Johnson v. Martin

3 F.4th 1210

Alonzo Cortez JOHNSON, Petitioner - Appellant,

v.Jimmy MARTIN, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

No. 19-5091

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED July 2, 2021

James L. Hankins, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Petitioner – Appellant.

Tessa Henry, Assistant Attorney General (Mike Hunter, Attorney General, and Julia Pittman, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent – Appellee.

Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

MORITZ, Circuit Judge.

An Oklahoma jury convicted Alonzo Johnson of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. After unsuccessfully challenging his convictions in state court, Johnson filed a 28 U.S.C § 2254 petition seeking federal habeas relief. As relevant here, he asserted that the prosecution exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner to exclude minorities from the jury, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Johnson also asserted, in relevant part, that gruesome evidence, juror misconduct, and cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The district court denied relief.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the denial of relief on Johnson's gruesome-evidence, juror-misconduct, and cumulative-error claims. But because we conclude that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) relied on an unreasonable factual determination and unreasonably applied Batson to reject Johnson's Batson claim and further determine that Johnson raised a prima facie case of discrimination under the first step of Batson , we reverse the district court's denial of habeas relief on Johnson's Batson claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

Although we will add more facts as needed to our analysis below, we begin by briefly setting the scene.¹ This appeal arises from a murder-for-hire plot involving five individuals: Mohammed Aziz, Allen Shields (Allen), Fred Shields (Fred), Terrico Bethel, and Johnson. The victim was Neal Sweeney, a fuel supplier.

Sweeney's fuel marketing company supplied fuel to convenience stores, including stores owned by Aziz. As a result of a dispute involving Aziz's nonpayment of bills, Sweeney obtained a default judgment against Aziz. Aziz, who had "developed an ‘intense hatred’ toward Sweeney," approached Allen and asked if Allen knew anyone who could kill someone for him. App. 30 (quoting R. vol. 1, 62). Allen spoke to his brother, Fred, about finding someone to do the job. Fred set the price for the murder at $10,000 and recruited Bethel to carry it out.

Fred also recruited Johnson, a cousin of the Shields brothers. Johnson "purportedly obtained the getaway car and helped coordinate with Aziz." Id. Bethel drove the car to Sweeney's office and shot Sweeney at close range, in the head. Later, law enforcement apprehended Fred "on a different crime[,] and [he] exposed the conspiracy" to kill Sweeney "in an effort to make a deal." Id. at 30–31.

The State charged Johnson with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.² His defense at trial centered on arguments that his involvement in the murder plot was minimal and that his coconspirators’ testimony against him was unreliable (Aziz testified at Johnson's trial, and the State introduced Allen's preliminary-hearing testimony). The jury convicted Johnson on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively.

Johnson filed a direct appeal, raising eighteen issues, and the OCCA affirmed. Johnson v. State , No. F-2013-173 (Okla. Crim. App. July 17, 2014) (unpublished) (Johnson I ). Johnson then sought postconviction relief, which the state trial court denied. Johnson v. State , No. CF-2009-2738 (Tulsa Cnty. Dist. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015) (unpublished) (Johnson II ). The OCCA affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. Johnson v. State , No. PC-2015-923 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016) (unpublished) (Johnson III ).

Johnson then filed the § 2254 petition underlying this appeal, raising seven claims. The district court denied the petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Johnson sought to appeal to this court and filed a combined opening brief and request for a COA. We granted him a partial COA to appeal the district court's resolution of four of his seven claims: the Batson claim, the gruesome-evidence claim, the juror-misconduct claim, and the cumulative-error claim.³ See § 2253(c)(3).

Analysis

We review the district court's legal analysis de novo.

Smith v. Duckworth , 824 F.3d 1233, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2016). In so doing, we remain bound by the constraints of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Id. at 1240–41. AEDPA requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to show that the state court's resolution of his or her claims (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate[-]court proceeding." § 2254(d). The two prongs of § 2254(d) thus impose "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Smith , 824 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Burt v. Titlow , 571 U.S. 12, 19–20, 134 S.Ct. 10, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013) ).

Under § 2254(d)(1), "[w]hether the law is clearly established is the threshold question." House v. Hatch , 527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008). "[W]ithout clearly established federal law, a federal habeas court need not assess whether a state court's decision was ‘contrary to’ or involved an ‘unreasonable application’ of such law." Id. at 1017 (quoting § 2254(d)(1) ). But if such clearly established law exists, a state-court decision is contrary to it if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from that precedent." Smith , 824 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior , 810 F.3d 724, 739 (10th Cir. 2016) ). And a state-court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 407–08, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Under § 2254(d)(2), "[w]e will not conclude a state court's factual findings are unreasonable ‘merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’ " Smith , 824 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Brumfield v. Cain , 576 U.S. 305, 313–14, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015) ). Instead, we "defer to the state court's factual determinations so long as ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.’ " Id. (quoting Brumfield , 576 U.S. at 314, 135 S.Ct. 2269 ). In line with this deference, we presume that a state court's factual findings are correct, "and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ " Id. (quoting § 2254(e)(1) ).⁴ But " ‘deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review,’ and ‘does not by definition preclude relief.’ " Brumfield , 576 U.S. at 314, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ( Miller-El I )). Accordingly, "if the petitioner can show that ‘the state courts plainly misapprehend[ed] or misstate[d] the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner's claim, that misapprehension can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.’ " Smith , 824 F.3d at 1241 (alterations in original) (quoting Ryder , 810 F.3d at 739 ).

I. Batson Claim

Johnson—who is African American—argues that the district court erred in denying his claim that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude racial minorities from the jury in violation of Batson . Batson held that the "Equal Protection Clause prohibits the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race." Saiz v. Ortiz , 392 F.3d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004). In other words, Batson recognized "the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria." 476 U.S. at 85–86, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

A trial court faced with a Batson challenge must apply a three-step burden-shifting analysis. See id. at 96–98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, ... the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question." Rice v. Collins , 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (citation omitted). "Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Id.

A. Additional Facts and Procedural Background

At Johnson's trial, the prosecutor exercised his first six peremptory challenges in the following order: (1) Dr. Tawil, (2) Mr. Dickens, (3) Ms. Aramburo de Wassom, (4) Ms. Wilson, (5) Ms. Carranza, and (6) Ms. Martinez. When the prosecutor moved to dismiss Mr. Dickens, an African American, from the jury pool, the trial court asked: "Your race neutral reason?" R. vol. 3, 449. The prosecutor responded: "Judge, he has a Ph.D., [and] we're concerned about him being a professor of liberal arts. It's been my practice to not keep those types of educated people, Ph.D.s in liberal arts, on the...