Klausen v. Television, Case No. 2:15-cv-08423-CAS(ASx)

158 F.Supp.3d 925

Christopher Klausen

v.Warner Bros. Television et al.

Case No. 2:15-cv-08423-CAS(ASx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed January 25, 2016

Michael Bononi, Jarryd Cooper, for Plaintiffs.

Adam Levin, for Defendants.

Proceedings: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND (Dkt. 14, filed November 25, 2015)

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 25, 2015, plaintiff, Christopher Klausen, filed the instant suit against defendants Warner Brothers Television (“Warner Bros.”) and Does 1 through 50 (collectively, “defendants”) in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Dkt. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). Plaintiff asserts claims against defendants for: (1) Discrimination based upon age in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov't Code. §§ 1294, et seq. ; and (2) Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of FEHA. Id. On October 28, 2015, defendants removed this action to this Court. Dkt. 1. As the basis for removal, defendants stated that plaintiff's action is preempted by Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. , because it requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement governing the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment. Id. at 2.

On November 25, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action to state court. Dkt. 14. On December 7, 2015, defendants filed an opposition, Dkt. 16, and on December 14, 2015, plaintiff filed a reply, Dkt. 20. Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is fifty-five years old, is a former employee of defendant Warner Bros. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8. For seven years, plaintiff worked as a Second Assistant Director on the popular television show, the Big Bang Theory . Id. ¶ 9. Throughout this period, plaintiff's employment with Warner Bros. was governed by two collective bargaining agreements: (1) the “Director's Guild of America Basic Agreement of 2011” which governed employment between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2014; and (2) the “Memorandum of Agreement for Directors Guild of America Basic Agreement of 2014” which governed employment between July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017 (collectively, “the CBA”). Dkt. 16, Holst. Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, Exs. 2-3.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against him, demoted him, and eventually terminated him because of his age. Compl. ¶ 9. As a Second Assistant Director, a major aspect of plaintiff's job duties involved interacting and working with the actors on the Big Bang Theory . Id. ¶ 29. This included serving as a liaison to the actors, making sure the actors were prepared for each scene, and putting the actors through wardrobe and make-up. Id. Plaintiff states that, after he turned fifty, he began to notice that the actors on the show, who are all considerably younger than plaintiff, began to ostracize him. Id. Beginning with the sixth season of the Big Bang Theory , defendants reassigned several of plaintiff's job responsibilities to two younger and less experienced employees, Nicole Lorre (“Lorre”) and T. Ryan Brennan (“Brennan”). Id. ¶¶ 27, 30. When plaintiff confronted one of the show's producers, Faye Oshima Belyeu, about his job duties being reassigned, she told him that his duties were reassigned because Lorre and Brennan “related to the actors better.” Id. ¶ 31.

Before the start of the seventh season of the Big Bang Theory , defendants told plaintiff that he would be permanently replaced as the Second Assistant Director by Lorre. Id. ¶ 36. Instead, plaintiff would now serve as the Second Second Assistant Director, an uncredited position. Id. As a general matter, plaintiff's new position still involved interacting with the actors. Id. ¶ 37. However, defendants told plaintiff that Brennan would be exclusively dealing with the actors on the show, again because he “relate[d] to the actors better.” Id. Defendants told plaintiff that his sole responsibility would be “blocking the background,” which is a stage term meaning directing the movements of the extras on the show. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff states that this was a less desirable and prestigious job duty than what he was previously assigned. Id.

Throughout the eighth season of the Big Bang Theory , defendant reassigned more of plaintiff's job duties to Brennan. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants frequently excluded him from assignments he had previously performed in favor of younger employees. Id. Finally, on or around April 20, 2015, and after completing filming of the eight season of the Big Bang Theory , defendants informed plaintiff that they would not be entering into a new contract with him for the show's ninth season, effectively terminating his employment. Id. ¶ 48. Defendants told plaintiff that they made this decision on the basis of “performance reasons.” Id. Plaintiff believes, however, that he was terminated because he was over fifty years old. Id. ¶ 51.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A motion for remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Remand may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction where a case presents a claim arising under federal law (“federal question jurisdiction”), or where the plaintiffs and defendants are residents of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (“diversity jurisdiction”). See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Galindo, 2011 WL 662324, *1 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (explaining the two types of jurisdiction). The Court strictly construes the removal statutes against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.1999).

B. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

Under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, district courts have jurisdiction over claims arising from “violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Federal substantive law preempts state law in an action arising under Section 301 in order to further the interest in uniform federal interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (“[D]imensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute [so that] issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 [are] to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.”) (citing Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. , 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) ). Accordingly, Section 301's preemptive force has been construed to cover most “state law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements.” Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. , 223 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir.2000).

Where a right “exists solely as a result of the [collective bargaining agreement], then the claim is preempted,” and the court's analysis ends there. Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp. , 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.2007). (citing Allis–Chalmers , 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. 1904 ). However, if the right exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement, it may still be preempted if “it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” Id. (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ). In general, if resolution of a state law claim requires an interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, then the claim is substantially dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement and is therefore preempted under section 301. Burnside , 491 F.3d at 1060 ; Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. , 255 F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1078, 122 S.Ct. 806, 151 L.Ed.2d 692 (2002). On the other hand, if the “meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of the state-law litigation” does not result in preemption. Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 124, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994).

Ultimately, “[t]he plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim.” Cramer , 255 F.3d at 691. Specifically, the court must consider “whether the claim can be resolved by 'look[ing] to' versus interpreting the CBA. If the latter, the claim is preempted; if the former, it is not.” Burnside , 491 F.3d at 1060 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Cramer , 255 F.3d at 691–92 (“[A]lleging a hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim: adjudication of the claim must require interpretation of a provision of the CBA.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA. More specifically, they contend that the resolution of plaintiff's FEHA claims will require a court to interpret the provisions of the CBA and therefore plaintiff's claims are preempted by section 301. The Court disagrees.

The Ninth Circuit has “consistently held that state law discrimination claims under the FEHA do not require courts to interpret the terms of a CBA and are therefore not preempted by § 301.” Schrader v. Noll Mfg. Co. , 91 Fed.Appx. 553, 555 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co. , 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA...