In re Ryan S.

797 A.2d 39

369 Md. 26

In re RYAN S.

No. 85, September Term, 2001.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 22, 2002.

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Celia Anderson Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued Before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, Judge.

The questions with which we are presented in this case involve, once again, the juvenile court practice that existed in Montgomery County when the juvenile court was part of the District Court, whereby adjudicatory hearings were commenced within the requisite time period pursuant to Rule 11-114 but were continued on non-consecutive trial dates over a period of months. Today, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner, Ryan S., waived his right to challenge the untimeliness of his adjudication; if error is found, we shall also consider whether the petitioner's motion for dismissal, or in the alternative, mistrial, should have been granted by the juvenile court due to violations of Rule 11-114b. Finally, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the juvenile court's order that Ryan and his mother, Linda S., pay restitution to the victim's insurer, Kaiser Permanente, in the amount of $10,000.00.

I. Statement of Facts

This case arises from an altercation between the petitioner, Ryan S., and the victim, Ronnie Dent, at the petitioner's home in Rockville, Maryland, on February 4, 1998. Dent, a 48-year-old man and cousin of Ryan's natural father, began a sexual relationship with Ryan's mother, Linda S., shortly after the death of Ryan's father. This relationship greatly upset Ryan, who was seventeen at the time of the altercation, and Ryan expressed his disapproval of the relationship to both Dent and his mother on several occasions. According to Dent, Ryan threatened to kill Dent a couple of times prior to their physical altercation.

The facts concerning the evening of February 4, 1998 were disputed. Both parties' versions agree, however, that at some point during the evening, Dent and Ryan began arguing.

Dent claimed that when he arrived at the home of Ryan and Linda S. on the evening of February 4, 1998, Ryan began yelling at Dent, exclaiming that he did not want Dent "coming around here, seeing my Mom." Dent testified that Ryan immediately grabbed a knife and moved toward Dent. To protect himself, Dent grabbed a vacuum cleaner and raised it to his shoulder. When Linda S. jumped in between them, Dent turned to put the vacuum cleaner down. As he was doing so, Ryan stabbed Dent in the back.

Ryan alleged that when he and Dent were arguing, Dent threatened to "crush him." Ryan further testified that Dent threw him to the ground and appeared to be reaching for something in his pocket. To protect himself, Ryan got up and ran to the kitchen to grab a knife. Dent then came after Ryan and again threw him into the ground, falling on top of him. The two struggled violently on the floor until, at some point, Dent exclaimed that he had been stuck with the knife. Ryan claimed that this was unintentional, that Dent "probably fell on it [the knife]."

Dent sustained serious injuries and was hospitalized as a result of the altercation.

II. Procedural History

Ryan turned himself into the police on May 11, 1998, and three days later, on May 14, 1998, he appeared before the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court.¹ The District Court ordered that Ryan be detained at the Alfred D. Noyes Children's Center ("Noyes") pending a "reverse waiver" hearing to determine whether his case would be heard in a juvenile or "adult" court.

On June 5, 1998, the petitioner was indicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for first degree assault and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. On June 10, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion to transfer his charges to juvenile court pursuant to Article 27, Section 594A.² The Circuit Court for Montgomery County held the "reverse waiver" hearing on August 10, 1998, and on August 14, 1998, ultimately granted the motion and ordered that the charges be transferred to juvenile court.

The State filed a petition in the District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court on August 20, 1998, charging Ryan with delinquency based on first degree assault, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. The State also sought the statutory maximum amount of restitution, $10,000.00, from Ryan and his mother for Dent's medical expenses.³

Ryan's adjudicatory hearing began on September 10 and continued on September 11, 1998. Pre-trial motions were heard and three of the State's witnesses testified.⁴ The adjudicatory hearing, however, was far from complete; the juvenile court scheduled the hearing to resume on December 13, 1998. Ryan contested both his continuing detention at Noyes⁵ and the duration of the delay between the hearings. The court refused to release Ryan and refused to move the adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date. As a result, Ryan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. At the habeas corpus hearing, the Circuit Court, without formally ruling, verbally directed that Ryan be released from Noyes and that the juvenile court re-schedule the date of the hearing for within thirty days of September 10, 1998.⁶ The juvenile court refused to honor the Circuit Court's instruction regarding scheduling, but ultimately did release Ryan from Noyes. Upon Ryan's release, the Circuit Court determined that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was moot and the petition was withdrawn.

The adjudicatory hearing resumed on December 14 and 15, 1998.⁷ When it became apparent, again, that the trial would not be completed during these scheduled dates, the court and counsel discussed scheduling issues again. The hearing was continued to January 13, 1999, and Ryan made no objection.

On the 13th of January, Ryan moved for a mistrial alleging that he had been denied his right to a fair trial due to the lengthy and disjointed nature of his adjudicatory hearing and because the recordings of the prior hearings were unintelligible, which he alleged was a violation of Rule 16 504.⁸ The motion for mistrial was denied, and the juvenile court resumed and completed the petitioner's adjudicatory hearing. The court found the petitioner not involved in first degree assault, but involved in second degree assault, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure.

To the extent necessary, a more detailed description of the procedural history and the pertinent portions of the transcripts of this case will be provided when discussing the issues presented below.

III. Discussion

A. Waiver

The Court of Special Appeals held that while the petitioner's complaint concerning the "protracted and disjointed nature of the proceedings in this case" was valid, the complaint, itself, was waived. See In Re Ryan S., 139 Md.App. 94, 111, 774 A.2d 1193, 1202 (2001). The intermediate appellate court asserted that the petitioner did not make a timely objection to the court's continuances and further claimed that any objection the petitioner did make was based on a violation of Rule 11-114b.2 and not Rule 11-114b.1, which was the basis upon which the motion for dismissal was argued.⁹ Id. at 111-12, 774 A.2d at 1202-03. We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals. The conclusion that the petitioner waived his right to appellate review of the timeliness and continuity of his trial is erroneous.

Contrary to that which the Court of Special Appeals alludes is necessary to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party need not, in every circumstance, recite a specific litany to constitute an objection to a trial ruling or course of action. Maryland Rule 4-323(c), applicable to criminal cases, provides in relevant part:

For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court.

As we stated in Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993), where defense counsel failed to make a specific motion but indicated his disagreement with the court's view on whether the reluctance of a juror (as demonstrated by polling) should be a factor in considering whether the verdict was defective, a party need only make known his "objection to the action of the court." Id. at 344, 619 A.2d at 550. See also Caviness v. State, 244 Md. 575, 578, 224 A.2d 417, 418 (1966)(stating that "unless a defendant makes timely objections in the lower court or makes his feelings known to that court, he will be considered to have waived them and he can not now raise such objections on appeal")(emphasis added).

Similarly, Maryland Rule 2-517(c), applicable to civil cases provides, in relevant part,

For purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court.

In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Theiss, 354 Md. 234, 729 A.2d 965 (1999), we discussed the historical development of Rule 2-517 and, quoting from a predecessor rule, Rule 17, noted that "[f]ormal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; ... it is sufficient that a party at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take...." Id. at 245, 729 A.2d at 971 (q...