In re P.R., 119,745

480 P.3d 778

In the INTEREST OF P.R., A Minor Child.

No. 119,745

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed February 12, 2021.

Rachel I. Hockenbarger, of Topeka, was on the briefs for appellant natural mother.

Morgan L. Hall, deputy district attorney, was on the briefs for appellee State of Kansas.

Jennifer Martin Smith, of Alderson, Alderson, Conklin, Crow & Slinkard, L.L.C., of Topeka, and Samantha R. Harrington, of Topeka, were on the briefs for appellees adoptive parents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Ward, J.:

We hold in this case that formal written acceptance by the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) is not required in order for a parent's relinquishment of parental rights to that agency to be valid. We find under the facts of this case that the mother's relinquishment of parental rights to DCF was valid, knowingly made, and effective to terminate her parental rights. And we agree that mother was afforded the procedural due process to which she was entitled.

HISTORY OF THE CHILD IN NEED OF CARE CASE

Proceedings in District Court

On March 30, 2015, the State filed a petition alleging that P.R., a child less than one year old at the time, was a child in need of care. The grounds asserted in the petition were lack of adequate parental care or control, as well as abuse or neglect. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 38-2202(d)(1)-(3). The petition alleged that the child's mother T.R. had been smoking marijuana in a motel room with P.R. present, left him there unattended for a period of time, and locked herself out of the motel room at some point with P.R. inside. T.R. admitted to law enforcement officers she had smoked methamphetamine several days earlier and was struggling to give up her drug habit. The petition further alleged that T.R. was receiving services from DCF under a Drug Endangered Children case management program, that she was on probation in Shawnee County for domestic battery, that she had prior convictions for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and that she was bi-polar but not receiving mental health services.

That same day the court held a temporary custody hearing. T.R. appeared in person without counsel. P.R. appeared by his guardian ad litem (GAL). Based on the contents of the petition, the court placed P.R. in the temporary custody of DCF after making findings of an emergency and the necessity for out-of-home placement.

On April 27, 2015, the case came on for adjudication. T.R. appeared with her attorney. P.R. appeared by his GAL. One of the two putative fathers named in the petition did not appear. According to the journal entry from that hearing, "the guardian ad litem and mother of the child did submit to the Court a stipulation or statement of no contest to the petition .... Upon inquiry the Court finds that it is knowingly and voluntarily offered and that there is a factual basis and accepts it." The court found P.R. to be a child in need of care based on the grounds alleged in the petition.

At the dispositional hearing held on July 20, 2015, T.R. was not present, but her attorney was present. P.R. appeared by his GAL. The court found that DCF or its contractor continued to make reasonable efforts toward the permanency goal of reintegration with the mother. Temporary DCF custody of P.R. with out-of-home placement continued.

On February 8, 2016, the court conducted a permanency hearing "to determine progress being made to achieve the current permanency plan goal(s) of reintegration." T.R. appeared in person and with her attorney. P.R. appeared by his GAL. Putative fathers did not appear. The district court found: the progress of the mother toward reintegration was adequate; P.R.'s needs were being met; and reintegration with the mother remained a viable goal. Previous orders of temporary DCF custody and out-of-home placement continued in effect. Another permanency hearing was scheduled for January 16, 2017.

In November 2016, the foster father filed a motion for interested party status on behalf of himself and his wife. He then filed an amended motion for interested party status on January 5, 2017. This motion asserted that P.R. had lived with the foster parents since March 30, 2015, when he was five weeks old, and that he had bonded with them during the 21 months he had been in their care.

On January 18, 2017, the State filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 38-2266(a) for a finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights or alternatively the appointment of a permanent custodian. The State's motion alleged a failure by the mother to make progress toward reintegration. It further alleged multiple positive urinalysis (UA) results, failure to appear for multiple UA appointments, lack of employment, inability to care for P.R., and other grounds. The motion noted the continuing absence of a known father and asserted that P.R. had been thriving in his foster home placement. Also, on January 18, 2017, P.R.'s maternal aunt and uncle filed a motion for interested party status.

That same date the court conducted its next permanency hearing in the case. T.R. was present with her counsel. The court noted that T.R. and her counsel had been served with the State's termination motion. P.R. appeared by his GAL. T.R. named two additional putative fathers during this hearing, but no putative father appeared. The court found that T.R.'s progress toward reintegration with P.R. was inadequate and that reintegration was no longer viable. The court found that adoption would be in P.R.'s best interests. The case plan goal was changed from reintegration to adoption. The foster parents' motion for interested party status was granted. The maternal aunt and uncle's motion for interested party status was not addressed at that time.

On March 30, 2017, two years to the day after P.R.'s removal from his mother's home, T.R. executed a written relinquishment of P.R. to the agency (DCF). T.R. signed the relinquishment form before a notary public. T.R.'s attorney approved the form and certified she fully explained to T.R. that "[T.R.] is permanently giving up all parental rights to the child and that [T.R.] has stated that such is her intention and desire."

The relinquishment form began with the following statement:

"NOTICE TO PARENT OR PERSON IN LOCO PARENTIS: This is an important legal document and by signing it you are permanently giving up all custody and other parental rights to the child named herein. You are to receive a copy of this document."

The relinquishment form recited biographical information about T.R. and P.R. It concluded with the following statements by T.R.:

"5. I do hereby relinquish the child to the Kansas Department of Children and Families, which I understand will have full power and all the rights of a legal guardian over the child, including the power to place the child for adoption and give consent thereto.

"6. I understand that by signing this relinquishment I do permanently give up all custody and other parental rights I have to such child, including the right to receive notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child. Understanding this, I wish to sign this relinquishment.

"7. At the time of signing this document, I am not under the care of a psychiatrist or other medical practitioner for any mental condition that would render me unable to make sound decisions, nor am I presently taking any medication or under the influence of any drug including alcohol that would impair my ability to understand or comprehend the significance or import or my relinquishment of the child identified above. I have been promised nothing in return for my relinquishment.

"8. I have read and understand the above and I am signing it as my free and voluntary act. Dated this 3/30/17 at 2:41 p.m."

On October 2, 2017, the court conducted a pretrial hearing on the termination of parental rights motion the State had filed in January. T.R. appeared with counsel. P.R. appeared by his GAL. The putative fathers appeared by counsel only. The foster parents appeared with counsel. The maternal aunt and uncle, who by this point had also been granted interested party status, appeared with their counsel. T.R. expressed her willingness to consent to a custodianship for P.R., but the State objected and urged the court to proceed with termination and the permanency of adoption. Trial on the termination motion was accordingly scheduled for January 16-17, 2018.

On January 8, 2018, just over a week prior to the trial at which the State would be asking the court to terminate the parental rights of T.R. and all putative fathers, the relinquishment form executed by T.R. on March 30, 2017, was filed in the record. It contained the signatures of T.R., her attorney Kathryn Gonzales, and it was notarized. The portion of the form showing acceptance of the relinquishment by DCF was not signed. However, an email from DCF's counsel which is included in the record indicates that DCF would accept T.R.'s relinquishment but, "a PRT trial was pending on father so we would not have accepted earlier."

On January 16, 2018, the termination of parental rights trial proceeded as scheduled. The State appeared by deputy district attorney Morgan Hall. The named and unknown putative fathers appeared by counsel, but none appeared in person. T.R. appeared with Gonzales. The court began the hearing by addressing T.R. and her counsel.

"The Court: So, the first issue is one of the permanency motion. Ms. Gonzales, your client has submitted a relinquishment, is that correct?

"Ms. Gonzales: That's correct, your honor."

Later in the hearing the following additional discussion occurred.

"The Court: Ms. Gonzales, anything else on behalf of your client?

"Ms. Gonzales: Your honor, we have no basis for which to object as to any unknown fathers. As far as the default.

"The Court: And her relinquishment stands.

"Ms. Gonzales: Yes. Ms. Hall and I double-checked with DCF last week, I believe it was.

"The Court: Very good.

"Ms. Gonzales: And, they sa

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