Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co.

280 A.3d 918

William KORNFEIND, Appellee

v.NEW WERNER HOLDING CO., INC. & the Home Depot, Inc.

Appeal of: New Werner Holding Co., Inc.

No. 30 EAP 2021

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: April 12, 2022

Decided: August 16, 2022

Erin Kelly Rudert, Esq., Ainsman Levine, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Amicus Curiae The Pennsylvania Association for Justice

Diane E. Vuocolo, Esq., Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Participants Old Ladder Company

Jonathan Richard Bruno, Esq., Joseph A. Del Sole, Esq., Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, Carol Ann VanderWoude, Esq., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant New Werner Holding Co., Inc.

Benjamin Daniel Hartwell, Esq., Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants Amici Curiae Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel and The Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Inc.

Patrick Daniel MacAvoy, Esq., Philadelphia, PA, Kevin Roberts Marciano, Esq., Media, PA, Marciano & MacAvoy, P.C., for Appellee William Kornfeind

BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

We granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Pennsylvania Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5521(b), requires our courts to apply—or "borrow"—a foreign jurisdiction's statute of repose to a claim that has accrued in a foreign jurisdiction. Section 5521, which is also referred to as the "borrowing statute," provides:

§ 5521. Limitations on foreign claims

(a) Short title of section. —This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act."

(b) General rule. —The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that provided or prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of this Commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim.

(c) Definition. —As used in this section "claim " means any right of action which may be asserted in a civil action or proceeding and includes, but is not limited to, a right of action created by statute.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5521. Because we agree with the lower courts that the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act does not require the application of a foreign jurisdiction's statute of repose, we affirm the portion of the order of the Superior Court that affirmed the trial court order denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellant New Werner Holding, Co., Inc. (New Werner).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2013, Appellee William Kornfeind was injured when he fell from a 28-foot extension ladder while performing maintenance work on the roof of his home in Wauconda, Illinois. He averred that the top portion of the extension ladder unexpectedly slid or telescoped downward while he was on it, causing him to fall to the ground. Am. Compl., 7/19/17, at 8, ¶¶ 27-29. As a result, Kornfeind sustained numerous injuries, including spinal injuries that rendered him tetraplegic. Id. at 8, ¶ 30.

The ladder was designed, manufactured, and distributed by Old Ladder Company (Old Ladder) in 1995. Id. at 7, ¶ 20; New Werner's Mot. for Summ. J., 1/7/19, at 2. Kornfeind believed he purchased it from The Home Depot (Home Depot) in Illinois sometime in the late 1990s. Id. at Ex. A., Kornfeind's 5/8/18 Dep., at 134. Old Ladder filed for bankruptcy in 2006. Id. at 2-3. In 2007, New Werner purchased certain assets of and assumed certain liabilities from Old Ladder. Id. at 2.

On September 3, 2015, Kornfeind commenced this action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons, followed by a May 26, 2017 complaint, and a July 19, 2017 amended complaint.¹ In the amended complaint, Kornfeind asserted causes of action for product liability and negligence against several defendants, including New Werner, as the owner of the product line, and Home Depot, as the seller of the ladder.² Regarding his product liability claims, Kornfeind's theory was that the ladder was defectively designed because it did not include a "Quick Latch" safety component that a competitor ladder company had invented. Kornfeind's Resp. to New Werner's Mot. for Summ. J., 2/6/19, at 3.

After the close of discovery, New Werner and Home Depot each filed motions for summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, they both asserted the trial court should utilize Pennsylvania's Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act to borrow Illinois’ ten-year statute of repose for product liability claims, 735 ILCS 5/13-213(b), which provides:

(b) Subject to the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) no product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall be commenced except within the applicable limitations period and, in any event, within 12 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession to its initial user, consumer, or other non-seller, whichever period expires earlier, of any product unit that is claimed to have injured or damaged the plaintiff, unless the defendant expressly has warranted or promised the product for a longer period and the action is brought within that period.

735 ILCS 5/13-213(b) (effective 1/01/91 to 3/8/95).³ They argued that because Kornfeind admitted in his deposition that he purchased the ladder in the late 1990s, the latest he could have purchased it was on December 31, 1999, which was more than ten years before he filed suit in 2015. As Kornfeind's product liability claims would be time-barred by the Illinois statute of repose and Pennsylvania does not have a statute of repose for product liability claims, New Werner and Home Depot argued that the Pennsylvania borrowing statute required the trial court to apply the shorter Illinois statute of repose and dismiss Kornfeind's product liability claims as untimely.⁴

The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment. It reasoned that, as a matter of law, Pennsylvania's borrowing statute "is explicitly limited to statutes of limitations and does not include statutes of repose." Trial Ct. Op., 9/24/18, at 5. It emphasized that the plain language of the borrowing statute applied only to statutes of limitations, highlighting that the title itself, the " ‘Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act,’ precludes its application to statutes of repose." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5521(a) ). Further, it explained the "intent of the [borrowing statute] is to prevent forum shopping for a jurisdiction that affords greater rights or a longer statute of limitations, not to dismiss cases that were timely filed within the statute of limitations of both states." Id. at 6.

The trial court subsequently denied New Werner and Home Depot's motions to certify the interlocutory orders for immediate appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). New Werner and Home Depot then filed a timely joint petition with the Superior Court for permission to appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311(a), which the Superior Court granted.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court order denying summary judgment to New Werner in a unanimous published opinion.⁵ Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., Inc. , 241 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2020). On appeal, New Werner argued that the phrase "period of limitations" in the Pennsylvania borrowing statute should be interpreted to include statutes of repose as well as statutes of limitation, which the Superior Court identified as an issue of first impression. Id. at 1219. The Superior Court explained that it reviews a denial of summary judgment for errors of law or abuse of discretion. Id. at 1216. Further, the court noted that statutory interpretation of the borrowing statute was a question of law over which it had a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review. Id. at 1219-20. The Superior Court acknowledged that the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent, the best indication of which is the plain language of the statute. Id. at 1220. The court noted that it must apply unambiguous statutory language; however, if the statute was ambiguous, then the court would look to the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), to determine the legislature's intent. Id.

The Superior Court noted that while both statutes of repose and statutes of limitations impose temporal limitations on liability, they are distinct in how the time periods are measured and in their policies. Id. (quoting Dubose v. Quinlan , 643 Pa. 244, 173 A.3d 634, 643-45 (2017) ). A statute of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff's claim accrues, while a statute of repose begins to run from the defendant's last culpable act. Id. As such, a "statute of repose limit is ‘not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.’ " Id. (quoting Dubose , 173 A.3d at 643-45 ). Further, while the statutes have similar policies, a statute of limitation encourages a plaintiff to diligently pursue claims and precludes a plaintiff's revival of stale claims, and a statute of repose represents a legislative judgment that a defendant should not be subject to liability after a certain time. Id. at 1221. The Superior Court added that "statutes of limitations are a form of procedural law that bar recovery on an otherwise viable cause of action. Conversely, statutes of repose operate as substantive law by extinguishing a cause of action outright and precluding its revival." Id. (quoting Graver v. Foster Wheeler Corp. , 96 A.3d 383, 387 (Pa. Super. 2014) ).

Turning specifically to the borrowing statute, the Superior Court initially agreed with New Werner that the temporal phrase "period of limitation" standing alone is broad enough to refer to either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Id. However, in the context of the borrowing statut...