Machie v. Nguyen

279 Ed. Law Rep. 129

824 F.Supp.2d 146

Edmond MACHIE, Plaintiff,

v.Charles NGUYEN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–552 (GK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Nov. 15, 2011.

Edmond Machie, Washington, DC, pro se.

Yoora Pak, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, McLean, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Edmond Machie, a native of Cameroon, brings this action against Defendants Dr. Charles Nguyen, Dean of the School of Engineering at the Catholic University of America (“Catholic University” or “University”) in Washington D.C., and Dr. Sameh Elsharkawy, a professor at the University. Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 2000d et seq. (“Title VI”), discrimination in violation of the Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq. (“WIA”), and also raises various common law causes of action.¹

This matter is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Defs. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 4]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, and Reply, and the entire record herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

I. Background ²

During the Spring 2006 semester, Plaintiff, who was a student at Catholic University, received a failing grade in CSC 522–Operating Systems, a computer science class taught by Defendant Elsharkawy. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6–7, 24. Plaintiff received this grade because of his performance on a group project, which served as the final exam for the class. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant Elsharkawy allegedly gave another group member, a non-Black woman of Asian descent, a better grade on the project than Plaintiff. Id.

On September 15, 2007, Defendant Nguyen placed Plaintiff on academic probation for the Fall 2007 semester because of his low GPA, and prohibited Plaintiff from taking more than three courses that term. Id. ¶ 18. On October 2, 2007, Defendant Nguyen informed Plaintiff that, due to his academic difficulties, he would be ineligible to graduate from the School of Engineering's Master's program in December 2007. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Nguyen advised Plaintiff to update the Director of the University's Department of Labor (“DOL”) scholarship program about this development. Id. At the time, Plaintiff appears to have been receiving a DOL scholarship. Id.

At some point thereafter, Plaintiff used the University's grade appeal process to challenge the grade he received in Defendant Elsharkawy's class. Id. ¶ 26. On or about December 18, 2009, Plaintiff's grade was raised. Id. ¶ 22.

Sometime on or around March 1, 2010, Plaintiff applied for readmission to the School of Engineering's Master's program. Id. ¶¶ 11–15. On April 20, 2010, Defendant Nguyen informed Plaintiff that he would not be admitted to the Master's program. Id. ¶ 21. On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff learned that his application was denied because his GPA fell below a 3.0. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that, because his grade in Defendant Elsharkawy's class had been raised, his GPA should have satisfied the Master's program's admissions requirement. Id.

On March 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint with this Court. On May 9, 2011, Defendants submitted a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On July 22, 2011, Defendants submitted a Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 20].

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, the complaint must plead facts that are more than “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability; “the pleaded factual content [must] allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider any documents attached to or incorporated into the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).

“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Under the standard set forth in Twombly, a “court deciding a motion to dismiss must ... assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 17 (citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1007 (D.C.Cir.2009) (declining to reject or address the government's argument that Iqbal invalidated Aktieselskabet ).

Complaints submitted by plaintiffs proceeding pro se are reviewed by the court under “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). However, a pro se complaint must still plead “ ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer more than the ‘mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C.Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that, by giving him a failing grade, Defendant Elsharkawy discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race and national origin in violation of Title VI. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nguyen similarly violated Title VI by placing him on academic probation for the Fall 2007 semester and failing to readmit him to the School of Engineering's Master's program. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated the WIA and subjected Plaintiff to “illegal arrest,” “false charge,” slander and libel, torture, and “attempted prosecution.” Compl. ¶¶ 28–29.

Defendants have raised a number of challenges to these claims, to which Plaintiff has failed to respond.⁴ In the Court's May 17, 2011 Order [Dkt. No. 5], Plaintiff was informed that “the Court may choose to treat as conceded any motion not opposed within the time limits put in place by the Court or may instead choose to consider on the merits any such motion.” Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to comply with this Order, the Court will consider the merits of Defendants' arguments.

A. Title VI

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VI because the statute does not allow for individual liability. Defs. Mot. 8–9.

Title VI prohibits federally-funded programs or institutions, such as universities, from discriminating against any person on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. As Defendants correctly point out, individual defendants, like Professors Nguyen and Elsharkawy, are not subject to suit under Title VI. Mwabira–Simera v. Howard Univ., 692 F.Supp.2d 65, 70 (D.D.C.2010)(citing to Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1169–70 (11th Cir.2003)).

Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under this statute.

B. Workforce Investment Act

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the WIA because the statute does not permit private parties to bring suit under the Act. Defs. Mot. 16–17.

The WIA was enacted to “provide workforce investment activities through statewide and local workforce investment systems that increase the employment, retention, and earnings of participants, and increase occupational skill attainment by participants, and, as a result, improve the quality of the workforce, reduce welfare dependency, and enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the Nation.” 29 U.S.C. § 2811. The WIA mandates that “[n]o individual shall be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, subjected to discrimination under, or denied employment in the administration of or in connection with, any such program or activity because of race, color, religion, sex ..., national origin, age, disability, or political affiliation or belief. 29 U.S.C. § 2938(a)(2).

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants received WIA funding, nor would they seem to be eligible for such funding under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2842; 29 U.S.C. § 2843. Moreover, as Defendants correctly argue, the WIA does not permit private plaintiffs to sue for violation of the statute's non-discrimination provision. See Borrero–Rodriguez v. Montalvo–Vazquez, 275 F.Supp.2d 127, 132 (D.P.R.2003) (“The [WIA] does not give the alleged victim [of discrimination] the right to sue. The Attorney General may or may not choose to file a civil action to remedy the alleged discrimination, if the matter is referred by the Secretary [of labor].”).

For this reason, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the WIA.

C. Plaintiff's Common Law Theories of Liability

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's factual allegations fail to support his claims for illegal arrest, false charge, slander and libel, torture, and attempted prosecution. Defs. Mot. 17–23.

1. Illegal Arrest

Although there is no cause of action under D.C. law for illegal arrest, the Court will construe Plaintiff's Complaint as raising a claim for false arrest, which is legally cognizable. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S.Ct. 594. There are two types of false arrest claims: ones...