L.H. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist.

944 F.Supp.2d 867

L.H., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. CV 12–1408 SS.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

May 10, 2013.

Drew D. Massey, Timothy A. Adams, Timothy Adams & Associates APLC, Santa Ana, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan Patrick Read, Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, Tiffany Marie Santos, Fagen Friedman and Fulfrost LLP, San Marcos, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

SUZANNE H. SEGAL, United States Magistrate Judge.

I.INTRODUCTION

On August 28, 2012, plaintiffs L.H. and B.H. (“Parents”), along with their minor child, M.H. (“Student”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint for attorneys' fees pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (“Complaint,” Dkt. No. 4). On August 29, 2012, Defendant Chino Valley Unified School District (“Defendant”) filed a Motion to Dismiss. (“MTD,” Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, including the Declaration of Roshni Gandhi and accompanying exhibits, on November 30, 2012. (“Gandhi Decl.,” Dkt. No. 17). On the same day, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Judicial Notice. (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 18). On December 20, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss correcting certain citation errors. (“Am. Opp.,” Dkt. No. 21). On January 28, 2013, Defendant filed a Reply. (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 26). On January 30, 2013, the Parties consented to proceed for all purposes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. No. 27). On April 16, 2013, the Court held a hearingon the Motion. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

II.OVERVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

The IDEA provides federal funds to assist state and local agencies in educating children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412; R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified School Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2011). The primary purpose of the IDEA is to provide all children with disabilities “a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for education, employment and independent living ....” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). This purpose is implemented in part through the development of individualized education programs (“IEP”), which are prepared by a team including the student's parents, teachers, and the local educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); see also Lake Washington School Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, 634 F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir.2011) (“The IDEA's ‘core’ is the ‘cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools,’ the ‘central vehicle’ of which is the development of an IEP.”) (quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005)). Among other things, an IEP sets forth the student's short term objectives and annual goals, the specific services to be provided to the student, and criteria for measuring the student's progress. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Pursuant to federal regulations implementing the IDEA, public agencies receiving IDEA funds are required to ensure that the IEP team reviews “the child's IEP periodically, but not less than annually, to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved ....” 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1)(i).

In furtherance of its overall goals, “the IDEA requires that states enact procedural safeguards to guarantee parental involvement in decisions relating to the child's education and to ensure local compliance with the IDEA.” Christopher S. ex rel. Rita S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir.2004). As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

To ensure parental involvement in educational decisions, the IDEA requires states to guarantee that parents of disabled students have the right to bring complaints “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” [20 U.S.C.] § 1415(b)(6). Any parent who brings such a complaint must have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing conducted by the state or local educational agency. Id. § 1415(f). If the hearing is held by a state agency, as is the case in California, seeCal. Educ.Code § 56501(b)(4), any party dissatisfied with the result may file a civil action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Id. at 1210;see also Weissburg v. Lancaster School Dist., 591 F.3d 1255, 1257 n. 1 (9th Cir.2010) (“Under the IDEA, any party [including a local educational agency] may request a due process hearing when there is a dispute about the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child.”) (emphasis in original); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 526, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007) (following an impartial due process hearing by the state educational agency, “an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court”).

“Distinct from the IDEA's due process requirements, the U.S. Department of Educationpromulgated regulations pursuant to its general rulemaking authority requiring each recipient of federal funds, including funds provided through the IDEA, to put in place a complaint resolution procedure (‘CRP’).” Porter v. Board of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.2002); see also34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151–153. “The CRP is designed to provide parents and school districts with mechanisms that allow them to resolve differences without resort to more costly and litigious resolution through due process.” Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also R.R. ex rel. R. v. Fairfax Cnty. School Bd., 338 F.3d 325, 331 n. 5 (4th Cir.2003) (“The CRP is an alternative method of addressing an IDEA grievance ....”) (citing Lucht ). Under the CRP, parents, students and organizations may file a compliance complaint with the state educational agency when a “public agency has violated the IDEA.” ¹Lucht, 225 F.3d at 1029;see also34 C.F.R. § 300.153(b).

While the IDEA specifically provides for judicial appeal of an impartial due process hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), neither the statute nor its implementing regulations expressly provide for appeals to district courts from CRP determinations, although courts have allowed such appeals. Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Assoc. v. California Dept. of Educ., 2013 WL 1326301 at *2 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (citing cases); S.A. ex rel. L.A. v. Tulare County Office of Educ., 2009 WL 30298 at *4 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2009) (“ S.A. I” ); see also Lucht, 225 F.3d at 1025 (affirming district court's award of attorneys' fees following CRP proceeding). Furthermore, “[t]he final step in California's CRP is not, as under the IDEA's due process procedures, the authorization of a lawsuit by a dissatisfied complainant. Under California's CRP ... only the Superintendent of Public Instruction is authorized to bring an action to enforce a CRP order.” Porter, 307 F.3d at 1073 (citing 5 Cal.Code Regs. § 4670).

Section 1415 of the IDEA provides in relevant part that “[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). “A prevailing party is one who ‘succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’ ” Weissburg, 591 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir.2007)). To be considered a “prevailing party,” the complainingparty must achieve a “ ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties' ” and “that alteration must be ‘judicially sanctioned.’ ” P.N. v. Seattle School Dist., 474 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 604–05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001)); see also Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist., No. 69, 374 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir.2004) ( “Buckhannon's definition of ‘prevailing party’ applies to the IDEA's attorney's fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).”).

Under the IDEA, a partially prevailing plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees commensurate with the party's “degree of success.” Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). Even if a complainant succeeds in the underlying proceeding, however, “a plaintiff is not the prevailing party [for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees under the IDEA] if his or her success is purely technical or de minimis.” Shapiro, 374 F.3d at 865;see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (“In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally ‘prevails' ... should receive no attorney's fees at all.”) (citation omitted); L.M. v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir.2009) (vacating award of attorneys' fees while explaining “a procedural violation may be harmless, and we must consider whether the procedural error either resulted in a loss of educational opportunity or significantly restricted parental participation”).

III.ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

On May 30, 2012, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Compliance Complaint with the California Department of Education. (Complaint at 2–3; Gandhi Decl., Exh. A at 4).² Plaintiffs complained that Defendant had failed to timely convene Student's annual IEP review. (Complaint at 3; Gandhi Decl., Exh. A at 3). According to the Compliance Complaint, even though Student's last IEP meeting had occurred on May 5, 2011, Defendant cancelled Student's...