In re Mindy F.

153 Conn.App. 786

105 A.3d 351

In re MINDY F.^*

No. 36696.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 15, 2014.

Decided Nov. 20, 2014.^**

Alison P. Gaston, for the appellant (respondent father).

Renée Bevacqua Bollier, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Thomas B. Pursell, for the minor child.

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and SHELDON and DUPONT, Js.

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The respondent father, Jason F. (father), appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights as to his child, Mindy F.¹ On appeal, the father claims that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a–112 (j)(3)(B)(i) ; (2) determined that the termination of his parental rights was in Mindy's best interest; (3) denied his motion to transfer guardianship to the child's paternal great aunt; and (4) approved a permanency plan calling for the termination of his parental rights before holding a full evidentiary hearing on that issue, as required by General Statutes § 46b–129 (k)(1). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On April 15, 2011, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), filed a neglect petition alleging, inter alia, that Mindy was being denied proper care and was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her wellbeing. Mindy, who was born in January, 2010, was approximately fourteen months old at the time. On September 2, 2011, the commissioner filed a motion for temporary custody, alleging that Mindy had been injured as a result of an automobile accident.² The commissioner further alleged that Mindy's mother, who was a passenger in the car at the time of the accident, was under the influence of alcohol at that time. At the time of the accident, the father was incarcerated. The court granted the motion and issued specific steps for the father to take in order to reunify him with Mindy. He was also advised of the need to comply with the specific steps.

Mindy was adjudicated neglected by the court on December 6, 2011.³ On January 30, 2012, the father, who had been released from prison, was arrested for possession of narcotics, and sentenced to one year in prison. Mindy was committed to the care and custody of the commissioner on March 5, 2012. On June 1, 2012, the commissioner filed a motion to review the permanency plan for Mindy that contemplated the termination of the father's parental rights and her subsequent adoption (initial permanency plan). The court approved the initial permanency plan on August 6, 2012, and ordered the commissioner to file a petition for termination of parental rights within sixty days. On October 5, 2012, the commissioner filed such a termination petition. On November 15, 2012, the father filed a motion seeking to transfer guardianship and custody of Mindy to her paternal great aunt, who had been granted intervenor status by the court. On May 3, 2013, the commissioner filed a motion to review a second permanency plan that continued to contemplate termination of the father's parental rights and a subsequent adoption (second permanency plan). The father filed an objection to the second permanency plan on June 13, 2013.

The hearings on the motion to transfer guardianship and the motion to review the second permanency plan were consolidated with the termination of parental rights trial. The consolidated proceedings began on September 9, 2013, and then continued on September 10 and 12, 2013, and January 15 and 29, 2014. On January 29, 2014, the commissioner requested that the court approve the second permanency plan. At that point in the consolidated proceedings, the commissioner had rested, but the father had not yet begun to present his evidence. Before ruling, the trial court inquired whether “anyone want[ed] to be heard on the [second permanency] plan.” In response, the father stated to the court that he had “filed an objection to the plan earlier on and I still object to the plan.”⁴ The father, however, did not request the opportunity to offer any witnesses in support of his objection before the court ruled. The court overruled the objection and approved the second permanency plan. The father then presented his evidence and a posttrial brief in opposition to the termination petition.

At the conclusion of the termination trial, the court issued a written memorandum of decision, outlining its findings. As to the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children and Families (department) “ha[d] made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but that the [father is] unwilling or unable to fully benefit from reunification services at this time,” and that the father had “failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would foster the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, [he] could assume a responsible position in the child's life.”

As to the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the court first considered and then made written findings pursuant to § 17a–112 (k). Specifically, the court found that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunite Mindy and the father, and that the services offered were “timely and extensive.” The court also concluded that the father had been incarcerated for a “good part of the time” and, as a result, was unable to comply with the specific steps. In addition, the court determined that Mindy had been residing with her foster mother since September 2, 2011, and that her emotional attachment to her birth parents was “unclear.” Ultimately, the court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of Mindy. The court also denied the father's motion to transfer guardianship to the paternal great aunt. This appeal followed.⁵

We begin by setting forth the statutory requirements for granting a petition for the termination of parental rights. “A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists [by clear and convincing evidence], it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

“Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is limited to whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous.... A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.... [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the trial court's] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.... [An appellate court does] not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.... [Rather,] every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jah'za G., 141 Conn.App. 15, 30, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 329 (2013).

I

In his first claim, the father challenges the trial court's finding that he failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a–112 (j)(3)(B)(i). Specifically, the father claims that he has made significant progress in achieving sufficient personal rehabilitation by seeking out and successfully completing multiple substance abuse treatment programs, earning his general equivalency diploma, taking parenting classes, and obtaining gainful employment and stable housing. This progress, the father contends, establishes that he could have assumed a responsible position in Mindy's life, and that the findings of the trial court to the contrary are clearly erroneous. We disagree.

Pursuant to § 17a–112 (j)(3)(B)(i), the court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights only after it has determined, by clear and convincing evidence, inter alia, that the “parent ... has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child....”

“In making that determination, the proper focus is on the parent's demonstrable development in relation to the needs of the child. As we have observed: [i]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.... Furthermore, our courts are required to construe liberally the provisions of § 17a–112 in the best interest of the child for whom a petition has been filed, rather than the parent thereof.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 853–54, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008). Moreover, as our cases have held, “even if a parent has made successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life and may have achieved a level of stability within [his] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a responsible position in the life of [his] child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)...