Love v. Johnson, Case No. 15-11834

146 F.Supp.3d 848

Emani Love, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Ruth Johnson, Defendant.

Case No. 15-11834

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed November 16, 2015

Daniel S. Korobkin, Michael J. Steinberg, Jay Kaplan, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Detroit, MI, John A. Knight, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Michael Frederik Derksen, Jacki Lynn Anderson, Steven R. Gilford, Proskauer Rose LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Denise C. Barton, Erik A. Grill, Kevin R. Himebaugh, Department of Attorney General, Jeanmarie Miller, State of Michigan, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [16]

Nancy G. Edmunds, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs, a group of transgender individuals, filed this civil rights lawsuit against the Michigan Secretary of State seeking a declaration that the department's policy for changing the sex on a state-issued ID is unconstitutional. According to the complaint, the policy has made it unduly burdensome—and in some cases impossible—for Plaintiffs and others like them to obtain a state ID that accurately reflects their gender. In this way, Plaintiffs are forced to rely on an official ID that does not conform with their physical appearance. This, they maintain, indirectly divulges their transgender status to complete strangers and places them at serious risk of harm.

Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). According to Defendant, even accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, Plaintiffs have failed to assert a claim of constitutional dimension.

For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a cognizable privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court further declines to address the substantive merit of Plaintiffs remaining claims on the principle of judicial restraint. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are six transgender individuals whose gender identity does not conform to the sex they were assigned at birth.¹ “Gender identity” commonly refers to “a person's internal sense of being male, female or something else[.]” American Psychological Association Publication, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx. “Sex assigned at birth” on the other hand, refers “to one's biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes....” Id. A transgender person may decide to undergo “gender transition”—the complex process of altering a person's birth-assigned sex—which may involve one or more of the following: “adopting the appearance of the desired sex through changes in clothing and grooming, adopting a new name, changing sex designation on identity documents (if possible), using hormone therapy treatment, and/or undergoing medical procedures....” Id. Plaintiffs' complaint focuses on the Michigan Secretary of State's alleged role in impeding the gender transition process by establishing unduly burdensome requirements for transgender individuals to alter the gender designation on their state IDs.

In 2011, Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (“Johnson” or “Defendant”) implemented a new policy (the “Policy”) for “changing sex” on a state ID. The Policy provides as follows:

An applicant may request to change the sex on their driver license or [personal identification card]. The individual must provide a certified birth certificate showing the sex of the applicant. A birth certificate is the only document accepted as proof to change an individual's sex. A U.S. passport cannot be accepted as proof of a sex change.

(Def.'s Br. Ex. A, Identification Policy) (emphasis in original). Under the Policy, then, transgender individuals must procure an amended birth certificate in order to obtain a new state ID.² Plaintiffs maintain that this requirement places “onerous and in some cases insurmountable obstacles to prevent transgender persons from correcting the gender on driver's licenses and state IDs... [and] stands in contrast with the decisions of the federal government and numerous states to ease restrictions on changing gender on identity documents....” (Compl. ¶ 45). Indeed, according to Plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of State only requires a doctor's certification that a person “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” to change the gender on his or her passport. (Id. at ¶ 45(a)). Likewise, “[a]t least 25 of the States and the District of Columbia do not require a transgender person to undergo surgery to change the gender” on their state ID. (Id. ¶ 45(c)).

Because state laws differ in terms of whether and how an individual can amend the gender on their birth certificate, the practical effect of the Policy varies. Under Michigan law, Plaintiffs Emani Love and A.M. are required to undergo sex-reassignment surgery to procure an amended birth certificate. (Id. at ¶5(c)). By contrast, Plaintiffs Tina Seitz, Codie Stone, and E.B. “cannot obtain an accurate [Michigan] driver's license under any circumstances because their state of birth does not allow them to amend the gender on their birth certificate.” (Compl. ¶ 5(a)). In this way, the Policy creates various subclasses based solely on an individual's state of birth.

Notwithstanding the obvious importance of an accurate state ID, Plaintiffs contend that the Policy indirectly requires them to reveal “their transgender status, their transition, and/or medical condition to all who see [their] licenses, including complete strangers.” (Id. ¶ 93). Based on their own experiences and “data regarding the high incidence of hate crimes among transgender individuals”, Plaintiffs allege that the forced disclosure of their status places them at great risk of bodily injury. (Compl. ¶ 94-95). This, in addition to the harassment, embarrassment, and “psychological injury by labeling them by the wrong sex”, is the driving force behind Plaintiffs' complaint. (Plfs.' Resp. 4). Plaintiffs now seek a declaration that the Policy is unconstitutional on the basis that it impermissibly interferes with their right to free speech, substantive due process, and equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs further allege that the Policy implicates their right to travel and autonomy in medical decision-making. Defendant, for her part, maintains that each of Plaintiffs' five claims are substantively devoid of merit and should be dismissed on the pleadings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Sixth Circuit recently noted that under the United States Supreme Court's heightened pleading standard laid out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), “a complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n , 714 F.3d 920, 924–25 (6th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court in Estate of Barney goes on to state that under Iqbal, “[a] claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hile the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ the plausibility standard does ask for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Finally, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show [n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id . at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). If the plaintiffs do “not nudge [ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Moreover, “documents attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co. , 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ). “A court may also consider matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. at 336. In addition documents not attached to the pleadings may still be considered part of the pleadings when the “document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim.” Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. , 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs assert five constitutional claims against Michigan Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (“Johnson” or “Defendant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes civil liability on a person acting under color of state law who “deprives another of the ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ” Kallstrom v. City of Columbus , 136 F.3d 1055, 1060 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). The preliminary question, therefore, is whether Johnson deprived Plaintiffs of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws.” Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2691, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).

A. Substantive Due Process-Fundamental Right to Privacy

According to Plaintiffs, the State's Identification Policy (the “Policy”) violates their right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it forces them to reveal their transgender status to complete strangers. This disclosure of highly personal and intimate information, Plaintiffs maintain, is both embarrassing and places them at great risk of bodily harm.

The Supreme Court has long recognized...