Kirkland v. Carlon (In re Heater)

498 P.3d 883

IN RE ESTATE OF John Clifford HEATER

Gina Mallough Kirkland, Petitioner,

v.John Carlon, Respondent.

No. 20200441

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard May 10, 2021

Filed November 12, 2021

Brent D. Wride, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Ben W. Lieberman, Salt Lake City, for respondent

Justice Petersen authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice Petersen, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Petitioner Gina Mallough Kirkland and her brother Garret Heater are co-personal representatives of the intestate estate of their deceased father John Clifford Heater (Heater). Kirkland and Garret¹ have litigated the administration of the estate for a number of years. During this litigation, Respondent John Carlon intervened, claiming Heater was his biological father and that he is therefore an additional heir to Heater's estate. Genetic testing proved him right. And the district court entered an order determining that Kirkland, Garret, and Carlon are the heirs to Heater's estate. Kirkland appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.

¶2 The case is now before us on certiorari. Kirkland argues that the establishment of a parent-child relationship in a probate case is governed by the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. And she contends that under the Parentage Act, Carlon's presumed father is not Heater but the man who was married to his mother at the time of his birth. She further argues that the Probate Code prohibits Carlon from inheriting from two fathers. We reject Kirkland's statutory arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 John Clifford Heater died intestate in 2008. His daughter and son, Kirkland and Garret, were Heater's only known heirs at the time of his death and are the co-personal representatives of his estate.

¶4 In 2016, with the litigation over the estate still ongoing, Garret connected with John Carlon through social media. Garret told Carlon that he thought Carlon might be Heater's biological son.

¶5 When Carlon was born, his mother Myrol Carlon was married to Thomas Carlon. The two remained married until Thomas died in 2007. But Myrol used to work for Heater and had a sexual relationship with him during the time Carlon was conceived. According to Carlon, Heater treated him and Myrol "in a manner that was not consistent with merely an employer and employee," showing "great interest" in the two of them. For instance, Heater took Myrol to some of her prenatal appointments when she was pregnant with Carlon, bought her maternity clothes, and drove her to the hospital when she was in labor. Heater also paid for Carlon to have a live-in nanny as a child and sent Carlon birthday cards with $100 every year through Carlon's college years and marriage. This led Carlon to "suspect[ ] for years that John Clifford Heater could be [his] father."

¶6 After Garret and Carlon's social media discussion, Carlon moved to intervene in the probate case. He stated that he believed Heater was his biological father and, if true, that he was an heir to Heater's estate. Garret supported the motion but Kirkland opposed it.

¶7 The district court permitted Carlon to intervene for the limited purpose of obtaining DNA testing. The DNA test results confirmed that Garret and Carlon were biological half-siblings.² Carlon had previously submitted to the court DNA test results that established he and his purported biological brother (Thomas and Myrol's son) did not share the same biological father. Carlon then renewed his motion to intervene in the probate case, which Kirkland opposed and the district court granted.

¶8 Carlon moved for summary judgment, seeking (1) a determination that he was Heater's biological son and (2) an order determining the heirs to Heater's estate. The district court granted summary judgment in Carlon's favor, finding first that Heater was Carlon's biological father and ultimately entering an order naming Kirkland, Garret, and Carlon as the heirs to Heater's estate. Because the court had determined Carlon was Heater's biological son, the court's order said "no further proceedings [were] necessary" to determine heirship.

¶9 Kirkland appealed, arguing that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the Probate Code in two ways. She first argued that under the Probate Code, the parent-child relationship must be determined in accordance with the Parentage Act. Kirkland v. Carlon (In re Est. of Heater ), 2020 UT App 70, ¶ 8, 466 P.3d 728. And she asserted that under the Parentage Act, Carlon's father is presumed to be the man who was married to his mother at the time of his birth—Thomas Carlon—and it was too late for Carlon to rebut this presumption because Thomas is deceased. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17. Second, she argued that the Probate Code prohibits a child from inheriting from more than one set of parents, so Carlon could not inherit from two fathers. Id. ¶¶ 8, 16–17. The court of appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.

¶10 Kirkland petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 "On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Marquina , 2020 UT 66, ¶ 24, 478 P.3d 37 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶12 On certiorari, Kirkland contends the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's order determining Carlon is Heater's child and an heir to Heater's estate.³ But before we proceed to the merits of this matter, we must first address whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to do so.

I. JURISDICTION

¶13 Although the district court granted summary judgment to Carlon and entered an order determining heirs, there are still ongoing proceedings in the district court. And for an appellate court to have jurisdiction, there must be "no claims pending below." WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Ests. Homeowners Ass'n , 2019 UT 45, ¶ 23, 449 P.3d 171. This is known as the final judgment rule. Id. ¶ 21 ("Under what we refer to as the final judgment rule, an ‘appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is not final.’ " (citation omitted)).

¶14 There are three general exceptions to the final judgment rule: (1) "when the legislature provides a statutory avenue for appealing nonfinal orders," Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB , 2018 UT 56, ¶ 13, 428 P.3d 1133 (citation omitted), (2) interlocutory appeals under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, id. ¶ 14, and (3) a district court's certification under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, id. ¶ 15.

¶15 Kirkland's notice of appeal was not brought under any of these exceptions. But in the notice of appeal, she explained that because the order determining heirs said "no further proceedings are necessary to determine the heirs of the Estate of John Clifford Heater," it was "final for purposes of appeal" "[u]nder Utah's pragmatic case-by-case approach to finality in probate matters."

¶16 Both parties cite to precedent from the court of appeals supporting this pragmatic approach to determining finality in probate matters. See, e.g. , Kelly v. West One Trust Co. (In re Est. of Morrison ), 933 P.2d 1015, 1016–17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (permitting an appeal of an order compelling an estate's heirs to return distributions despite ongoing claims in the district court because "Utah has effectively adopted [a] pragmatic, case-by-case approach to finality in probate matters"). And both Kirkland and Carlon argue that we have effectively endorsed such an approach, because Kelly v. West One Trust Co. (In re Estate of Morrison ), relied on case law from this court concluding an order was final and appealable when it " ‘resolve[d] an issue of vital importance’ and ‘conclude[d] a major phase in the process of formal testacy proceedings.’ " Id. at 1017 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Est. of Christensen v. Christensen , 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982) ); see also id. at 1016–17 (citing First of Denver Mortg. Invs. v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs. , 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979) ; Hayward v. Voorhees (In re Est. of Voorhees ), 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961) ).

¶17 But the cases upon which In re Estate of Morrison relied are in conflict with rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. And these rules are controlling. See UTAH R. APP. P. 1(a) ("These rules govern the procedure before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Utah in all cases." (emphasis added)); UTAH R. CIV. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions of a civil nature .... These rules govern all actions brought after they take effect and all further proceedings in actions then pending."); see also Gillett v. Price , 2006 UT 24, ¶¶ 7–9, 135 P.3d 861 (explaining that, where "the rules provide the source of available relief," our precedent that held otherwise was abrogated); Strand v. Nupetco Assocs. LLC , 2017 UT App 55, ¶ 4, 397 P.3d 724 ("Courts are, in short, bound by the text of the rule.").

¶18 The parties argue that the "pragmatic approach" is necessary in probate matters because such cases may effectively resolve after an important ruling, although the ruling does not trigger an entry of final judgment. However, we note that in such a scenario, an order resolving "an issue of vital importance" that did not result in an entry of final judgment could be a candidate for rule 54(b) certification or a petition for interlocutory appeal under appellate rule 5.

¶19 We take the opportunity to disavow the pragmatic test and clarify that a nonfinal order in a probate case may be appealed only through the mechanisms delineated in our civil and appellate rules or statutory exemptions.⁴ Under the applicable procedural rules, Kirkland...