Jones v. Goodrich Corp.

422 F.Supp.3d 518

Brenda JONES, as Co-Administrator of the Estate of John David Hortman, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.GOODRICH CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

3:12-cv-01297-WWE

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed September 30, 2019

John Gagliano, Gagliano Law Offices, Arthur Alan Wolk, Pro Hac Vice, Cynthia M. Devers, Michael S. Miska, The Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, John K. McDonald, Kernan, Scully & McDonald, LLP, Waterbury, CT, Timothy A. Loranger, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

David Lassen, Pro Hac Vice, Michael Scoville, Pro Hac Vice, Rachel Constantino-Wallace, Pro Hac Vice, Steven S. Bell, Pro Hac Vice, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Shawn Stephen Smith, Jeffrey M. Thomen, McCarter & English, LLP, James H. Rotondo, Andraya Pulaski Brunau, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT, Paul N. Bowles, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas R. Pantino, Pro Hac Vice, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Tucker, Collier, Pagano, Aubert, LLP, New York, NY, J. Denny Shupe, Pro Hac Vice, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Robert J. Williams, Pro Hac Vice, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Steven E. Arnold, SA Law, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF IMPLIED FIELD PREEMPTION

WARREN W. EGINTON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this action, plaintiffs assert claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract, and fraud, stemming from the fatal crash of an AH-6M "Mission Enhanced Little Bird" helicopter on August 8, 2011, at Fort Benning, Georgia. U.S. Army pilots, John David Hortman and Steven Redd, were killed in the accident.

Pursuant to the Court's request, the parties submitted briefs on the issue of implied field preemption, that is when Congress intends federal law to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law. Although the parties disagree as to many of the underlying technical aspects of the case, the issue of field preemption is primarily one of law. Moreover, even when resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the Court finds, based on Second Circuit precedent, that plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted. For the following reasons, summary judgment will be granted in defendants' favor.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' helicopter was powered by a single Rolls-Royce Model 250 Series IV engine with a specific designation of 250-C30R/3M. Plaintiffs submit that moments before the crash impact that killed Captain Hortman and Chief Redd, the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control ("FADEC") computer that controls all aspects of engine operation in their helicopter experienced a "step count fault," which caused a failure of the FADEC. A step count fault is caused by, among other things, a faulty fuel metering valve potentiometer ("MVP"), which is part of the hydromechanical unit that physically meters fuel to the combustion chamber. The fault caused the FADEC to enter a fixed fuel mode where the pilot cannot alter the fuel flow and power to the engine.

The Army required both the baseline Mission Enhanced Little Bird engine and all of the modifications, including modifications to the FADEC, to be FAA certified. Any changes in equipment that were required by the Army also required the Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs") to obtain additional FAA certification. Plaintiffs' statement of additional uncontested facts provides: "It is clear that the FAA was the ‘Airworthiness Authority for the C30R/3M engine." [ECF No. 488, ¶ 27].

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991).

The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London American International Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the nonmoving party submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the motion for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Implied Field Preemption

"When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is preempted." Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). The Second Circuit has found clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety. Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Com'n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011). Indeed: "The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).

In Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Cuomo (ATA) , 520 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2008), this Court observed that several of our sister circuits, and several district courts within our own circuit, have concluded that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of air safety and thereby preempt state regulation of that field. ATA examined evidence of Congressional "intent to centralize air safety authority and the comprehensiveness of [ ] regulations pursuant to that authority," under both the Aviation Act and the ADA.

Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 210.

After concluding in Goodspeed that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of air safety, the Second Circuit recognized the second step of the implied preemption inquiry as an analysis of whether the state laws at issue intrude upon the preempted field of air safety. Id. at 211.

Goodspeed dealt with environmental laws that required a permit for tree removal on wetlands near the Airport. The Second Circuit determined that neither the Connecticut Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act ("IWWA") nor the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA") prohibited the removal of the obstructions at issue. Moreover, the Airport was not licensed by the FAA, was not federally funded, and had no federal agency approval or mandate to remove the trees from its property. Id. at 211. The state laws did not enter the scope of the preempted field in either their purpose or their effect: "On their face, the IWWA, CEPA, and the local permit process established pursuant thereto do not address issues of air safety." Id. at 210. In sum, despite Congress's intent to occupy the entire field of air safety, there was no federal interest in the Airport's proposed actions, as the state laws at issue did not interfere with federal law.

Seven years after its decision in Goodspeed, The Second Circuit affirmed that "Congress intended the FAA, as amended by the ADA, to occupy the field of air safety." Fawemimo v. American Airlines, Inc., 751 Fed. Appx. 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Accordingly, "State laws that conflict with the FAA or sufficiently interfere with federal regulation of air safety are thus preempted." Id.

The Second Circuit recently confirmed its two-step field preemption analysis in Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019). After recognizing federal preemption of the "entire field of air safety," the Court of Appeals looked to whether the runway statute at issue fell within the scope of that preemption. Id.

The runway statute at issue in Tweed effectively prohibited lengthening of the primary runway beyond its current length of 5,600 feet. The limitation directly restricted weight load, passenger capacity, and types of planes that can use the runway. Id. at 74. The Court held that "[t]his localized, state-created limitation is incompatible with the FAAct's objective of establishing a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation in the field of air safety." Id. The Second Circuit also looked to the FAA's involvement with Tweed:

[T]he FAA's involvement with Tweed and its runway project has been direct and significant. The Airport is federally regulated and exists within the Tweed-New Haven Airport Layout Plan ("ALP"), which is approved by the FAA. The FAA maintains full control over any modification to the ALP, including runway length. The Airport is classified by the FAA as a primary commercial service airport and is required to hold an operating certificate under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. Part 139. A Master Plan is required of all Part 139 airports, and Tweed's Master Plan, which includes extending the length of the runway up to 7,200 feet, was approved by the FAA as far back as 2002. This level of federal interest and involvement is further indication that the Runway Statute is preempted.

Id. at 75. The outcome of the Second Circuit's field preemption analysis in Tweed was simple: "We straightforwardly conclude that the Runway Statute falls well within the scope of the FAAct's preemption because of its direct impact on air safety." Id. at 74.

Plaintiffs submit three primary arguments as to why their claims in this case are not preempted based on Tweed and its predecessors. Plaintiffs argue: (1) The circumstances of Tweed do not speak to implied field preemption or to any issues arising in the instant litigation; (2) The FAA's interest and involvement with aircraft engine-component design and...