LaFrance v. Lodmell

322 Conn. 828

144 A.3d 373

Joan LaFRANCE

v.Dean W. LODMELL.

Nos. 19614

19615.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 6, 2016.

Decided Sept. 6, 2016.

Dana M. Hrelic, with whom were Wesley W. Horton and, on the brief, Brendon P. Levesque, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Mathew P. Jasinski, with whom was Laura W. Ray, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.^*

EVELEIGH, J.

This consolidated appeal arises from a marital dissolution action brought by the plaintiff, Joan LaFrance, against the defendant, Dean W. Lodmell. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly: (1) applied General Statutes § 46b–66 (c) to an agreement to arbitrate contained within a prenuptial agreement between the parties and limited arbitration to the sale of a jointly owned residential property (residence); (2) denied the defendant's request for leave to file an amended cross complaint to assert certain claims against the plaintiff in the dissolution action; and (3) confirmed the arbitration awards where the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority and the scope of the submission. We reject the defendant's claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court.¹

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the defendant's appeal. “In contemplation of marriage, the parties entered [a prenuptial agreement] on November 22, 2000. They were married on November 25, 2000. Neither party contests the enforceability of the [prenuptial] agreement. On March 15, 2010 ... an action for dissolution of marriage [was commenced]. [The agreement to arbitrate in] the [prenuptial] agreement provides: ‘In the event of any dispute hereunder, such dispute shall be resolved by first submitting the matter to mediation. If mediation fails, then the matter shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.’ ... [The trial court] ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on the matter of ‘the sale of the [residence] ... and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale.’ ” Lodmell v. LaFrance, 154 Conn.App. 329, 330–31, 107 A.3d 975 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 921, 107 A.3d 959 (2015).

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's order and the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id., at 331, 107 A.3d 975. On November 16, 2011, the Appellate Court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id. In October, 2012, the parties participated in a three day hearing before an arbitrator, Donna M. Wilkerson, who issued “a partial award on November 9, 2012, which was modified on December 17, 2012, and a final award on December 17, 2012....” Id.

On December 30, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment confirming the partial arbitration award and confirming in part, modifying in part, and vacating in part the final arbitration award, from which the defendant appealed. Thereafter, on April 3, 2014, the defendant filed a request for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint in the present case, which was denied. On January 15, 2015, the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage, allocating property, interpreting the prenuptial agreement and deciding all pending motions. The defendant then filed a second appeal.

These two appeals were then consolidated and transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51–199 and Practice Book § 65–1. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly applied § 46b–66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate contained within the prenuptial agreement. Specifically, the defendant asserts that § 46b–66 (c) applies only to an agreement to arbitrate that has been entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed. The defendant further claims that, even if § 46b–66 (c) applies to agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements, the trial court improperly contravened the terms of the prenuptial agreement in the present case by limiting the scope of the arbitration. In response, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly applied § 46b–66 (c) to the agreement to arbitrate in the prenuptial agreement. The plaintiff further asserts that the trial court properly found, pursuant to § 46b–66 (c), that it would not be “ ‘fair and equitable under the circumstances' ” to require the parties to arbitrate claims for damages that were not allowed by the prenuptial agreement. We agree with the plaintiff.

A

The resolution of whether § 46b–66 (c) applies to an agreement to arbitrate in a prenuptial agreement presents an issue of statutory construction.² In conducting this analysis, “we are guided by the well established principle that [i]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... We are also guided by the plain meaning rule for statutory construction. See General Statutes § 1–2z.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cales v. Office of Victim Services, 319 Conn. 697, 701, 127 A.3d 154 (2015).

Section 46b–66(c) provides: “The provisions of chapter 909 shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution of marriage under this chapter, provided (1) an arbitration pursuant to such agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that (A) each party entered into such agreement voluntarily and without coercion, and (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances, and (2) such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody. An arbitration award in such action shall be confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance with the provisions of chapter 909.”³

The statutory language provides no express guidance as to whether the legislature intended for it to apply to agreements to arbitrate that are entered into as part of a prenuptial agreement. The legislature's use of the term “any agreement” rather than the term “an agreement,” however, strongly suggests an intent to include all agreements to arbitrate matters related to dissolutions of marriage. See, e.g., Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781, 802, 712 A.2d 396 (use of term “ ‘any person’ ” indicative of legislature's intent to include all persons), cert. denied sub nom. Slotnik v. Considine, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S.Ct. 542, 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

The defendant asserts, however, that the use of the phrase “in an action for dissolution” limits the applicability of § 46b–66 (c) to only those agreements to arbitrate that are entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed and, therefore, excludes agreements to arbitrate that are entered into as part of prenuptial agreements. We disagree. There is nothing in the plain language of the statute that indicates that § 46b–66 (c) applies only to an agreement to arbitrate that is entered into after an action for dissolution has been filed. To the contrary, the broad language of § 46b–66 (c)includes “any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution....” Agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements, like the agreement to arbitrate in the present case, are by definition agreements to arbitrate issues that would only arise once the parties are involved “in an action for dissolution....” General Statutes § 46b–66 (c).

If the legislature intended to exclude agreements to arbitrate that are contained within prenuptial agreements, it could have expressly done so. “[I]t is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly ... or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 618, 72 A.3d 394 (2013) ; see also Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802, 818, 104 A.3d 727 (2014). Indeed, the legislature did use limiting language elsewhere in § 46b–66 (c), when it provided that “such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody.” The use of such limiting language in other portions of § 46b–66 (c) is further indication that if the legislature had intended to exclude agreements to arbitrate contained in prenuptial agreements it could have done so.

Furthermore, reading § 46b–66 (c) in relationship to the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part lends additional support to our understanding that § 46b–66 (c) covers all agreements to arbitrate controversies between parties to a marriage, regardless of when the parties entered into that agreement. “In seeking to determine [the] meaning [of a statute, § 1–2z ] directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 321 Conn. 805, 816, 139 A.3d 585 (2016).

It is important to recognize that § 46b–66 (c) explains the conditions under which agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage are governed by the provisions of chapter 909 of the General Statutes; see General Statutes § 52–406 et seq. ; which contains the procedures governing arbitration. Therefore, before chapter 909 can apply to an agreement to arbitrate between parties to a marriage, it must meet the requirements set forth in § 46b–66 (c). In turn, chapter 909 also explains what agreements to arbitrate are governed by its provisions. Specifically, General Statutes § 52–408 provides in relevant part: “[A]n agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the...