Masoud v. Saul

448 F.Supp.3d 147

Nizar MASOUD, Plaintiff,

v.Andrew SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 3:19-cv-00246 (JAM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 23, 2020

Melissa A. Buckley, Buckley & Buckley, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Vernon Norwood, Social Security Administration—NY Office of the General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.

RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS TO REVERSE AND AFFIRM DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Nizar Raef Masoud asserts that he is disabled and unable to work because of complications arising from chemotherapy for Hodgkin's lymphoma, degenerative joint disease of the left ankle, neuropathy, visual impairment, and spinal stenosis. He has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, who denied his claim for supplemental security income. Masoud has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Doc. #19, and the Commissioner has filed a motion to affirm his judgment, Doc. #24.¹ For the reasons discussed below, I will grant Masoud's motion for judgment on the pleadings, deny the Commissioner's motion to affirm, reverse the decision of the Commissioner, and remand for a calculation of benefits.

BACKGROUND

I refer to the transcripts provided by the Commissioner. See Doc. #14 et seq. Masoud is a carpenter who made a steady living in Homs, Syria, with his wife and children, until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. "Everything was OK until the war started." Doc. #14-4 at 83-84 (Tr. 778) (hearing transcript). After he was captured and tortured, Masoud fled from his captors and left Syria with his family, ending up in a Jordanian refugee camp for two years. While in the camp, Masoud discovered a lump on his neck. Cancer was suspected. Fortunately, with the assistance of Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Services, a New-Haven-based federal refugee resettlement agency, Masoud and his family were able to emigrate to the United States as refugees, at which time Masoud could be treated at the Yale-New Haven Hospital ("YNHH"). See ibid.

Tests conducted at YNHH in December 2015 (the onset date) rapidly revealed that Masoud had Stage IVB Hodgkin's lymphoma. See Doc. #14-10 (Tr. 1406). Chemotherapy was recommended as a matter of urgency, and began on January 13, 2016. See ibid. But the cancer and chemotherapy led to a host of adverse symptoms, including, most notably, a diagnosis of grade two neuropathy in February 2016. See Doc. #14-10 at 48 (Tr. 1446). By September 2017, Masoud was being treated for back pain, hearing problems, numbness in his fingers, poor vision, sleep apnea, and the loss of all his teeth. Doc. #14-10 at 144-45 (Tr. 1541-42). The chemotherapy was, however, successful: treatment was stopped in June 2016, see Doc. #14-9 at 332 (Tr. 1293), and by August 2016, Masoud's treating physician reported that his cancer was in remission, see Doc. #14-9 at 144 (Tr. 1115).

Masoud filed an application for supplemental security income on March 4, 2016, alleging a disability that began on December 1, 2015, around the time he was formally diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma. See Doc. #14-7 at 3 et seq. (Tr. 886 et seq. ). Masoud's claim was initially denied on July 29, 2016, see Doc. #14-5 at 8 (Tr. 806), and denied again upon reconsideration on December 5, 2016, see id. at 16 (Tr. 814). He then timely filed a written request for a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on January 12, 2017. See Doc. #14-6 at 15 (Tr. 829).

Masoud appeared with counsel and an interpreter and testified at a hearing in New Haven before the ALJ on January 16, 2018. Doc. #14-4 at 73 et seq. (Tr. 768 et seq. ). Vocational expert Theresa Wolford testified by phone. Ibid.

On February 13, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Masoud was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Doc. #14-2 at 11-22 (Tr. 12-23). The Appeals Council denied Masoud's request for review on January 16, 2019. Id. at 2 (Tr. 1). Masoud then filed this appeal on February 20, 2019. Doc. #1.

To qualify as disabled, a claimant must show that he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months," and "the impairment must be ‘of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.’ " Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2)(A) ). "[W]ork exists in the national economy when it exists in significant numbers either in the region where [claimant] live[s] or in several other regions of the country," and "when there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more occupations) having requirements which [claimant] [is] able to meet with his physical or mental abilities and vocational qualifications." 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a) - (b) ; see also Kennedy v. Astrue, 343 F. App'x 719, 722 (2d Cir. 2009).

The agency engages in the following five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a "residual functional capacity" assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or his past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

Estrella v. Berryhill , 925 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) ; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).

In applying this framework, if an ALJ finds a claimant to be disabled or not disabled at a particular step, he may make a decision without proceeding to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proving the case at Steps One through Four; the burden shifts at Step Five to the Commissioner to demonstrate that there is other work that the claimant can perform. See McIntyre v. Colvin , 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014).

After proceeding through all five steps, the ALJ concluded that Masoud was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Masoud had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 4, 2016, the date of his application. See Doc. #14-2 at 17 (Tr. 16). At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Masoud suffered from the following severe impairments: Hodgkin's lymphoma in remission status post chemotherapy and degenerative joint disease of the left ankle. See ibid.

At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Masoud did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See ibid. The ALJ then found that Masoud had a residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c). See id. at 20-22 (Tr. 19-21).

At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Masoud was unable to perform any past relevant work. Id. at 23 (Tr. 22). At Step Five, the ALJ found that because Masoud had an RFC to perform the full range of medium work, was younger than age 49, and had limited education with no transferrable skills, a finding of "not disabled" was directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 203.26. This rule is contained in Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Part 404, available at https://www.ssa.gov/OPHome/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm [https://perma.cc/F7EA-V5F3 ], and this Appendix is better known as "the grids." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.969 (applying the Part 404 grids to supplemental security income).

At the hearing, however, the ALJ elicited the testimony of a vocational expert. See Doc. #14-4 at 94-103 (Tr. 789-98). The expert testified that a person of Masoud's age, education, and work background, limited to the full range of medium work as defined in the regulations, with further non-exertional limitations of "only frequent postural activities" and "only occasional exposure to higher concentrations of dusts, fumes, gases and the like" would be able to perform a range of unskilled work. Id. at 95 (Tr. 790). The expert further testified that this hypothetical person who had the further limitation of "only frequent handling and fingering with both hands" but who was also "unable to communicate effectively in English, verbally or in writing" could not perform any unskilled work. Doc. #14-4 at 96-97 (Tr. 791-92).

The ALJ ultimately held that Masoud was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act since March 4, 2016. See Doc. #14-2 at 23 (Tr. 22).

DISCUSSION

The Court may "set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error." Burgess v. Astrue , 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(1) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" and "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lesterhuis v. Colvin , 805 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam ). Absent a legal error, the Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court might have ruled differently had it considered the matter in the first instance. See Eastman v. Barnhart , 241 F. Supp. 2d 160, 168 (D. Conn. 2003).

Distilled to its...