Johnson v. Bronson

830 N.W.2d 595

2013 ND 78

Carol J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.Natalya BRONSON, M.D.; Prairie St. John's Fargo, LLC, dba Prairie St. John's Hospital; B.R. Clark, R.N., Steven Mottinger; John Does 1–100; Jane Does, 1–100, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20120239.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 14, 2013.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 2013.

Carol J. Johnson, self-represented, Fargo, ND, plaintiff and appellant.

Randall S. Hanson (on brief) and Donna M. Smith (argued), Grand Forks, ND, for defendants and appellees Natalya Bronson, M.D.; Prairie St. John's Fargo, LLC; B.R. Clark, R.N.; John Does 1–100; and Jane Does 1–100.

James S. Hill (argued) and Kara J. Johnson (appeared), Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee Steven Mottinger.

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Carol Johnson appeals from a judgment denying her motions for summary judgment, motion to amend her complaint, and granting the defendants' summary judgment motions for various claims related to her involuntary hospitalization. Johnson also appeals from an order denying her motion for reconsideration and an order denying her objections to the district court's award of costs and disbursements to the defendants. We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] In 2009, Johnson, a formerly licensed attorney in California, representing herself, sued Dr. Natalya Bronson, Registered Nurse B.R. Clark, Prairie St. John's Hospital, (“Prairie”), John Does 1–100, Jane Does 1–100 (collectively “Medical Defendants”), and Attorney Steven Mottinger after being involuntarily hospitalized. Johnson asserted claims of: (1) negligence of physician; (2) negligent credentialing and supervision of physician by hospital; (3) negligent credentialing and supervision of the nurse and other employees by hospital; (4) malicious credentialing and supervision of physician and other staff members by hospital; (5) vicarious liability of hospital; (6) false imprisonment; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) alternative liability of hospital in respondeat superior-intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) legal malpractice.

[¶ 3] In 2007, Johnson interviewed in Bismarck for a position with the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigations. Johnson claims that during the interview, she “sensed a radio frequency or other device which created for her what she termed to be ... ‘electronic hazard[s].’ ” ¹ Upon returning home from the interview, Johnson reported the “electronic hazards” to the North Dakota Attorney General's Office. Johnson believed these “electronic hazards” were intended to harm her and her son and evidenced the commission of crimes. Johnson began contacting local law enforcement to report the “electronic hazards” because she was concerned with enforcement of laws proscribing the “electronic hazards.” Law enforcement contacted Johnson's son and encouraged him to have Johnson visit Prairie, a psychiatric and chemical dependency center in Fargo, to discuss her concerns. On July 18, 2007, Johnson and her son visited Prairie and spoke with staff members.

[¶ 4] After meeting with staff, Johnson was involuntarily detained under N.D.C.C. § 25–03.1–25 as a “person requiring treatment.” Registered Nurse B.R. Clark, a mental health professional, signed the application for emergency admission. On July 19, 2007, Dr. Natalya Bronson performed an evaluation and concluded Johnson was experiencing paranoia and had a delusional disorder. Dr. Bronson's evaluation stated that “there exists a serious risk of harm ... and substantial likelihood of ... substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in dangerousness to that person, others, or property” and no less restrictive alternative to hospitalization existed. Dr. Bronson also noted Johnson had a thyroid enlargement, possibly causing her condition. A petition for Johnson's involuntary commitment was filed.

[¶ 5] On July 20, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held in accordance with N.D.C.C. ch. 25–03.1 to determine if there was probable cause to involuntarily hospitalize Johnson as a “person requiring treatment.” Attorney Steven Mottinger represented Johnson at the hearing. Before the hearing, Mottinger met with Johnson to discuss her case. According to Johnson, Mottinger “exhibited the conduct of ‘electronic hazards' ” when they met. Mottinger testified in a deposition that Johnson told him he was “emitting electronic hazards” and refused to speak with him. At the hearing, Dr. Bronson testified that Johnson was mentally ill and was a person requiring treatment. Dr. Bronson recommended that Johnson be held for a period of up to fourteen days. In contrast, Johnson testified that she was not suffering from a mental illness and, because the electronic hazards she reported constituted crimes, it was her civic duty to report them. The court determined probable cause existed to hospitalize Johnson. Johnson was returned to Prairie; however, she refused all medications and recommendations of the treatment team. On July 24, 2007, Prairie discharged Johnson, reporting: “[Johnson] is not following the recommendations of the treatment team ... but [Johnson] is not gravely disabled, a danger to herself, or danger to others at this time, so we are discharging her against medical advice.”

[¶ 6] In 2009, Johnson commenced this action. Her claims against the Medical Defendants essentially asserted that because “[a]t all material times, [she] was without mental defect or disease of any kind whatsoever,” the Medical Defendants had no authority to involuntarily commit her. Johnson's claims against Mottinger asserted that he committed legal malpractice in his representation of Johnson and was also liable for false imprisonment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Johnson alleged that, as a result of Mottinger and the Medical Defendants' conduct, she was subjected to numerous electronic hazards and suffered “severe and serious injuries and monetary damages.” Johnson sought compensatory damages for costs related to medical care and treatment, pain and suffering, and the “loss of the enjoyment of life.” Johnson sought damages in excess of $10,000,000 for lost wages and reduced earning capacity, asserting her ability to reenter the legal profession had been destroyed due to the stigma of being civilly committed.

[¶ 7] In November 2011, Mottinger moved for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss Johnson's legal malpractice claim against him. Johnson responded and moved for summary judgment against Mottinger. In December 2011, the Medical Defendants made multiple motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment on Johnson's various claims and issues. Johnson responded and moved for summary judgment against the Medical Defendants. Mottinger also joined in the Medical Defendants' summary judgment motions related to noneconomic and economic damages. Johnson then moved to amend her second amended complaint to identify some of the John and Jane Doe defendants by name and to seek punitive damages.

[¶ 8] On March 20, 2012, in a 40–page memorandum decision and order, the district court denied Johnson's summary judgment motions and her motion to amend her complaint and granted Mottinger and the Medical Defendants summary judgment motions. The district court also awarded Mottinger and the Medical Defendants costs and disbursements. Johnson objected to the costs and disbursements award. The court denied her objections. Johnson appealed the district court's summary judgment decisions, award of costs and disbursements, and “all other orders adverse to the Plaintiff in this proceeding....” Johnson also moved for reconsideration of the March 20, 2012, order under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60 and submitted a 108–page brief in support of her motion. The district court subsequently decided that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Johnson's Rule 60 motion because Johnson had filed a notice of appeal. In June 2012, Johnson moved this Court to remand this case to the district court. On remand, the district court denied Johnson's motion for reconsideration, concluding Johnson had failed to put forth grounds for relief under Rule 60. Johnson then appealed the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration.

II

[¶ 9] Our standard for summary judgment is well-established:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.

Golden v. SM Energy Co., 2013 ND 17, ¶ 7, 826 N.W.2d 610 (citation omitted). “Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of a material factual dispute as to an essential element of the claim and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Barbie v. Minko Constr., Inc., 2009 ND 99, ¶ 6, 766 N.W.2d 458 (citation omitted). “When no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the trial court in resistance to the motion for summary judgment, it is presumed that no such...