Maples v. State

507 Mich. 461

968 N.W.2d 446

David A. MAPLES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.STATE of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 160740

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal April 7, 2021

Decided July 20, 2021

Bendure & Thomas, PLC, Grosse Pointe Park (by Mark R. Bendure ) for David A. Maples.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Christopher M. Allen, Assistant Solicitor General, and Robyn Frankel and Gallant Fish, Assistant Attorneys General, for the state of Michigan in support of plaintiff's position.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Linus Banghart-Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for the state of Michigan in support of defendant's position.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

McCormack, C.J.

The Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA), MCL 691.1751 et seq. , allows people who were wrongfully imprisoned to seek compensation for the harm they suffered. The WICA limits eligibility for compensation to claimants who can prove (among other things) that new evidence shows that they were wrongfully convicted. This appeal is about what "new evidence" means under the act.

The WICA defines "new evidence," in relevant part, as "any evidence that was not presented in the proceedings leading to plaintiff's conviction ...." MCL 691.1752(b). David Maples, the WICA plaintiff here, relies on exculpatory evidence that was unavailable to present at his originally scheduled trial but was considered by the court at a pretrial hearing. We hold that this is new evidence under the WICA because it was not presented to a trier of fact during a proceeding that determined guilt—a trial or a plea hearing. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Maples, Lawrence Roberts, and James Murphy were at a bar when Murphy sold cocaine to an undercover officer. Maples and Roberts claimed they did not know about the drug sale but were arrested after they left the bar together. The charges against Roberts were eventually dismissed; the charges against Maples were not.

Shortly after his arrest, Murphy wrote a letter to the trial court, explaining that Maples and Roberts had nothing to do with the crime. During a pretrial hearing on Murphy's motion to dismiss his own charges based on an entrapment defense, which Maples joined, Murphy testified that Maples was neither involved in nor aware of the drug deal. (Murphy later signed affidavits swearing to the same.) The trial court denied that motion. Maples also moved to dismiss his case for a speedy-trial violation but did not prevail.

After the trial court denied his entrapment and speedy-trial motions, Maples planned to present Murphy as a defense witness at his trial. But the day before it was set to begin, he learned that Murphy had promised the prosecution he would not testify on Maples's behalf as part of his own plea deal. And Roberts—Maples's only other witness—couldn't be found. With no available witnesses, and relying on his counsel's advice that he could still appeal the speedy-trial violation, Maples pled guilty to delivery of cocaine.

Maples's appeal did not succeed in the Court of Appeals, and this Court denied leave; his attorney's advice that he could challenge the speedy-trial violation on appeal after pleading guilty was wrong. See People v. Maples , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 4, 1997 (Docket No. 196975), p. 1, 1997 WL 33339368 ; People v. Maples , 459 Mich. 867, 584 N.W.2d 738 (1998). He filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on that incorrect advice, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted him relief. Maples v. Stegall , 427 F.3d 1020, 1034 (C.A. 6, 2005). The panel concluded that Maples had been prejudiced by his trial's uncommonly long delay because both Roberts and Murphy likely would have testified favorably for him but were unavailable by the time of trial. Id. at 1033-1034. Since Maples's speedy-trial-violation claim had merit, his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for advising him to plead guilty when doing so waived his right to appeal the claim, and he was entitled to habeas relief on that basis. Id. at 1034. The Macomb Circuit Court then dismissed Maples's criminal charges and vacated his conviction.

Maples filed his WICA complaint in the Court of Claims shortly after the WICA became law in 2017, seeking compensation from the state for his wrongful imprisonment. Maples argued that he met the WICA's requirements for compensation because new evidence demonstrated that he did not perpetrate the crime and was not an accomplice or accessory to the acts that were the basis of the conviction. The new evidence that resulted in the vacation of his convictions and the dismissal of the charges against him, according to Maples, was the exculpatory testimony of Murphy and Roberts that he was unable to present at a trial. Maples relied on Murphy's testimony at the entrapment hearing, Murphy's affidavits, and Murphy's letter to the trial court to support his claim. Maples did not include a similar offer of proof to establish Roberts's purported testimony, though he argued that Roberts would have testified favorably for him.

The state moved for summary disposition, which the Court of Claims granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court determined that neither Murphy's nor Roberts's testimony was new evidence. Alternatively, the court found that it was Maples's trial counsel's deficient performance and the speedy-trial violation that had "resulted in" the vacation of his conviction, not Murphy's proffered testimony.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. Maples v. Michigan , 328 Mich. App. 209, 213, 936 N.W.2d 857 (2019). The panel agreed that Murphy's testimony was not new evidence because it had been presented at the entrapment hearing. Id. at 221, 936 N.W.2d 857. It also agreed that Roberts's alleged testimony was not new evidence because Maples had offered no proof of what that testimony would have been. Id. at 221-222, 936 N.W.2d 857. Therefore, the panel held that the Court of Claims did not err by granting summary disposition in the state's favor. Id. at 222, 936 N.W.2d 857. Because it found that Maples had not carried his burden of proof by supporting his claim with new evidence, the panel did not address the alternative ground proffered by the Court of Claims for dismissing his case. Id. This appeal followed.

II. THE WICA'S "NEW EVIDENCE" REQUIREMENT

New evidence is the key to prevailing on a claim for compensation. To receive an award under the WICA, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) new evidence demonstrates that they did not perpetrate the crime; (2) new evidence resulted in their conviction being reversed or vacated; and (3) new evidence resulted in either the dismissal of the charges or in an acquittal of all the charges on retrial. MCL 691.1755(1)(c). The WICA defines new evidence as follows:

"New evidence" means any evidence that was not presented in the proceedings leading to plaintiff's conviction, including new testimony, expert interpretation, the results of DNA testing, or other test results relating to evidence that was presented in the proceedings leading to plaintiff's conviction. New evidence does not include a recantation by a witness unless there is other evidence to support the recantation or unless the prosecuting attorney for the county in which the plaintiff was convicted or, if the department of attorney general prosecuted the case, the attorney general agrees that the recantation constitutes new evidence without other evidence to support the recantation. [ MCL 691.1752(b).]

The WICA does not further define any of these terms. It does not explain what "proceedings" might "lead[ ] to [the] plaintiff's conviction."

We have long required criminal defendants seeking relief from judgment based on new evidence to show that the evidence is not just new, but that it is newly discovered. See People v. Cress , 468 Mich. 678, 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 (2003). As this Court has explained, "evidence is not newly discovered if the defendant or defense counsel was aware of the evidence at the time of trial." People v. Rao , 491 Mich. 271, 281, 815 N.W.2d 105 (2012). Had the Legislature intended to exclude evidence like Murphy's exculpatory testimony from the definition of "new evidence" because it was known at the time of trial, it could have simply adopted our well-established standard for newly discovered evidence. The WICA's text, however, includes no discovery timing requirement.

The Legislature chose not to incorporate this Court's definition of new evidence into the WICA even though it was aware of our judge-made standard for newly discovered evidence. See Reed v. Breton , 475 Mich. 531, 540, 718 N.W.2d 770 (2006) ("[T]he Legislature is held to be aware of this state's law ...."). The WICA's definition of new evidence turns not on when it was discovered, but on whether the evidence was presented in certain proceedings.

III. ANALYSIS

We review the interpretation of the WICA de novo. Sanford v. Michigan , 506 Mich. 10, 14, 954 N.W.2d 82 (2020). As always, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Id. at 14-15, 954 N.W.2d 82. The most reliable indicator of intent is usually the statute's text. Badeen v. PAR, Inc. , 496 Mich. 75, 81, 853 N.W.2d 303 (2014). When a term in that text is undefined, we apply its plain and ordinary meaning. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP v. Detroit , 505 Mich. 284, 305-306, 952 N.W.2d 358 (2020). And we analyze the ordinary meaning of statutory language in the context of the entire statute, TOMRA of North America, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 505 Mich. 333, 339, 952 N.W.2d 384 (2020), to give it "the reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute," People v....