Ligon v. City of N.Y.

925 F.Supp.2d 478

Jaenean LIGON, individually and on behalf of her minor son, J.G.; Fawn Bracy, individually and on behalf of her minor son, W.B.; Jacqueline Yates; Letitia Ledan; Roshea Johnson; Kieron Johnson; Jovan Jefferson; A.O., by his parent Dinah Adames; Abdullah Turner; Fernando Moronta; and Charles Bradley, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK; Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department; Police Officer Johnny Blasini; Police Officer Gregory Lomangino; Police Officer Joseph Koch; Police Officer Kieron Ramdeen; Police Officer Joseph Bermudez; Police Officer Miguel Santiago; and Police Officers John Doe 1–12, Defendants.

No. 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Feb. 14, 2013.

Christopher Dunn, Esq., Alexis Karteron, Esq., Taylor Pendergrass, Esq., Daniel Mullkoff, Esq., New York Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., Esq., Mariana Kovel, Esq., The Bronx Defenders, Bronx, NY, Juan Cartagena, Esq., Foster Maer, Esq., Roberto Concepcion, Jr., Esq., LatinoJustice PRLDEF, John A. Nathanson, Esq., Tiana Peterson, Esq., Mayer Grashin, Esq., Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Heidi Grossman, Mark Zuckerman, Joseph Marutollo, Brenda Cooke, Richard Weingarten, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

+--------------------------------------------------+
¦I.  ¦INTRODUCTION                             ¦483¦
+----+-----------------------------------------+---¦
¦    ¦                                         ¦   ¦
+----+-----------------------------------------+---¦
¦II. ¦LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION¦486¦
+----+-----------------------------------------+---¦
¦    ¦                                         ¦   ¦
+----+-----------------------------------------+---¦
¦III.¦APPLICABLE LAW                           ¦487¦
+--------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------+
¦A.¦Sources of Liability                                 ¦487¦
+--+-----------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦B.¦The Fourth Amendment, Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion¦488¦
+--+-----------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦C.¦Criminal Trespass under New York State Law           ¦490¦
+--+-----------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦D.¦De Bour                                              ¦491¦
+------------------------------------------------------------+

+-------------------------+
¦   ¦                 ¦   ¦
+---+-----------------+---¦
¦IV.¦FINDINGS OF FACT ¦492¦
+-------------------------+

+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦A.¦Evidence of an Unconstitutional Practice or Custom of the NYPD¦492¦
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦1.¦Findings of Fact Regarding Testimony of ADA Rucker and Decline to     ¦492¦
¦  ¦Prosecute Forms                                                       ¦   ¦
+--+----------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦2.¦Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs' Stops                          ¦496¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+-------------------------------+
¦a.¦Charles Bradley's Stop  ¦497¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦b.¦Abdullah Turner's Stops ¦499¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦c.¦J.G.'s Stop             ¦503¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦d.¦Jerome Grant's Stop     ¦504¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦e.¦Roshea Johnson's Stop   ¦505¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦f.¦Letitia Ledan's Stops   ¦506¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦g.¦Fernando Moronta's Stop ¦507¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦h.¦Kieron Johnson's Stop   ¦508¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦i.¦Jovan Jefferson's Stop  ¦509¦
+-------------------------------+

+----------------------------------------------+
¦3.¦Expert Testimony Regarding UF–250 Forms¦510¦
+----------------------------------------------+

+--------------------------------------+
¦B.¦Steps Taken by the NYPD in 2012¦517¦
+--------------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
¦1.¦NYPD Recognition of a Problem in TAP                      ¦517¦
+--+----------------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦2.¦Interim Orders 22 and 23 of 2012                          ¦518¦
+--+----------------------------------------------------------+---¦
¦3.¦Absence of Steps Meaningfully Addressing Outdoor TAP Stops¦520¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------+
¦  ¦           ¦   ¦
+--+-----------+---¦
¦V.¦DISCUSSION ¦522¦
+------------------+

+------------------------------------+
¦A.¦Standing                     ¦522¦
+--+-----------------------------+---¦
¦B.¦Preliminary Injunctive Relief¦523¦
+------------------------------------+

+---------------------------------------------------------------+
¦1.¦Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits¦523¦
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

+-------------------------------+
¦a.¦Deliberate Indifference ¦523¦
+-------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------+
¦i.  ¦ADA Rucker's Testimony    ¦524¦
+----+--------------------------+---¦
¦ii. ¦Plaintiffs' Stops         ¦524¦
+----+--------------------------+---¦
¦iii.¦Decline to Prosecute Forms¦526¦
+----+--------------------------+---¦
¦iv. ¦Dr. Fagan's Analysis      ¦527¦
+----+--------------------------+---¦
¦v.  ¦Notice to Defendants      ¦531¦
+----+--------------------------+---¦
¦vi. ¦Legal Analysis            ¦532¦
+-----------------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦b.¦Failure to Rebut Deliberate Indifference Claim Based on Steps Taken by¦533¦
¦  ¦NYPD in 2012                                                          ¦   ¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+---------------------------+
¦2.¦Irreparable Harm    ¦539¦
+--+--------------------+---¦
¦3.¦Balance of Equities ¦539¦
+--+--------------------+---¦
¦4.¦Public Interest     ¦541¦
+---------------------------+

+---------------------------------------------+
¦C.¦Appropriate Scope of Injunctive Relief¦541¦
+---------------------------------------------+

+---------------------------------+
¦1.¦Immediate Relief          ¦542¦
+--+--------------------------+---¦
¦2.¦Proposed Additional Relief¦543¦
+---------------------------------+

+-------------------------------+
¦a.¦Policies and Procedures ¦544¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦b.¦Supervision             ¦544¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦c.¦Training                ¦544¦
+--+------------------------+---¦
¦d.¦Attorneys' Fees         ¦545¦
+-------------------------------+

+-------------------+
¦   ¦           ¦   ¦
+---+-----------+---¦
¦VI.¦CONCLUSION ¦545¦
+-------------------+

+---------------+
¦           ¦   ¦
+-----------+---¦
¦APPENDIX A ¦545¦
+-----------+---¦
¦           ¦   ¦
+-----------+---¦
¦APPENDIX B ¦550¦
+---------------+

I. INTRODUCTION

This case, filed in 2012, is one of three cases currently before this Court challenging aspects of the New York City Police Department's “stop and frisk” practices.¹ Of the three cases, this case is the most narrow. It deals only with stops made by the police on suspicion of trespass outside of certain privately-owned buildings in the Bronx. But the legal issues raised by this case have roots that stretch back decades.

In 1964, New York adopted the first version of its stop and frisk law, which has since been amended several times. The essence of the law is that a police officer may stop a person in a public place when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and the officer may demand of him his name, his address, and an explanation of his conduct. Upon stopping a person, if the police officer reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search the person for a deadly weapon.²

This law and the policing practices associated with it have raised a host of difficult questions, including: (1) what is reasonable suspicion; (2) what constitutes a stop; (3) what is a public place; (4) when is a stopped person free to walk away from the police; and (5) when does an officer have grounds to reasonably suspect that he is danger of physical injury. None of these questions are easily answered.

In 1968, the United States Supreme Court heard a challenge to New York's stop and frisk statute in the context of two criminal convictions, and made some important points that bear repeating today.³First, the Court held that although states may develop their own laws on stop and frisk, they may not “authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct.” ⁴ The Court stated, in no uncertain terms, that the question is not whether a particular search was authorized by state law but “ ‘whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” ⁵Second, the Court held that it would not judge the constitutionality of the New York statute on its face, but rather as applied to the particular facts of the two cases it was reviewing.⁶Third, the Court stressed that a police officer must have reasonable grounds before he seizes a person. In that regard the Court stated: “The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries.” ⁷

In confronting the issues addressed in this Opinion, I am keenly aware that this Court does not stand in the...