McCall v. Sopneski

202 Conn.App. 616

246 A.3d 531

Kyle MCCALL

v.Gina SOPNESKI et al.

AC 42498

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 30, 2020

Officially released February 16, 2021

John F. Wynne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph N. Schneiderman, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Edward N. Storck III, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher J. Lynch, for the appellee (defendant Reynolds Garage & Marine, Inc.).

Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js.^*

ELGO, J.

The plaintiff, Kyle McCall, was injured when the motorcycle he was operating was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Gina Sopneski and owned by the defendant Reynolds Garage & Marine, Inc., known also as Reynolds Subaru (Reynolds).¹ The plaintiff thereafter served a two count complaint on the defendants, alleging in the first count negligence against Sopneski and in the second count vicarious liability against Reynolds pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a.² The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Reynolds on the second count of the complaint,³ concluding as a matter of law that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Reynolds was immune from liability for Sopneski's actions. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the propriety of that determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On May 18, 2017, the plaintiff was operating a motorcycle on Route 154 in Deep River. At the same time, Sopneski was operating a 2014 Subaru motor vehicle (Subaru) on Route 154. When she attempted to make a left-hand turn onto Southworth Street, the Subaru collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle, causing injury to the plaintiff.

At the time of that accident, the Subaru was owned by Reynolds and had been provided to Sopneski on a temporary basis while her own motor vehicle was being repaired. It is undisputed that, prior to obtaining temporary use of the Subaru, Sopneski furnished proof of her automobile insurance to Reynolds and entered into a written agreement with Reynolds regarding the use of the Subaru (agreement).

Following the accident, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants. His complaint contained two counts. Count one alleged negligence on the part of Sopneski.⁴ In count two, the plaintiff alleged that Reynolds was vicariously liable for the plaintiff's injuries pursuant to § 14-154a because the defendants had entered into a rental agreement regarding Sopneski's use of the Subaru. In response, Reynolds filed an answer and two special defenses, in which it alleged (1) that Reynolds was immune from liability pursuant to General Statutes § 14-60 ‘‘because the [Subaru] ... was loaned to [Sopneski] for her use while her own vehicle was being repaired’’ and (2) there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

On August 6, 2018, Reynolds moved for summary judgment on count two of the complaint on the ground that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it was immune from liability pursuant to § 14-60, which grants immunity to motor vehicle dealers from liability for any damage caused by a loaned automobile, so long as the customer has furnished the dealer with proof of liability insurance.⁵ On January 4, 2019, the court granted the defendant's motion, concluding that ‘‘[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the transaction between Sopneski and Reynolds falls within the purview [of] § 14-60.’’ In so doing, the court emphasized that, for two reasons, it construed the agreement between the defendants as a loan of the vehicle, rather than as a rental of it. First, the court noted the undisputed fact that the agreement provided for the use of a ‘‘temporary substitute vehicle’’ while Sopneski's own vehicle was being repaired. Second, the court relied on the undisputed fact that Sopneski was not charged for her temporary use of the substitute vehicle. Accordingly, the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he defendant ha[d] met its burden in clearly demonstrating that the [Subaru] was loaned to Sopneski by Reynolds while Sopneski's own vehicle was in for repairs ... and that Sopneski provided Reynolds with proof of insurance.’’ The court thus rendered judgment in favor of Reynolds on the second count of the complaint,⁶ and this appeal followed.⁷

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Reynolds is entitled to the immunity provided by § 14-60 (a). We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. ‘‘The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49 ] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forth-with if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. ... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America , 310 Conn. 304, 312–13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). ‘‘When a court renders summary judgment as a matter of law, our review is plenary, and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Armshaw v. Greenwich Hospital , 134 Conn. App. 134, 137, 38 A.3d 188 (2012).

Additionally, because this appeal involves questions of statutory construction, we set forth our well established principles of statutory construction. ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... Statutory interpretation is a question of law, over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rutter v. Janis , 180 Conn. App. 1, 7–8, 182 A.3d 85 (2018), aff'd, 334 Conn. 722, 224 A.3d 525 (2020).

In granting Reynolds’ motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Reynolds had loaned the Subaru to Sopneski on a temporary basis while her own motor vehicle was being repaired, in accordance with § 14-60 (a).⁸ The plain language of that statute permits dealers to ‘‘loan a motor vehicle or number plate or both ... when a motor vehicle owned by or lawfully in the custody of such person is undergoing repairs ... provided such person shall furnish proof to the dealer or repairer that he has liability and property damage insurance which will cover any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of the loaned motor vehicle, motor vehicle on which the loaned number plate is displayed or both. Such person's insurance shall be the prime coverage. ...’’ General Statutes § 14-60 (a). In the present case, it is undisputed that the Subaru had been provided to Sopneski on a temporary basis while her own motor vehicle was being repaired by Reynolds. It also is undisputed that Reynolds verified that Sopneski had a valid automobile insurance policy prior to lending the Subaru to her.⁹

Our Supreme Court's decision in Cook v. Collins Chevrolet, Inc. , 199 Conn. 245, 246, 506 A.2d 1035 (1986), is instructive in resolving the plaintiff's claim. The issue in Cook was ‘‘the extent of the statutory liability of an automobile dealer and its insurer [under § 14-60 ] when a motor vehicle bearing a loaned dealer's license plate becomes involved in an accident.’’ Id. In that case, the defendant dealer lent a dealer plate to the purchaser of a pickup truck while his registration was pending. Id., at 247, 506 A.2d 1035. Significantly, the dealer confirmed that the purchaser ‘‘had liability insurance covering personal injury and property damage’’ prior to so doing. Id. The purchaser thereafter was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the plaintiff, who brought an action against the purchaser and the dealer. Id. The trial court subsequently granted the dealer's motion for summary judgment on the ground that it had fully complied with the requirements of § 14-60 when lending the dealer plates to the purchaser. Id., at 248–49, 506 A.2d 1035.

On appeal, our Supreme Court examined ‘‘the language, history, and applicability of § 14-60 ’’ and observed that a dealer's failure to comply with that statute by loaning a motor vehicle or dealer plate to an uninsured person ‘‘would make the dealer jointly liable’’ with that person. Id., at 249–50, 506 A.2d 1035. The court noted the ‘‘legislative intent to impose liability on a dealer only when [the dealer] violates the mandate of § 14-60 and lends dealer plates to a purchaser who is not insured.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 250...