Masika v. United States

263 A.3d 1070

Moureen MASIKA, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 20-CF-274

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 22, 2021

Decided December 2, 2021

Donald L. Dworsky was on the brief for appellant.

Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, Elizabeth Kelley, Jennifer Mika, and Ethan L. Carroll, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, Thompson,^* Associate Judge, and Nebeker, Senior Judge.

Nebeker, Senior Judge:

Appellant, Moureen Masika, appeals her conviction for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult or elderly person ("FEVA") by fraud. She challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support fraud and the jury instructions regarding the fraud offense. We affirm.

I. Background

In 2012, Hugh Jacobsen suffered a stroke and his physical health and cognitive functions began to decline. Mr. Jacobsen's son, Simon Jacobsen, hired two home health aides through Georgetown Home Care to assist with his father's care, including his bathing, dressing, and cooking. In 2018, appellant and Margarette Butler were the two home health aides that cared for Hugh Jacobsen.

Due to his condition, Hugh Jacobsen was unable to manage his finances. Simon Jacobsen and his wife directly provided for most of his father's needs. They ordered groceries to be delivered to Hugh Jacobsen's house through Instacart. If the aides wanted to order carryout food for Hugh Jacobsen, Simon Jacobsen would place the order himself. His clothes and medications were also provided for.

If the aides needed to purchase an item for Hugh Jacobsen, they could use a debit card connected to his BB&T Bank checking account that was kept in a kitchen cabinet. The card was meant for "small incidental things from time to time," such as butter, detergent, and toothpaste, as the aides were not supposed to leave Hugh Jacobsen alone in the house. Simon Jacobsen instructed the aides that they needed his permission to use the card, and after making a purchase they were to put receipts in a jar in the kitchen. He never gave them permission to get cash using the debit card.

Jonathan Altheimer—an attorney who worked for the family architecture firm—was responsible for helping Simon Jacobsen manage Hugh Jacobsen's bills and monitor his bank statements. In May 2018, he noticed charges on the debit card statement from CVS Pharmacy that were in larger amounts and more frequent than usual, with back-to-back transactions on many dates. The CVS transactions from January 1, 2018, through approximately April 13, 2018, totaled over $3,400. Mr. Altheimer obtained two receipts from CVS and discovered that each included a small amount of goods as well as $40 in cash back. He brought this irregular card activity to Simon Jacobsen's attention.

Simon Jacobsen confronted both of the home health aides about the charges towards the end of May 2018. He compared the dates of the transactions to the aides’ work schedules and learned that appellant was working on the days the charges were made. When he asked appellant to explain the charges, she said something to the effect of, "Oh, Simon, this is something we all have to do." She also asked him to throw away the receipts.

He again confronted her about the charges on October 4 in a text message that read, "You owe us $7,000 in stolen credit card cash back charges from CVS." Appellant responded, "Simon, I don't owe you any money. Any money I used on that card was for your father. I gave that job nothing but my best. It's not an easy job. I used my money many times, even have receipts. I don't buy personal things from CVS."

The police investigation identified and obtained eighty-five receipts from CVS. The items purchased included a home paternity test, makeup, a hair wrap, and feminine pads. Ms. Butler identified appellant on CVS security camera footage on several of the dates in question, including at the self-checkout register on at least three occasions.

Appellant was charged with FEVA by fraud and three counts of second-degree theft. The case proceeded to a jury trial. After all of the evidence had been introduced, the trial court discussed the jury instructions with counsel for both parties. Regarding the instructions for fraud as it relates to the FEVA charge, the trial court discussed the paragraph from the standard instructions explaining "false representation," asking whether it fit the facts of the case and "what statement or assertion from the evidence" it would refer to. The government suggested removing the paragraph, to which counsel for appellant stated, "I agree with the Government." The trial court stated it would delete the entire paragraph about false representations, as well as the following paragraph defining "material fact," which related back to the definition of false representation.¹ Both parties stated that they did not object.²

The jury convicted appellant on all counts. Judge Robert Okun sentenced her to 180 days of incarceration on each count, all suspended, with three years of probation with the condition that she not work as a home health aide, and ordered her to pay $1,800 in restitution.

II. Analysis

Appellant does not challenge her theft convictions. She raises two issues on appeal regarding the FEVA by fraud conviction. First, she challenges the sufficiency of evidence of the underlying offense of fraud. Specifically, she argues there was insufficient evidence to show she made a "false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise." She also contends that the jury instruction on FEVA constituted plain error because it did not include the definitions of "false representation or promise" and "material fact" to accompany the instruction on fraud.

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the fact-finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence." Cherry v. District of Columbia , 164 A.3d 922, 929 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). "The evidence is sufficient if any rational fact-finder could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Hernandez v. United States , 129 A.3d 914, 918 (D.C. 2016).³

D.C. Code § 22-933.01(a)(3) (2021 Supp.) provides that:

a person is guilty of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult or elderly person if the person intentionally and knowingly ... [v]iolates any provision of law proscribing theft, extortion, forgery, fraud, or identity theft against the vulnerable adult or elderly person, so long as the offense was undertaken to obtain the property, including money, of a vulnerable adult or elderly person.

First-degree fraud requires proof that a person "engage[d] in a scheme or systematic course of conduct with intent to defraud or to obtain property of another by means of a false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise and thereby obtain[ed] property of another or cause[d] another to lose property." D.C. Code § 22-3221(a) (2012 Repl.); Cooper v. United States , 28 A.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. 2011).

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that she engaged in a scheme and systematic course of conduct, had the requisite intent, or obtained the property of another. Her only challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is that the government failed to prove that she made "a false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise." Her argument seems to rest on the assumption that a statement is required to prove fraud.

Appellant relies in part on the common law definition of fraud, which requires a "false representation," to support this interpretation. See Bennett v. Kiggins , 377 A.2d 57, 59 (D.C. 1977). However, under the common law, we have recognized that "[n]ondisclosure or silence, as well as active misrepresentation, may constitute fraud." Id. ; see also Pyles v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. , 172 A.3d 903, 908 (D.C. 2017) ("[F]raud may be committed by the omission of material facts...."); In re Outlaw , 917 A.2d 684, 688 (D.C. 2007) ("Concealment or suppression of a material fact is as fraudulent as a positive direct misrepresentation.") (quoting In re Mitchell , 727 A.2d 308, 315 (D.C.1999) ).

Federal courts interpreting the mail fraud statute⁴ —which served as a model for the District's fraud statute and the source of the statutory language appellant points to—have similarly made clear that fraud does not necessarily require a statement. See The District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982, Extended Comments on Bill No. 4-133 before the Committee on Judiciary, 4th Council Period, at 40, 41 (July 20, 1982); United States v. Woods , 335 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that the government "needed to prove a specific false statement" for mail fraud because "a defendant's activities can be a scheme or artifice to defraud whether or not any specific misrepresentations are involved") (internal brackets omitted); United States v. Colton , 231 F.3d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying common law meaning of "to defraud" in bank fraud statute to "include[ ] acts taken to conceal, create a false impression, mislead, or otherwise deceive in order to "prevent the other party from acquiring material information") (internal brackets omitted).

Appellant also emphasizes the distinction between fraud and theft, codified at D.C. Code § 22-3211 (2021 Supp.) to encompass several previously distinct offenses including larceny by trick, larceny by trust, and false pretenses. Before fraud was established as a separate offense, frauds were prosecuted under these theft-related offenses. The District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982, Report on Bill No. 4-133 before the Committee on Judiciary, 4th...