Jones v. Jones

320 Mich.App. 248

905 N.W.2d 475

Jeremy Phillip JONES, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Sharon Denise JONES, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 334937

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 6, 2017, at Lansing.

Decided June 22, 2017, 9:00 a.m.

Speaker Law Firm (by Jennifer M. Alberts and Liisa R. Speaker ) for Sharon D. Jones.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Saad and O'Connell, JJ.

Saad, J.Defendant appeals the judgment of divorce that the trial court entered. This case raises an issue of first impression regarding whether the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq. , is applicable to a child born through in vitro fertilization (IVF). For the reasons provided in this opinion, we hold that the RPA does apply in these circumstances, and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS

The parties' testimony was somewhat unclear regarding specific dates. Defendant and plaintiff married in 1998. On November 2, 2001, their son, DJ, was born. The parties lived together until approximately 2008, with the exception of one month when defendant and DJ lived apart from plaintiff. Around 2008, plaintiff moved to Bridgman in Berrien County to be closer to the Native American tribe to which he belonged, and defendant and DJ moved to Detroit. The parties maintained separate residences, but plaintiff would visit defendant approximately once a week through 2012 or 2014.

On November 18, 2013, defendant gave birth to a daughter, AJ, conceived by using assisted reproductive technology (ART)—in particular, IVF. The parties disputed the extent of plaintiff's involvement in AJ's conception. Plaintiff testified that he revoked his consent to the procedures in January 2010. Though he might not have provided defendant with a copy of the revocation, he testified that defendant was aware of his revocation. Plaintiff further testified that AJ's conception involved an anonymous sperm donor. Although plaintiff conceded to driving defendant to a few appointments, he believed that these appointments were for other purposes, such as harvesting eggs for future use, rather than defendant actively attempting to conceive a child.

In 2015, plaintiff filed the instant suit for divorce. Plaintiff alleged that AJ was born out of wedlock and that, consequently, he was not AJ's legal father. The parties also disputed the custody and support of DJ. During trial, the parties entered into a settlement, which stipulated that plaintiff was not AJ's legal father, and the trial court accepted the stipulation.¹

II. ANALYSIS

A. APPLICABILITY OF THE RPA

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it found that plaintiff was not AJ's legal father. We disagree.

Ordinarily, the fact that a party entered into a settlement precludes appellate review. See Chapdelaine v. Sochocki , 247 Mich.App. 167, 177, 635 N.W.2d 339 (2001) ("A party cannot stipulate a matter and then argue on appeal that the resultant action was error."). However, our courts have limited the enforcement of settlement agreements when they concern the well-being of children. See Koron v. Melendy , 207 Mich.App. 188, 191, 523 N.W.2d 870 (1994) (stating that a trial court is not bound to accept the parties' agreement to child custody but can accept it if it is in the child's best interests); Johns v. Johns , 178 Mich.App. 101, 105–106, 443 N.W.2d 446 (1989) (holding that the plaintiff who had acted as father to the children at issue for 15 years, could not disclaim paternity via stipulation during a custody battle). By revoking plaintiff'spaternity, the settlement agreement at issue completely eliminates any right AJ may have to seek support from plaintiff. Accordingly, despite the parties' settlement agreement, we will analyze whether the trial court properly terminated plaintiff's paternity under the RPA.

This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in proceedings under the RPA for clear error. Demski v. Petlick , 309 Mich.App. 404, 431, 873 N.W.2d 596 (2015). "The trial court has committed clear error when this Court is definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake." Id. at 431–432, 873 N.W.2d 596 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and application of statutory provisions. Parks v. Parks , 304 Mich.App. 232, 237, 850 N.W.2d 595 (2014).

"When interpreting a statute, a court must give effect [to] the Legislature's intent." Id. To determine the legislative intent, this Court first looks to the language of the statute itself, and if the language is unambiguous, "it must be enforced as written." Title Office, Inc. v. Van Buren Co. Treasurer , 469 Mich. 516, 519, 676 N.W.2d 207 (2004). Words of statutes are given their plain and ordinary meanings, while legal terms are construed according to their legal meanings. Lech v. Huntmore Estates Condo. Ass'n (On Remand) , 315 Mich.App. 288, 290, 890 N.W.2d 378 (2016). Statutes must be read as a whole, and this Court may not read statutory provisions in isolation. Milot v. Dep't of Transp , 318 Mich.App. 272, 278, 897 N.W.2d 248 (2016).

The RPA provides the procedures for courts to determine the paternity of children in certain situations. Although defendant argues that the RPA is not the proper vehicle by which to determine AJ's paternity, the RPA expressly "governs an action to determine that a presumed father is not a child's father," MCL 722.1435(4), and this is the precise situation before us. The RPA defines a presumed father as "a man who is presumed to be the child's father by virtue of his marriage to the child's mother at the time of the child's conception or birth." MCL 722.1433(e). Indeed, presuming paternity by the husband when a married couple has undergone ART to conceive is not contrary to the purpose of the RPA. In fact, it is consistent with the Legislature's general policy of recognizing the legitimacy of a child born through ART to a married couple. See, e.g., MCL 333.2824(6) ; MCL 700.2114(1)(a). Thus, as a starting point, plaintiff is the presumed father by virtue of his marriage to defendant at the time AJ was conceived and born, and the RPA is indeed the statute that applies to determine paternity.

The RPA provides that a presumed father who files for divorce may be declared to not be a child's father as follows:

If a child has a presumed father, a court may determine that the child is born out of wedlock^{[2 ]} for the purpose of establishing the child's paternity if an action is filed by the presumed father within 3 years after the child's birth or if the presumed father raises the issue in an action for divorce or separate maintenance between the presumed father and the mother. The requirement that an action be filed within 3 years after the child's birth does not apply to an action filed on or before 1 year after the effective date of this act. [ MCL 722.1441(2).]

Here, on the basis of the testimonial evidence, the trial court found that plaintiff made no genetic donation in the IVF process and that AJ was not a product of the parties' marriage. The trial court's findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. Plaintiff testified that he revoked his consent to defendant's IVF procedures in January 2010 and provided a copy of his revocation of consent to the trial court. Although plaintiff allegedly failed to provide a copy of the revocation of consent to defendant, plaintiff testified that defendant was aware of his revocation because the first fertility center they used subsequently refused to give defendant treatment. At the second fertility center used by defendant, the parties signed a financial waiver indicating that, for financial purposes, defendant should be treated as an unmarried woman. Further, although defendant testified that plaintiff was aware of her ongoing efforts to become pregnant, she also testified that she only told plaintiff of the procedures to which he drove her. Importantly, the parties have lived in separate residences on opposite sides of the state since approximately 2008. And finally, it is significant that the parties entered into a settlement that specifically provided that plaintiff is not the father. While this settlement may not be controlling, it is nonetheless substantial evidence on the matter at issue. In light of this evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred when it found that AJ was not issue of the marriage and therefore was born out of wedlock under the RPA.

If a trial court determines that a child was born out of wedlock, the court nonetheless may refuse to enter an order stating that the child was born out of wedlock if it would not be in the child's best interests to do so. MCL 722.1443(4) provides that

[a] court may refuse to enter an order ... determining that a child is born out of wedlock if the court finds evidence that the order would not be in the best interests of the child. The court shall state its reasons for refusing to enter an order on the record. The court may consider the following factors:

(a) Whether the presumed father is estopped from denying parentage because of his conduct.

(b) The length of time the presumed father was on notice that he might not be the child's father.

(c) The facts surrounding the presumed father's discovery that he might not be the child's father.

(d) The nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed or alleged father.

(e) The age of the child.

(f) The harm that may result to the child.

(g) Other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the father-child relationship.

(h) Any other factor that the court determines appropriate to consider.

Here, as defendant acknowledges, the trial court stated that it reviewed the best-interest factors under MCL 722.1443(4) and found that they favored approving the settlement. Defendant notes that the court did not make any explicit findings with respect to any specific factor, but ...