J.D.I. v. State

77 So.3d 610

J.D.I.

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–10–0534.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

July 8, 2011.

Samantha Burt, Opelika, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Kristi O. Wilkerson, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

BURKE, Judge.

The appellant, J.D.I., pleaded guilty as a youthful offender to one count of obstructing justice by using a false identity, a violation of § 13A–8–194, Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve one year of supervised probation.¹

The evidence established that on July 26, 2010, Montgomery Police Officer Lonnie Barnes was on routine patrol in the Dalraida area of Montgomery when he passed a vehicle being driven by J.D.I. Officer Barnes noted that there was a large crack in the windshield running from below the tint line all the way across the windshield diagonally. ² Officer Barnes testified that he believed that the crack could potentially obstruct J.D.I.'s vision, depending on how he was positioned in the driver's seat. He also testified that he routinely stopped cars with cracked windshields to advise the drivers of the potential safety issues; he noted that a cracked windshield could easily shatter. Officer Barnes conducted a traffic stop to warn J.D.I. of the potential dangers involved in operating a motor vehicle with a cracked windshield.

Officer Barnes got out of his patrol unit and asked for J.D.I.'s driver's license and proof of insurance. J.D.I. stated that he did not have a driver's license. Officer Barnes testified that the traffic stop began to change from that point forward. Officer Barnes asked J.D.I. for his name, but the name he provided was not “on file.” (R. 5.) Officer Barnes then asked J.D.I. for his date of birth; a subsequent check of the database confirmed J.D.I.'s real name and the existence of several outstanding misdemeanor warrants. Officer Barnes was aware of at least one of the outstanding warrants because he had tried to serve the warrant himself. (R. 14.) J.D.I. insisted that the false name he had given to Officer Barnes was, in fact, his real name. Officer Barnes gave J.D.I. an oral warning for the cracked windshield and arrested him.³

At the suppression hearing, J.D.I. testified that there was a crack in the windshield that ran diagonally across the windshield. He denied that the crack covered the entire surface of the windshield and denied that the crack obstructed his vision in any way.

Tawanda Thrasher also testified at the suppression hearing. First, she testified that the crack in the windshield extended across the full surface of the windshield, but she denied that it obstructed the driver's view. She subsequently changed her testimony to state that the crack did not extend over the entire surface of the windshield.

J.D.I. claims that § 32–5–215(a), Ala.Code 1975, which provides that a windshield must be unobstructed, is unconstitutionally vague, and that Officer Barnes's reliance on § 32–5–215(a), Ala.Code 1975, to justify his traffic stop for the cracked windshield was a mistake of law that could not provide probable cause ⁴ for the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest.

I.

On appeal, J.D.I. contends that § 32–5–215(a), Ala.Code 1975, is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he argues that the statute does not make it a criminal act to drive a vehicle with a cracked windshield.

At the hearing on his motion to suppress, J.D.I. sought to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop. He argued that the statute relied upon by Officer Barnes criminalizes only windshield cracks that obstruct the driver's view; therefore, because Officer Barnes could not say with certainty that the crack in the windshield obstructed J.D.I.'s view, he should not have been stopped. He argued that because the statute is not phrased conditionally, i.e., “could obstruct the driver's clear view,” but rather is in the present tense, “obstructs the driver's clear view,” he did not violate it. Thus, he argued at the hearing, Officer Barnes's reliance on § 32–5–215(a) to justify the stop of the vehicle J.D.I. was driving was a mistake of law that could not provide reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest. The trial court denied J.D.I.'s motion to suppress, stating:

“I am denying the motion to suppress, [Defense counsel], because the officer had every reason to stop the vehicle. He has testified that the crack went all the way across. He went up there to tell the guy you have a cracked windshield. You know, that is a violation if it obstructs your view, which like you said maybe the court will say that's not a well-written law. Who knows what obstructs the view means. But we have got what we have got. The officer said it could obstruct his view. He had every reason at that point to say I need to see your driver's license.

“I agree with y'all. But I am not the one who can make the law about the windshield. That's got to go down the street. So the appellate courts can tell us. They might agree with you, Richard, and say, yeah, that is a vague law. It is not clear. We need to get rid of that law because I will put on the record we have had a lot of officers lately pulling folks over with cracked windshields. Do they pull everyone over? No. Do they pull you over every time? No. But the point is they are pulling folks over. And we—the courts need some guidance and the police officers need the guidance.”

(R. 39–40.)

Defense counsel argued, “But I just—you know, the law is clear that—it's clear that it's got to obstruct.” (R. 40.) ⁵ The trial court then continued and argued that the statute is unclear and stated that she “want[ed] the [C]ourt [of Criminal Appeals] to go even further and rule on whether someone can just be stopped if we have got just a crack on a passenger side or the muffler example because I would analogize that to just a person walking down the street.” ⁶ J.D.I. entered a guilty plea to the offense of obstruction of justice, reserving for appeal the issue argued during the hearing.

However, J.D.I. was not convicted of violating § 32–5–215; therefore he lacks standing to challenge its constitutionality.

In Peak v. City of Tuscaloosa, 73 So.3d 5 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), this court analogously stated:

“[B]ecause Peak was never charged with or convicted of violating § 13–51(6) [of the Tuscaloosa Municipal Code], he has no standing to challenge that section. See J.L.N. v. State, 894 So.2d 738, 741 n. 3 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ( ‘In addition to challenging § 15–20–26(b), Ala.Code 1975, under which he was indicted, the appellant also appears to argue that §§ 15–20–23, 15–20–25, and 15–20–26(a), (c), and (d), Ala.Code 1975, are unconstitutional. However, he was not charged with violating any of those provisions of the [Community Notification Act]. Therefore, he does not have standing to challenge those provisions, and we will not review his constitutional challenges regarding those provisions.’), rev'd on other grounds, 894 So.2d 751 (Ala.2004); and State v. Wilkerson, 54 Ala.App. 104, 105, 305 So.2d 378, 380 (1974) (‘ “As a general rule, in criminal prosecutions, accused has the right to assert the invalidity of the law, regulation, or rule under which he is being prosecuted [but] ... [a]n accused affected by one portion of a statute may not plead the invalidity of another portion of the same statute not applicable to his case ...” ’ (quoting 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 84)). See also Byrd v. State, 78 So.3d 445 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); and Taylor v. State, 442 So.2d 128 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).”

73 So.3d at 11.

Moreover, J.D.I. did not argue that the statute was unconstitutionally vague; his argument addressed whether the facts of his case fell within the purview of the statute, which prohibits driving a vehicle with an obstructed windshield. He argued that Officer Barnes had not proven that the crack obstructed his view, and he also argued that a crack in the windshield did not constitute a “nontransparent material” as required by the statute. In fact, defense counsel argued that the language of the statute was clear and that his facts did not indicate a violation of the unambiguous terms of the statute.

Therefore, the constitutionality of § 32–5–215, Ala.Code 1975, is not properly before this court.

II.

J.D.I. also argues that the State presented insufficient proof that Officer Barnes had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop.

“ ‘[B]ecause a routine traffic stop is a limited form of seizure, it is analogous to an investigative detention, and we have therefore held that a traffic stop will be governed by the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [ (1968) ].’ J.T.C. v. State, 990 So.2d 444, 447 (Ala.Crim.App.2008).

“ “ ‘ Terry sets up a two-prong test of the reasonableness of investigatory detentions and weapons searches. First, we must decide whether the detention was justified at its inception.... Second, the officer's actions must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. At both stages, the reasonableness of the officer's suspicions is judged by an objective standard taking the totality of the circumstances and information available to the officers into account.” United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.2004) (quotations and citations omitted).’

“ United States v. Sanchez, 519 F.3d 1208, 1212–13 (10th Cir.2008).”

State v. Ellis, 71 So.3d 41, 45 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). See State v. Davis, 7 So.3d 468, 470 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“ ‘ “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), requiring only that the detaining officers “have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person detained of criminal activity,” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (A...