McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc.

320 Conn. 299

130 A.3d 231

Janice McCULLOUGH

v.SWAN ENGRAVING, INC., et al.

No. 19480.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 7, 2015.

Decided Feb. 2, 2016.

Christopher Meisenkothen, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Catherine Ferrante, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Joseph J. Passaretti, Jr., Glastonbury, with whom was Tushar G. Shah, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Robert F. Carter, Woodbridge, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Janice McCullough, was required to file a separate timely notice of claim for survivor's benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31–275 et seq., where her husband, Arthur McCullough (decedent), had filed a timely claim for disability benefits during his lifetime with the defendant Swan Engraving, Inc. (Swan Engraving).¹ The plaintiff appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Review Board (board) reversing the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner (commissioner) awarding the plaintiff survivor's benefits.² On appeal, the plaintiff claims that she was not required to file a separate notice of claim for survivor's benefits because the timely filing of any claim for benefits under the act satisfies the limitation period for all potential claims under the act. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the board.

The relevant, undisputed facts and procedural history are as follows. The plaintiff is the widow and presumptive dependent of the decedent.³ The decedent was employed by Swan Engraving from 1970 to 1998 as a photograph engraver. During the course of his employment, he was exposed to toxins through his use of carbon arc lamps. In February, 2000, he was diagnosed with disabling pulmonary fibrosis as a result of his work exposure to toxins. In May, 2002, the decedent filed a timely claim for benefits. After seeking medical treatment for his pulmonary fibrosis, including a lung transplant, the decedent succumbed to his illness and died on March 31, 2005. At no time prior to the decedent's death was the claim accepted or were benefits paid.

On April 19, 2006, fifty-five weeks after the decedent's death, the plaintiff filed a claim for death and survivor's benefits. Thereafter, the defendants accepted the decedent's underlying claim for benefits and the parties entered into a voluntary agreement as to that claim on February 26, 2013.

The commissioner conducted a hearing on the plaintiff's claim for survivor benefits. At the hearing, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff's claim for survivor benefits was not timely because it was filed more than one year after the decedent's death and more than six years after the date of the decedent's first manifestation of symptoms of a work-related injury. In response, the plaintiff claimed that the timely filing and acceptance of the decedent's claim for benefits satisfied the limitation period for all potential claims under the act. The commissioner agreed with the plaintiff and determined that her claim for survivor benefits was timely and ordered the defendants to pay survivor's benefits to the plaintiff.

The defendants appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board. The defendants challenged the commissioner's finding that the decedent's timely filing of a claim for benefits under the act satisfied the statute of limitations requirement for the plaintiff's claim for survivor's benefits and asserted that the plaintiff was required to file a separate timely claim for benefits within one year from the decedent's death. The board reversed the decision of the commissioner, concluding that the statutory scheme requires a dependent filing for survivor's benefits to file a separate claim and that "claims under [General Statutes] § 31–306⁴ ... must be commenced under the time limitations of [General Statutes] § 31–294c⁵ ... subject to the limited exceptions expressly provided for under [General Statutes] § 31–306b⁶ ...."⁷ (Footnotes added.) This appeal followed.⁸

"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals.

The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established. The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.... [Moreover, it] is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and ... board.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegallyor in abuse of its discretion.... We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 315 Conn. 543, 550, 108 A.3d 1110 (2015). "In addition to being time-tested, an agency's interpretation must also be reasonable...." Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346, 356, 10 A.3d 1 (2010). "Even if time-tested, we will defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute only if it is ‘reasonable’; that reasonableness is determined by ‘[application of] our established rules of statutory construction.’ " Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission, 318 Conn. 769, 781, 122 A.3d 1217 (2015).

"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In doing so, we are guided by the mandates of General Statutes § 1–2z. The issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case is a question of law subject to plenary review. Id., at 782, 122 A.3d 1217.

Furthermore, "[i]t is well established that, in resolving issues of statutory construction under the act, we are mindful that the act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be construed generously to accomplish its purpose.... The humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers' compensation.... Accordingly, [i]n construing workers' compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act.... [T]he purposes of the act itself are best served by allowing the remedial legislation a reasonable sphere of operation considering those purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supra, 315 Conn. at 550–51, 108 A.3d 1110.

On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that her claim is not barred by the statute of limitations in § 31–294c because the timely filing of the decedent's notice of claim satisfied the requirements of that statute and there is no requirement that she file a separate claim. In response, the defendants assert, and the board concluded, that the plaintiff was obligated to file a separate claim for survivor's benefits within the statute of limitations provided for in § 31–294c (a).

In order to resolve this question, we begin by examining the plain language of § 31–294c. Section 31–294c (a) provides in relevant part: "No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later...."

Nothing in the plain language of § 31–294c seems to apply to the exact situation in the present case. First, it is undisputed that the decedent complied with the terms of § 31–294c (a) by giving notice of his claim on May 30, 2002, which was within three years from the first manifestation of the disease. Thereafter, the decedent died on March 31, 2005, and the defendants have agreed that his death was as a result of his occupational disease. The defendants eventually accepted the decedent's claim and issued voluntary agreements on that claim.

Second, the only language in § 31–294c regarding a dependent filing a claim for benefits is not applicable in the present case. The only phrase addressing dependents provides as follows: "[I]f death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31–294c (a). In the present case, the decedent's death did not occur within two years of the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease. Accordingly, based on its plain language, § 31–294c not only does not seem to provide a statute of limitations for the plaintiff's claim, it does not seem to apply to ...