J.K.J. v. City of San Diego

J.K.J., individually, and successor in interest to the Deceased,ALEAH JENKINS, by and through his guardian-ad-litem, JEREMY HILLYER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-2123-CAB-RBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 13, 2020

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 7]

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion has been fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on February 13, 2020. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I. Allegations in the Complaint

On November 27, 2018, Defendant San Diego Police Officers Lawrence Durbin, Nicholas Casciola, and Jason Taub pulled over a vehicle in the La Jolla neighborhood of San Diego for having an expired registration. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 36.] Aleah Mariah Jenkins was a backseat passenger in the vehicle. [Id.] During the stop, Jenkins was responsive and answered questions posed by the officers. [Id. at ¶ 28.] She also "complied with [the officers'] request that she be handcuffed, and she gave [them] permission . . . to search her and her belongings." [Id.]

At some point, Jenkins was placed in a patrol car where she began vomiting. [Id. at ¶ 30.] One of the officers asked Jenkins if she was "withdrawing" and told her to stick her head out of the car window. [Id.] In response, Jenkins told Durbin that she was sick and was pregnant. [Id.] Durbin then told one of the other officers, "don't worry about it." [Id.]

After Jenkins had vomited on herself, Durbin told her that "because she had once been arrested on her twin sister's warrant, he needed to take her downtown to police headquarters for fingerprinting." [Id. at ¶ 32.] Jenkins then asked Durbin for a napkin and some water, and Durbin responded that he did not have anything to give her but that he would get her some water when they got to the watch commander. [Id.] Durbin then began driving Jenkins to San Diego Police headquarters in downtown San Diego. [Id. at 34.]

During the drive to police headquarters, Jenkins complained of feeling sick and asked Durbin for water several times. [Id. at 35.] She repeatedly asked Durbin for help, and at one point screamed in distress and said, "Please, help me!" [Id.] Durbin "ignored her repeated pleas for help and dismissed them." [Id. at ¶ 37.] He also asked Jenkins "What's going on?" and "What are you doing?" [Id. at ¶ 38.] At one point during the drive, Durbin got out of the car and reprimanded Jenkins, telling her "to knock it off" and telling her, "you're fine." [Id. at ¶ 39.] During this stop, Durbin opened the door to the patrol car which cause Jenkins to partially fall out of the car. [Id.] Durbin "pushed her body back into the back seat and slammed the vehicle door on her." [Id.]

The drive to police headquarters took over an hour. [Id. at ¶ 40.] During the drive, Durbin did not "summon medical care, request assistance from other officers, inform dispatch that [Jenkins] may need medical attention, and/or take [Jenkins] to any number of hospitals on the route." [Id.] Upon arrival at police headquarters, when Durbin opened the back door to his patrol car, Jenkins began screaming for help, to which Durbin responded, "Stop hyperventilating. You're doing that to yourself." [Id. at ¶ 41.] He also told her she was "faking it" and that it could lead to another charge if she continued to resist." [Id.]

Durbin then pulled Jenkins out of the patrol car and laid her on the ground. [Id. at ¶ 42.] He took Jenkins fingerprints while she was on the ground and placed her back intothe patrol car. [Id.] Some time later, Durbin returned to the patrol car to check on Jenkins. [Id. at ¶ 43.] He then summoned medical attention, stating "I can't tell if she is breathing or not." [Id.] Jenkins subsequently went into a coma and then died on December 6, 2018. [Id. at ¶ 44.]

On December 13, 2019, Jenkins' minor son, J.K.J., through his biological father and general guardian Jeremy Hillyer, filed this lawsuit, naming Casciola, Taub, and Durbin in their individual capacities, David Nisleit, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as chief of police for the San Diego Police Department, and the City of San Diego, as defendants. Defendants now move to dismiss the entire complaint or in the alternative to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

II. Legal Standard for Motions to Dismiss

The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss apply here. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the Court "required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

The complaint asserts six claims—four under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and two under California state law. The four § 1983 claims are labeled: (1) unreasonable search and seizure—detention and arrest; (2) unreasonable search and seizure—denial of medical care; (3) municipal liability for unconstitutional custom or policy; and (4) deprivation of life without due process. The third claim is made against the City and Police Chief Nisleit, while the other three are against Officers Casciola, Taub, and Durbin. The complaint also asserts a claim for negligence under California Government Code § 820 and California common law against all defendants, and a claim for failure to summon immediate medical care under California Government Code § 845.6 against the City and Officers Casciola, Taub, and Durbin.

A. Survival Claims versus Wrongful Death Claims

A fundamental flaw in the complaint concerns its failure to distinguish between Jenkins' claims that survive her death (if any), commonly referred to as "survival claims," and claims of J.K.J. for his injuries resulting from Jenkins' death, commonly referred to as "wrongful death" claims. The complaint categorizes each of the six claims as being both a survival and wrongful death claim.

1. Survival Claims

"In a survival action, a decedent's estate may recover damages on behalf of the decedent for injuries that the decedent has sustained. In a wrongful death action, by comparison, the decedent's dependents may only pursue claims for personal injuries they have suffered as a result of a wrongful death." Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir.1994)). "[U]nlike a wrongful death action, a survival action is a cause of action that existed while the decedent is alive and survives the decedent." Adams v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 4th 71, 78-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). "A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent's death, and if state law authorizes a survival action." Tatum v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006). "The party seeking to bring a survival action bears the burdenof demonstrating that a particular state's law authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state's requirements for bringing a survival action." Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's survival claims, the complaint must satisfy California's requirements.

"California's statutory requirements for standing to bring a survival action are stated under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30: 'A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest ..., and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest.'" Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1229; see also Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1093 n.2 ("Where there is no personal representative for the estate, the decedent's 'successor in interest' may prosecute the survival action if the person purporting to act as successor in interest satisfies the requirements of California law. . . ."). Here, J.K.J. alleges that he is Jenkins' successor in interest pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(a). Section 377.60(a), however, concerns standing for wrongful death actions. Stennett v. Miller, 34 Cal. App. 5th 284, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32, a survival action in California must be accompanied by an affidavit including, among other things, "[i]f the decedent's estate was administered, a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedent's cause of action to the successor in interest," along with facts supporting statements that the affiant is either the decedent's successor in interest or is authorized to act on the successor in interest's behalf, in the action. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.32(4)-(5). Contrary to Plaintiff's opposition brief, this requirement has not been satisfied here through Jeremy Hillyer's declaration...