Mayo v. Doe

480 F.Supp.3d 395

Christopher J. MAYO, Plaintiff,

v.Chris DOE, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:19-cv-781 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed August 17, 2020

Christopher J. Mayo, Jewett City, CT, pro se.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Victor A. Bolden, United States District Judge

Christopher J. Mayo, ("Plaintiff"), pro se and currently incarcerated at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut, has filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Trooper Sergeant Chris Doe, K-9 Trooper John Doe #1, Troopers John Doe #2-#7, Norwich Police Detective Ryan Kelsey, the Statewide Narcotics Task Force Southeastern, and Troop D – Montville State Police are all named as Defendants.

Mr. Mayo alleges that Sergeant Chris Doe sexually assaulted him during a stop that did not result in an arrest. Mr. Mayo seeks monetary and punitive damages of $5,000,000.00, and mental and emotional damages of $5,000,000.00.

All claims against the Statewide Narcotics Task Force Southeastern and Troop D – Montville State Police as well as all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The case will proceed on the excessive force claim against Sergeant Chris Doe, the failure to intervene claim against Detective Kelsey and the other Doe Defendants, and the unconstitutional search and seizure claims against all individual Defendants.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Allegations

On October 5, 2017, at 6:30 p.m., Mr. Mayo allegedly arrived at the back of a Chinese restaurant and laundromat in Jewett City. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 1 (May 21, 2019). Inside the restaurant, he allegedly was approached by six to eight plain clothes Detective Troopers all wearing exposed gold badges. Id. ¶ 2. All of these officers were white. Id. The officers allegedly took Mr. Mayo's phone from his hand and ordered him out of the restaurant. Id. Once outside, they allegedly pulled him around the corner into the alley near his car. Id. ¶ 3.

A uniformed state trooper allegedly searched Mr. Mayo's car without permission or a warrant. Id. ¶ 4. The trunk allegedly was open and a police dog was laying on the back seat. Id. The K-9 officer allegedly had the dog walk around Mr. Mayo multiple times. Id. ¶ 5. Although the officer allegedly kept tapping Mr. Mayo's pockets, the dog did not signal. Id. The officers allegedly became frustrated. Id. Mr. Mayo allegedly stated that he wanted to go home and eat dinner. Id. ¶ 6.

Mr. Mayo alleges he saw and heard Sergeant Chris Doe putting on a glove. Id. ¶ 7. The Defendants allegedly ordered Mr. Mayo to step to the back of the laundromat and hold the wood cross post of the staircase. Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Mayo allegedly "contested," but was afraid of being arrested and began to move slowly. Id. Trooper Mike and Trooper Robinson/Robertson allegedly grabbed Mr. Mayo's wrist and held him against the post. Id. ¶ 9.

Sergeant Chris Doe then allegedly aggressively penetrated Mr. Mayo's rectum four to five times. Mr. Mayo experienced severe pain. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Mayo allegedly tried to pull away and yelled "What are you doing?" Id. ¶ 11. Sergeant Chris Doe allegedly then pulled his hand out, smiled, removed the glove, and told Mr. Mayo that he could leave. Id. ¶ 13. All the defendants allegedly laughed as he left. Id.

Mr. Mayo alleges he is mentally and emotionally disturbed and depressed as a result of this incident and has become impotent. Id. ¶ 14.

B. Procedural History

On May 21, 2019, Mr. Mayo filed his Complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Compl.; Mot., ECF No. 2 (May 21, 2019).

On June 6, 2019, the Court granted Mr. Mayo's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Order, ECF No. 8 (June 6, 2019).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners’ civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte "dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) ; see also Liner v. Goord , 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is mandatory); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter , 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (" Section 1915A requires that a district court screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint sua sponte if, inter alia, the complaint is ‘frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’ " (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A )).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to provide the defendant "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

A plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require "detailed factual allegations," a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am. , 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F. 3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater , 623 F. 3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the "special solicitude" courts afford pro se litigants).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court considers the facts alleged to support possible claims for use of excessive force, unconstitutional search and seizure, and failure to intervene to prevent harm.

A. Excessive Force

Claims for use of excessive force by police officers during an arrest or other seizure are considered under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that the amount of force used was objectively unreasonable either as to when or how the force was applied, and that, as a result of the use of force, he suffered some compensable injury. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; Maxwell v. City of N. Y. , 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004). Whether a given quantum of force is excessive depends on "the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crim at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

"The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight" and must allow "for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Mr. Mayo contends that Sergeant Chris Doe used excessive force against him. Mr. Mayo alleges that he was sexually assaulted because the defendants were frustrated when the police dog did not detect anything. He allegedly was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee, he merely said that he wanted to leave. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for now. See Burnes v. Suda , 2019 WL 5683541, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2019) (Plaintiff "ha[d] stated a plausible excessive force claim against [defendant officers] based on allegations that they punched him several times and shot him with a taser while he was handcuffed on the ground .... Those allegations support an inference that the defendants’ use of force ..., was objectively unreasonable."); ( Swift v. Mauro , No. 5:04-CV-0899 (NAM/GJD), 2008 WL 207793, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2008)) (finding plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts where he alleged defendant officers "beat him with their fists even though he did not resist arrest and attempted only to defend himself from defendants’ unwarranted attack").

Accordingly, Mr. Mayo's excessive force claim will proceed against Sergeant Chris.

B. Unconstitutional Search and Seizure

The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1,30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). In examining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion...