Lafate v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Usa)

123 F.Supp.2d 773

Eunice M. LAFATE, Plaintiff, v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK (USA), a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 96-575-JJF.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

November 1, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James J. Maron, David E. Wilks, Maron, Marvel & Wilks, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiff.

Barry M. Willoughby, William W. Bowser, Jan R. Jurden, Drewry Nash Fennell, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, New Trial and Amendment of the Verdict (D.I.214). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Defendant's motion in part, and grant the Defendant's motion in part.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, a 53 year old female born in Jamaica, began working for the Defendant in 1985 as a Credit Correspondent. During her employment with the Defendant, the Plaintiff was promoted several times and received ratings of 1 or 2 on a 5 point scale on her annual performance review.¹ By 1992, the Plaintiff was the Credit Supervisor in the New Underwriting area of the Credit Department. In 1994, the Plaintiff's position was upgraded by the Defendant to a Level 06 based on an evaluation by her supervisor at the time, Edward Matthews.

In May 1994, the Plaintiff applied and interviewed for the position of a Level 08 Compliance Officer upon the recommendation of Matthews. (D.I. 124 at 3). Even though the Plaintiff received an initial interview and second interview, the Plaintiff was not offered the position. (D.I. 124 at 3). In November 1994, the Plaintiff applied for the position of a Level 07 Regulatory Compliance Officer. (D.I. 124 at 3). On December 1, 1994, the Plaintiff was denied the position, without an interview, by David Blank, Vice-President of the Defendant's Legal Department. (D.I. 124 at 3).

Upon receiving this notice, the Plaintiff asked Blank why she was not granted an interview. (D.I. 124 at 3). Blank asked the Plaintiff about her latest performance evaluation. (D.I. 124 at 3). The Plaintiff informed Blank that she had received a "1 — outstanding." (D.I. 124 at 3). Blank replied that he had received different information upon speaking with Matthews. (D.I. 124 at 3).

On December 27, 1994, the Defendant provided the Plaintiff with her performance evaluation which stated that she received a "3 — fully satisfactory," and criticized her verbal communication skills. (D.I. 124 at 3). On December 29, 1994, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant's Human Resources Office and requested copies of her 1992 and 1993 reviews. (D.I. 124 at 3). Later that morning, Blank contacted the Plaintiff for an interview for the Level 07 position. (D.I. 124 at 3-4). The Plaintiff and Blank initially agreed to meet on January 3, 1995; however, Blank later insisted on meeting with the Plaintiff that same day. (D.I. 124 at 4). The Plaintiff met with Blank and Helen Stewart, and in January 1995, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff that the Level 07 position was offered to another candidate. (D.I. 124 at 4).

In February 1995, the Plaintiff filed a charge of race and age discrimination against the Defendant with the Delaware Department of Labor ("DDOL") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (D.I. 124 at 4). The DDOL found reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices. (D.I. 124 at 4). In August 1996, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to the Plaintiff. (D.I. 124 at 4).

The Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant suit on November 26, 1996, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981 a ("Section 1981"), and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Delaware state law. (D.I. 124 at 1). In addition to the allegations contained in the complaint filed with the DDOL and EEOC, Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint in this lawsuit also alleged that the Defendant responded to the charges of age and race discrimination by engaging in a course of conduct intending to retaliate against the Plaintiff for filing the original discrimination charges, in violation of Title VII and Section 1981. (D.I. 124 at 7). In Count V, the Plaintiff asserted a related claim, alleging that the retaliation taken by the Defendant amounted to a Constructive Discharge from her employment. (D.I. 124 at 7). On July 14, 1999, the Court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's ADEA and state law claims, but denied the motion as to the Title VII and Section 1981 claims. (D.I.130).

The case was tried before a jury on November 15, 17, and 18, 1999. The jury returned a verdict on November 19, finding in favor of the Defendant on the Plaintiff's discriminatory promotion and constructive discharge claims. The jury found in favor of the Plaintiff on her retaliation claim and awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. Title VII Retaliation Claim

The Defendant asserts that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because: (1) the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, (2) the Plaintiff did not show that the Defendant's reasons for its actions were a pretext for retaliation, and (3) the Plaintiff's failure to complain bars her retaliation claim. The Court will address each argument in succession.

Under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should grant a judgment as a matter of law only "where there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for the nonmoving party." Price v. Delaware Dept. of Correction, 40 F.Supp.2d 544, 549 (D.Del. 1999); FED.R.CIV.P. 50. When considering a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), the court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of Am., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir.1990)). The non-moving party is entitled to "all logical inferences" that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir.1991)). Although more than a "mere scintilla of evidence" is required to uphold the jury verdict, the court should only overturn the verdict if it is "so unreasonable" that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 802, 805 (D.Del.1993), aff'd, 60 F.3d 843 (Fed.Cir.1995).

1. The Plaintiff has Established a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case for a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action." Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir.1997)). The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiff was involved in employee activity that is protected under Title VII. The Defendant does dispute that it engaged in "adverse employment action" and that the Plaintiff successfully established a causal link between the protected employee activity and the alleged "adverse employment action."

a. Adverse Employment Action

Retaliatory conduct constitutes "adverse employment action" under Title VII only if it "alters the employee's `compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' deprives him or her of `employment opportunities,' or `adversely affect[s] his [or her] status as an employee.'" Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.1997). Consequently, "`not everything that makes an employee unhappy' qualifies as retaliation, for `[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a [retaliation claim].'" Id. (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996)). Job termination, however, is not a requirement for a finding of adverse employment action — less severe action can suffice. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir.1997).

The Defendant asserts that the actions it took do not amount to adverse employment action. The Defendant argues that the individual acts the Plaintiff complains about have been held by courts not to constitute adverse employment action. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1297 (holding that isolation and lack of respect from fellow managers and co-workers did not amount to adverse employment action); Crawley v. Runyon, 1998 WL 355529 (E.D.Pa. June 30, 1998) (having employee followed into the bathroom was not adverse employment action); Clary v. Marley Cooling Tower Co., 1997 WL 150048 (D.Kan. Mar. 12, 1997) (transfer to inferior cubicle does not amount to adverse employment action). These cases, however, all involved situations where there was one alleged retaliatory act, or a couple isolated instances. The Third Circuit has recently emphasized that courts should not analyze the employer's individual acts in isolation, but should analyze all of the acts collectively in deciding whether there has been adverse employment action. Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 503 n. 9 (3d Cir.2000). For instance, in Kim, the court held that: "as a matter of law, [the defendant's] conduct, which included reduction of duties, disciplinary action and negative personnel reports, as well as required remedial training, constituted adverse employment action." 123 F.3d at 1060. The Third Circuit has further held:

[t]o move [the Plaintiff] from work she had done satisfactorily for over two...