McDuffie v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Elections

273 A.3d 838

Kenyan MCDUFFIE, Petitioner,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Respondent,Bruce Spiva, Intervenor.

No. 22-AA-276

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

FILED- April 28, 2022

ORDER

Per Curiam:

Pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-1001.08(0)(2), Kenyan McDuffie seeks expedited review of an April 18, 2022, Memorandum Opinion and Order issued by the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The Board declared that Mr. McDuffie does not meet the qualification requirements set forth in D.C. Code § l-301.83(a) to serve as Attorney General for the District of Columbia and thus concluded that his name may not be placed on the June 21, 2022, Democratic primary ballot as a candidate for that office. Appellate briefing was completed in this matter on April 26, 2022, and oral argument, at which the court heard from Mr. McDuffie, the Board, and intervenor/challenger Bruce V. Spiva, was held on April 27, 2022. Because the court's understanding is that the Board requires a decision from this court by April 28, 2022, to timely prepare ballots for printing and mailing, the court is issuing its order to announce our holding affirming the Board's decision and provide a brief summary of our reasoning. A published opinion will follow.

In addition to imposing registration, residency, and bar membership requirements, § 1-301.83(a)(1)-(4), the statute setting forth the minimum qualifications and requirements for the Attorney General imposes an experiential requirement, id. § 1-301.83(a)(5). Specifically, the statute provides that "no person shall hold the position of Attorney General for the District of Columbia unless" they have:

(5) ... been actively engaged, for at least 5 of the 10 years immediately preceding the assumption of the position of Attorney General, as:

(A)An attorney in the practice of law in the District of Columbia;

(B) A judge of a court in the District of Columbia;

(C) A professor of law in a law school in the District of Columbia; or

(D)An attorney employed in the District of Columbia by the United States or the District of Columbia.

Id. (emphases added). Mr. McDuffie has a law degree, does not practice law, and has been serving as a Councilmember for Ward 5 in the District of Columbia since 2012. It is agreed that he is not eligible to run for Attorney General under § 1-301.83(a)(5)(A)-(C). The only substantive question is whether Mr. McDuffie is qualified to run for Attorney General under § 1-301.83(a)(5)(D), which requires that he have "been actively engaged, for at least 5 of the [past] 10 years ... as ... [a]n attorney employed in the District of Columbia by ... the District of Columbia." Mr. McDuffie argued to the Board that he satisfies § 1-301.83(a)(5)(D) either because (1) he is an attorney and is employed by the District of Columbia; or (2) he is an attorney and, although not employed as such, is "actively engaged" in legal work in his capacity as a councilmember. The Board rejected these arguments. Observing that an individual need not be a lawyer to serve as a member of the Council of the District of Columbia, the Board concluded that to satisfy the experiential requirement of § 1-301.83(a)(5)(D), an individual must "have served or be serving in the position of attorney." Board Memorandum Opinion and Order at 10. The Board reasoned that this determination was dictated by the plain text of the statute and that to read the statute as Mr. McDuffie had urged would either effectively eliminate an experiential requirement for government employees who happen to be attorneys, but do not serve in attorney positions, or create a linedrawing problem in determining when a District employee not employed as an attorney is engaged in "functional[ly] equivalent" work. Id.

Mr. McDuffie argues that our review of the Board's interpretation of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia Clarification and Elected Term Amendment Act of 2010, codified in part at § 1-301.83, is de novo because it presents a pure question of law. The Board and Mr. Spiva argue, however, that this court should accord some deference to the Board's decisionmaking. Because we agree with the Board's understanding of the statute, we need not resolve this dispute in this order.

"The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used." Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v . District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (quoting Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 64 (D.C. 1980) (en banc)). Although we disagree with the Board that § 1-301.83(a)(5)(D) "is plain and admits of no more than one meaning," Peoples Drug Stores, 470 A.2d at 753 (quoting Davis v . United States , 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C. 1979) ), the court concludes that a holistic examination of the "statute's full text, language[,] ... punctuation, structure, and subject matter," Baltimore v . District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1146 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp ., 825 A.2d 939, 946 (D.C. 2003) ), as well as the evolution of the statutory language (discussed at oral argument), support the Board's determination that, for an...