to drink alcohol, that he smelled of alcohol at his visits with the children, and that he had informed DSS "he would cut back on drinking but would never quit completely" but "the changes he would be making would be temporary only because of DSS involvement."

At the initial permanency planning hearing held 21 March 2018, the trial court concluded that further DSS efforts to reunify the children with respondents "clearly would be futile, unsuccessful and inconsistent with the [children's] health and safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time." The court established a primary permanent plan of adoption for the children with a secondary plan of custody or guardianship with an approved caretaker.

DSS filed a motion for termination of respondents’ parental rights on 14 May 2018. After a series of continuances, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing beginning on 27 February 2019, proceeding over four dates, and concluding on 8 May 2018. On 24 September 2019, the court entered an order adjudicating the existence of grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights for (1) neglect, (2) willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal from the home, and (3) dependency.

The trial court held a dispositional hearing on 27 September 2019. In an order entered on 25 October 2019, the court concluded that terminating respondents’ parental rights was in the best interests of Justin and Billy but not in the best interests of Chaz. The court terminated respondents’ parental rights in Justin and Billy and dismissed DSS's motion as to Chaz. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) – (b) (2019).

Respondents each filed timely notice of appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1) (2019). We consider their appeals in turn.

II. Respondent-Mother's Appeal

Respondent-mother claims the trial court erred in concluding that grounds exist to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) and (6). "We review a trial court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 ‘to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.’ The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal." In re A.L.S. , 374 N.C. 515, 519, 843 S.E.2d 89 (2020) (quoting In re C.B.C. , 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692 (2019) ). We have held that "an adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights." In re E.H.P. , 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49 (2019). Therefore, if we determine that one of the trial court's adjudicated grounds for termination is supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, we need not review the remaining grounds. Id.

The trial court concluded, inter alia , that respondent-mother had neglected the children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A juvenile is "neglected" within the meaning of our Juvenile Code if he does not receive "proper care, supervision, or discipline" from his parents or "lives in an environment injurious to [his] welfare." N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). "In order to constitute actionable neglect, the conditions at issue must result in ‘some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment.’ " In re K.L.T. , 374 N.C. 826, 831, 845 S.E.2d 28 (2020) (quoting In re Stumbo , 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255 (2003) ).

For purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1),

"the dispositive question is the fitness of the parent to care for the child ‘at the time of the termination proceeding.’ " In the event that "a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing, ‘requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to show that the child is currently neglected by the parent would make termination of parental rights impossible.’ " In such circumstances, the trial court may find that a parent's parental rights in a child are subject to termination on the grounds of neglect in the event that the petitioner makes "a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent."

In re S.D. , 374 N.C. 67, 73, 839 S.E.2d 315 (2020) (quoting In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. 71, 80, 833 S.E.2d 768 (2019) ).

In support of its adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the trial court recounted the conditions leading to the children's prior adjudication as neglected on 7 February 2017. As respondent-mother states in her brief, "[t]he children were removed from the custody of their parents primarily due to the father's alcohol abuse and improper discipline. The trial court also noticed issues with the cleanliness of the home." The court also made findings detailing the causes of Chaz's failed trial home placement with respondent-mother in the spring of 2017.²

Respondent-mother argues that, given the progress she and respondent-father had made at the time of the termination hearing, the evidence and the trial court's findings of fact do not...