Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham

211 Conn.App. 765

274 A.3d 140

LOCH VIEW, LLC

v.TOWN OF WINDHAM

AC 44169

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 18, 2021

Officially released April 19, 2022

Richard P. Weinstein, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Sarah Black Lingenheld, West Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eric W. Callahan, New London, with whom, on the brief, was Richard S. Cody, New London, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., Suarez and Vertefeuille, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

In this action that arose out of a municipal tax dispute, the plaintiff, Loch View, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to open, modify, and vacate the judgment dismissing the its action against the defendant, the town of Windham.¹ Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court either failed to exercise its discretion or abused its discretion in denying its motion to open.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as summarized in the court's memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. "On July 2, 2009, [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] entered into a written tax fixing agreement [agreement] whereby [the defendant] agreed to set municipal taxes on two parcels of property on Main Street in Windham at a discounted rate in exchange for [the plaintiff] taking over the properties and investing a certain amount of money into the redevelopment of those properties. To ensure that [the plaintiff was] meeting its obligations under the tax fixing agreement, the agreement require[d] [the plaintiff] to provide periodic reports and documentary evidence to [the defendant] demonstrating that [the plaintiff was] in fact making the required investments in the properties. The [agreement] provide[d] [the defendant] with the right to cancel the [agreement] and recoup any tax benefits provided to [the plaintiff] should [the defendant] determine that [the plaintiff was] not living up to its investment commitments. In 2016, [the defendant] determined that [the plaintiff] was not living up to its obligations under the [agreement] and therefore [the defendant] sought to exercise what [it] viewed as its right to retroactively reassess the relevant properties in order to recoup the tax benefits provided to [the plaintiff] under the agreement."

Thereafter, in Loch View, LLC v. Windham , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6149827-S, the plaintiff commenced an action challenging the defendant's termination of the agreement and its attempt to retroactively assess the relevant parcels and charge the plaintiff back taxes (2016 action). The plaintiff specifically alleged that (1) the defendant's tax assessments were "manifestly excessive," (2) the defendant failed to "apply uniform percentages to the present true and actual valuation of the properties," in violation of General Statutes § 12-64,³ and (3) the valuation of the plaintiff's two parcels of property was grossly and manifestly excessive, in violation of the equal protection clause of the state constitution.

The plaintiff subsequently requested and was granted leave to amend its complaint five times in the 2016 action to add additional counts arising out of the defendant's retroactive adjustment of taxes with respect to additional tax years. Through those amended complaints, the plaintiff also added counts that (1) alleged that the defendant breached the agreement, (2) alleged that the defendant breached the obligation of good faith and fair dealing with respect to its enforcement of the agreement, (3) demanded a declaratory judgment seeking to declare illegal and void the defendant's retroactive assessment, (4) sought injunctive relief arising out of the defendant's enforcement of the contract, and (5) alleged that, in the event that the defendant was permitted to retroactively assess the plaintiff's taxes, the plaintiff sought a refund for its overpayment of taxes.

On April 30, 2019, the defendant filed a counterclaim in the 2016 action, alleging that the plaintiff had breached the agreement and that the defendant was therefore "entitled to recapture a sum equal to the financial benefit the plaintiff received as a result of reduced tax levies ...." The defendant specifically alleged that the plaintiff had failed (1) to meet the financial requirements of the agreement, (2) to pay recaptured taxes pursuant to the agreement, (3) to accurately account for the cost of work done on the parcels, and (4) to provide the town with thorough and semiannual reports pursuant to the agreement. Thereafter, on October 21, 2021, the plaintiff filed an answer to the defendant's counterclaim and asserted eight special defenses, including a special defense that the defendant's actions in terminating the agreement deprived the plaintiff of its constitutional right to challenge the tax assessment and violated its procedural and substantive due process rights.

In 2019, while the 2016 action was pending,⁴ the plaintiff filed the action underlying this appeal, alleging in a single count that it had been deprived of its constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities (2019 action). The 2019 action specifically alleged that the defendant's cancellation of the tax fixing agreement was "improper, illegal, arbitrary, and capricious," that it violated the plaintiff's state and federal due process rights, and that it constituted a taking under the United States and Connecticut constitutions. Given that the complaint alleged several federal law claims, the defendant removed the case to federal court. Shortly after its removal, however, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in state court that alleged only state law causes of action, and the case was remanded back to state court. The defendant then moved to dismiss the 2019 action in its entirety, pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, arguing that the plaintiff's claims in the 2019 action were duplicative of those in the pending 2016 action.

Thereafter, the court, Budzik, J. , issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. In so ruling, the court concluded that "both cases require resolution of the same underlying rights and factual claims, specifically, whether [the defendant] properly exercised its rights under the [agreement]" and, consequently, concluded that the plaintiff's 2016 and 2019 actions were virtually alike, and that, "under the circumstances of this case," it was proper for the court to dismiss the 2019 action. In reaching that decision, the court reasoned: "First, there does not appear to be any prejudice to [the plaintiff] in having the terms of the [agreement] determined in the context of the 2016 case. Count three of [the plaintiff's] operative complaint in the 2016 case squarely alleges that [the defendant] violated the [agreement]. [The plaintiff] has offered no reason why the court hearing the 2016 case cannot properly adjudicate that issue, or that [the plaintiff] will not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue as part of the 2016 case. Second, [the plaintiff] has not identified any relief that it is seeking in this case that it cannot receive in the 2016 case. ... Finally, this case is in its early stages. Therefore, it would serve the interests of judicial economy, avoiding unnecessary litigation, and avoiding conflicting results from different courts to dismiss this case and have [the plaintiff] litigate its claims over the proper application of the [agreement] in the 2016 case."

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend its complaint in the 2016 action, so that it could add the constitutional count that it had asserted in the recently dismissed 2019 action. The court, Cordani, J. , denied that request as untimely. The plaintiff then filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action, alleging that the denial of its request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action constituted a good and compelling reason to open the judgment in the 2019 action. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to open, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth below as necessary.

We first set forth our standard of review and the applicable law. "The principles that govern motions to open ... a civil judgment are well established. Within four months of the date of the original judgment, Practice Book [§ 17-4 ] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation. ... The exercise of equitable authority is vested in the discretion of the trial court ... to grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newtown v. Ostrosky , 191 Conn. App. 450, 468, 215 A.3d 1212, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 925, 218 A.3d 68 (2019). If a court fails to exercise its discretion in ruling on a motion to open, that failure to do so is error. See Higgins v. Karp , 243 Conn. 495, 504, 706 A.2d 1 (1998) ; see also State v. Lee , 229 Conn. 60, 73–74, 640 A.2d 553 (1994) ("[i]n the discretionary realm, it is improper for the trial court to fail to exercise its discretion").

When a court exercises its discretion in ruling on a motion to open, we review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Dimmock v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 84 Conn. App. 236, 241, 853 A.2d 543, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 923, 859 A.2d 577 (2004). "In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. ... The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Travis R. , 80 Conn. App. 777, 782, 838 A.2d 1000, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 904, 845 A.2d 409 (2004) ; see also Hall v. Hall , 335 Conn. 377, 396, 238 A.3d 687 (2020) (trial courts enjoy "broad...