Lewis ex rel. Shakur v. Wetzel

153 F.Supp.3d 678

Daniel Lewis, also known as Naseer Shakur, Plaintiff

v.John Wetzel, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:12-CV-02208

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed December 21, 2015

Daniel Lewis, Graterford, PA, pro se.

Julie R. Tilghman, Dept. of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Kane, District Judge

I. Background

On November 5, 2012, Daniel Lewis, also known as Naseer Shakur, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder¹ and presently confined at the State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania² , filed a 3-page form complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against twenty-three individuals presently or formerly employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Doc. 1. Because Lewis's statement of claim consisting of one sentence was completely conclusory, by order of November 7, 2012, he was directed to file an amended complaint. Doc. 7. After being granted an extension of time, Lewis on December 17, 2012, filed a 67-page, handwritten, amended complaint consisting of 148 numbered paragraphs and a prayer for relief consisting of paragraphs A through L. Doc. 11.

In the amended complaint Lewis names as defendants 25 individuals presently or formerly employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Id. The majority of the defendants are or were located at the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Huntingdon”). Id. The remaining defendants are or were located at the Department of Corrections' administrative offices in Mechanicsburg and Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. Id. The 25 defendants are as follows: (1) John Wetzel, Secretary of the Department of Corrections; (2) Jeffrey Beard, former Secretary of the Department of Corrections; (3) Tabb Bickell, Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; (4) R. Lawler, former Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; (5) James Eckard, Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Huntingdon; (6) Brian Corbin, former Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Huntingdon; (7) Garman, Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Huntingdon; (8) J. Keller, Classification Program Manager and member of Program Review Committee at SCI-Huntingdon; (9-11) Lieutenants Fogel, Dunkle, and Johnson at SCI-Huntingdon; (12) Charles Mitchell, Hearing Examiner at SCI-Huntingdon; (13) Connie Green, Grievance Coordinator at SCI-Huntingdon; (14-18) Corrections Officers N. Lehman, McDermott, McDowell, Cook and Heaster at SCI-Huntingdon; (19-20) Robert Macintyre and Robin Lewis, Chief Hearing Examiners for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; (21) Richard Goss, psychologist at SCI-Huntingdon; (22-23) Corrections Officers Kyle and Riggleman at SCI-Huntingdon; (24) James Barnacle, Chief Investigator/Director of the Office of Special Investigations; and (25) Dorina Varner, Chief Grievance Coordinator of the Department of Corrections. Id.

In the amended complaint, Lewis raises a host of claims starting in May 2008, against the defendants relating to his alleged 3½ year stay in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon. Id. Lewis divides his amended complaint into the following five sections: (1) excessive solitary confinement (Id. , ¶¶ 1-23); (2) custom of using falsified misconducts (Id. , ¶¶ 24-65); (3) custom of using excessive force (Id. , ¶¶ 66-115); (4) custom of demeaning sexual harassment and voyeuristic nude photography (Id. , ¶¶ 116-140); and (5) custom of systematic denial of grievances (Id. , ¶¶ 141-148). Lewis contends that the conduct of the Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The overall outline of Lewis's amended complaint is set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 which state in toto as follows:

1. Starting from May 29th, 2008 a day after plaintiff was first placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon on trumped up misconduct reports by officers Thompson, Marlett, and Prokop³ he had been at various times subjected to the long established custom of abuses of SCI-Huntingdon's RHU, such custom of abuse consist of inflicting both psychological and physical pain and suffering upon inmates in the RHU through physical assaults, verbal threats, provoked cell extractions, denial of basic life necessities such as showers, food, yard exercise and mental health services, contamination of food by officers, voyeuristic and violent demeaning sexual harassment as a result of being forced to submit to nude photography, retaliation for reporting abuses through grievances and/or verbally protesting such abuses, the use of excessive and retaliatory solitary confinement under the guise of categorizing targeted inmates as displaying maladjustive behavior, and most of all false misconducts.

2. Such custom of abuse had been able to flourish for many years in the RHU because of the use of cover-up tactics by both the institutional and central office administrative officials and the very blatant and callous disregard of both of the same officials to take meaningful steps to end the abusive practices once they're made aware of them through both informal and formal complaints such as grievances and personal correspondences.

3. Plaintiff states as a fact that he has been personally subjected to the long established custom of abuses in SCI-Huntingdon's RHU and made to suffer under inhumane conditions of confinement with the full knowledge and expressed authorization of both the institutional administration at SCI-Huntingdon,... and the central office administration at Camp Hill...

Id. , ¶¶ 1-3. Lewis sets forth throughout the complaint several instances where he was charged with and found guilty of violating prison regulations. Lewis claims that all of these charges were false or fraudulent. He also alleges that he was subjected to the use of excessive force by prison guards on several occasions and grievances which he filed were systematically denied by personnel at SCI-Huntingdon and then by administrative personnel of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. With respect to the supervisory or administrative defendants, Lewis does not allege that they were involved in the conduct giving rise to his grievances. He merely alleges that they are liable because the multiple instances of the alleged use of excessive force, filing of false misconducts, and denial of grievances, etc., rose to the level of a custom.⁴

On November 20, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss portions of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants' motion is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below Defendants' motion will be granted other than with respect to one verbal harassment claim which escalated into violence and due process claims against Defendant Mitchell, the hearing examiner at SCI-Huntingdon.⁵ As will be explained more fully hereinafter, the court will review the claims against Defendant Mitchell and dismiss those claims pursuant to the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). Also, the claims against several defendants for allegedly filing false misconduct reports will be dismissed pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) ). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id . at 570, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 at 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.) “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65, and a court “ ‘is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ ” Id ., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (quoted case omitted).

In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.” Fowler, supra , 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id . at 210–11. Second, we “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “ ‘plausible claim for relief.’ ” Id . at 211 (quoted case omitted).

In addition, because Lewis complains about “prison conditions,” the screening provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), of the PLRA apply,⁶ given that Lewis was granted in forma pauperis status to pursue this suit. The court's obligation to dismiss a complaint under the PLRA screening provisions for complaints that fail to state a claim is not excused even after defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See, e.g. , Lopez v. Smith , 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 6 (9th Cir.2000). Hence, if there is a ground for dismissal which was not relied upon by a defendant in a motion to dismiss, the court may nonetheless sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such ground pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. See Lopez , 203 F.3d at 1126 n.6, Dare v. U.S. , Civil No. 06–115E, 2007 WL 1811198, at *4 (W.D.Pa. June 21, 2007), aff'd , 264 Fed.Appx. 183 (3d Cir.2008).

III. Statement of the Allegations of the Amended Complaint

The court has thoroughly reviewed the complaint and will at...