James v. State

555 S.W.3d 254

Cedric Levone JAMES, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-18-00032-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: June 21, 2018

Date Decided: July 19, 2018

Troy A. Hornsby, Miller, James, Miller & Hornsby, LLP, Texarkana, TX, for Appellant.

Laura M. Carpenter, Assistant District Attorney, Marshall, TX, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

In a jury trial, Cedric Levone James was convicted for evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle. After James pled true to the State’s enhancement allegation, he was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, James argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial that he was a registered sex offender who had previously evaded arrest. Because we conclude that (1) there was no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence that James had previously evaded arrest and (2) James was not harmed by the admission of evidence that he was a sex offender, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

(1) There Was No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting Evidence that James Had Previously Evaded Arrest

Justin Clark, a patrol officer with the Marshall Police Department (MPD), testified that, on January 13, 2017, he attempted to pull over a white 2006 Nissan Altima after it failed to signal a turn at an intersection. Instead of yielding to Clark’s lights and sirens, the vehicle sped off, leading Clark on a chase at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour through residential areas. Video of the chase demonstrated that the Nissan was occupied by three men, including Anthony Gatson.

Gatson, who had been convicted of multiple felonies and was incarcerated at the time of trial, explained the events leading up to the chase. He testified that his friend, Donald Ray Green, was "down on his luck" and requested that Gatson assist him in stealing from several local businesses. Gatson agreed, and the duo hatched a plan to commit several thefts throughout town. Green introduced him to a man named "Ced," who drove Gatson and Green around town while they executed their plan.

Gatson testified that he was in the car when police attempted to make the stop and that "Ced" drove off against Gatson’s will, leading MPD on the high-speed chase that ended at a railroad track after a passing train blocked their getaway. While "Ced" escaped from the vehicle and ran away, Gatson and Green were apprehended by police and arrested. Video of the incident showed that one of the vehicle’s occupants had thrown a bag of drugs from the window and that drug paraphernalia was found in the car after the apprehension. At trial, Gatson was equivocal when asked to identify James as the driver, stating merely, "He look[s] like the dude, but ... I'm not really sure."

Because the chase occurred late at night, Clark could not then clearly see the Nissan’s driver, who successfully escaped the scene before the other occupants were apprehended. The video recording included no image of the driver. However, both Clark’s testimony and the video of the incident demonstrated that Gatson, when questioned by MPD, identified the driver of the vehicle as James. Additionally, Clark testified that the license plates on the car were registered to James.

Through James' questioning of both Gatson and Clark, James implied that Gatson, in an attempt to save himself, spoke James' name on the night of the incident not because he actually knew him to be the driver, but because the name was suggested to him by Green and the MPD. Gatson testified that (1) he heard Green tell police that the driver’s full name was Cedric James, (2) MPD repeated the name to him, (3) he merely recited James' name to MPD when asked, and (4) he did not know whether the driver was actually James. However, Clark testified that Gatson identified James before his name was spoken by anyone.

To that point during the trial, Green had not complied with the State’s subpoena requiring his presence, leaving only Gatson’s and Clark’s testimony on the element of identity. As a result, the State asked the trial court to allow Clark to testify that James was a registered sex offender who had failed to register his vehicle with his compliance officer. Counsel objected to the State’s introduction of this evidence on the grounds that it was irrelevant, that it constituted an inadmissible extraneous offense, and that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State responded that it needed to introduce the evidence to explain why James would have a motive for evading arrest. Over those objections, the trial court permitted Clark to testify that James was a registered sex offender who was required, but failed, to inform his compliance officer that he was driving the 2006 Nissan Altima.

For purposes of showing modus operandi , the State then sought to introduce the testimony of Cory Adkinson, a patrol officer who attempted to stop the same vehicle twenty days before the incident in this case. The State informed the trial court:

[T]he same vehicle ran the same route, [the] driver got stopped at the same train tracks, [and he] jumped out and ran down the same path....

And he’s going to testify that about two hours later, Cedric James called in and reported his car was stolen, and he—when he went over there to take the report from him, that he was wearing the same pants as the man that had got out and ran away, but he had taken off his shirt and his jacket.

James objected on grounds of "relevancy, as to speculation" and that the probative value of Adkinson’s testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. James further added that the evidence failed to establish modus operandi because, unlike the prior incident, James had not reported the car stolen on January 13. The trial court overruled James' objections.

Adkinson, an officer with MPD, testified that, on December 29, 2016, he observed a white 2006 Nissan disregard a stop sign and evade arrest when Adkinson tried to initiate a traffic stop. He added that the driver sped from "Norwood to Highbridge to Ralph Street to Evans Street" and to the train tracks, a strikingly similar route to the one taken January 13. Adkinson testified that the driver abandoned the vehicle and fled on foot when he came across the train tracks. Although he was unable to detain or locate the driver, whom Adkinson described as an African-American male in a dark-colored jacket and pants, the car’s license plates were registered to James. According to Adkinson, he received a call from James, who reported that his car had been stolen. When Adkinson spoke to James about his stolen car, he noticed that James, an African-American male, was wearing dark-colored pants. After watching MPD’s video of the January 13, 2017, incident, Adkins testified that the driver who evaded arrest December 29, 2016, escaped using the same route.

Green appeared in the courtroom by the time Adkinson had concluded his testimony. Green, who had been convicted of five felony offenses and had been in prison for most of his life, testified that he paid James to drive Gatson and him in James' white car on January 13. Green said that he had never met James before the incident and that he still did not know his full name. However, Green positively identified James as the driver who evaded arrest.

"A trial judge’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and will not be reversed if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement." Tillman v. State , 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Davis v. State , 329 S.W.3d 798, 813–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Russeau v. State , 291 S.W.3d 426, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ). Abuse of discretion occurs only if the decision is "so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree." Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; see Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court. Moses v. State , 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.

De La Paz v. State , 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

a. Rule 104(b)

When called on to rule on admission of extraneous-offense evidence during guilt/innocence, the trial court must initially decide, under Rule 104(b), whether a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that the extraneous offense was committed. Fischer v. State , 268 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Harrell v. State , 884 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ). Citing Rule 104(b) and his initial "speculation" objection, James contends that the trial court erred in its assessment. However, we conclude that James has failed to preserve any Rule 104(b) issue for our review on appeal.

When, as in this case, "the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later." TEX. R. EVID. 104(b). A trial court may admit questioned evidence as conditionally relevant, carrying along the proponent’s accompanying duty to establish that relevancy at a later time. Rawlins v. State , 521 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd) (citing Powell v. State , 898 S.W.2d 821, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ). In such a case, if the sponsor of the evidence fails to later establish relevancy, the opponent must renew his original objection to the evidence and request that the trial court instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. Id. (citing Powell , 898 S.W.2d at 829 ). Without such an objection, no complaint is preserved for appellate review. Id. at 868–69 (c...