Mcentyre v. Sam's E., Inc.

313 Ga. 429

870 S.E.2d 385

MCENTYRE

v.SAM'S EAST, INC.

S21Q0909

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 8, 2022

Joseph West Dent, Joseph W. Dent, P.C., PO Box 70549, Albany, Georgia 31708, Alfreda Lynette Sheppard, Watson Spence LLC, PO Box 2008, Albany, Georgia 31702-2008, for Appellant.

Ernest Linwood Beaton, Howard M. Lessinger, McLain & Merritt, PC, 3445 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 500, Atlanta, Georgia 30326-3240, John Holder Smith, Jr., Young Thagard Hoffman Smith & Lawrence, P.O. Box 3007, Valdosta, Georgia 31604-2999, for Appellee.

Keith Robert Blackwell, Alston & Bird LLP, One Atlantic Center, 1201 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, for Amicus Appellee.

Bethel, Justice.

This case involving personal injury claims arising from an automobile accident is before this Court on three certified questions from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The questions seek this Court's interpretation of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b), which provides that "[n]o person shall operate or load for operation, on any public road, any vehicle with any load" unless the load and any covering thereon is "securely fastened" and whether this code section applies to a tort claim. Our responses to the questions certified, as explained more fully below, can be summarized as follows: (1) OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) imposes a duty on a person assisting the operator of a vehicle with loading merchandise onto the vehicle to securely fasten the load; (2) a person assisting in loading a vehicle may be liable in tort for injuries to a third party resulting from a breach of his or her duty to secure that load (and any covering thereon); and (3) when serving as the basis for a civil tort suit, a violation of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) is subject to ordinary tort principles and defenses.¹

1. The pleadings and discovery materials indicate the following: On February 22, 2016, Mary Louise McCall purchased two mattresses and two box springs from the Sam's Club in Albany, Georgia, which Sam's East, Inc. operated. Sam's East employees Darion Ponder and Eddie Shorter assisted McCall by physically placing the mattresses and box springs onto McCall's pickup truck bed. McCall did not physically load or handle the mattresses and box springs when Ponder and Shorter loaded them onto her truck. The parties dispute whether Ponder and Shorter simply loaded the mattresses and box springs onto the bed of McCall's truck or whether they also tied the mattresses and box springs to the truck in an attempt to secure them. Upon leaving Sam's Club, one of the mattresses became loose and fell from the bed of McCall's truck onto a public roadway. Shortly after the mattress fell onto the road, Amanda McEntyre's vehicle struck the mattress, resulting in serious injuries to her neck and shoulder.

McEntyre filed a lawsuit against McCall, which was later settled. McEntyre also filed a personal injury lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against Sam's East, alleging negligence and negligence per se and seeking punitive damages. After Sam's East filed a motion for summary judgment and McEntyre filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the district court stayed the proceedings and certified the following questions to this Court:

(1) Does OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) require a person — who is assisting the operator of a vehicle to load merchandise onto said vehicle — to "securely fasten" the load to the vehicle?

(2) Under OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), would a person — who assists in loading or securing a load to a vehicle but is not operating the vehicle — be liable to a third party who is injured while the vehicle is in operation on a public road as a result of the load becoming loose, detached, or in any manner ... a hazard to other users of the public road?

(3) Under OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), does the occurrence of a load becoming loose, detached, or in any manner ... a hazard to other users of the public road necessarily mean that the load was not securely fastened? That is to say, is OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) a strict liability statute?

2. The district court's certified questions call upon us to interpret the meaning of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), which provides:

(b) No person shall operate or load for operation, on any public road, any vehicle with any load unless such load and any covering thereon is securely fastened so as to prevent such covering or load from: (1) Becoming loose, detached, or in any manner becoming a hazard to other users of the public road[.]

In considering the meaning of this statute,

we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mobley v. State , 307 Ga. 59, 69 (4) (a), 834 S.E.2d 785 (2019).

(a) The first question the district court asked is whether OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) requires a person to "securely fasten" the load when he or she is merely assisting the operator of a vehicle in loading it. We conclude that under the plain language of the statute, a person assisting the operator of a vehicle with loading has a duty to "other users of the public road" to "securely fasten[ ]" the load.

The question posed by the district court assumes that the person assisting with the loading is not also the operator of the vehicle. The phrase "[n]o person shall ... load for operation" does not limit the duty imposed by the statute to secure a load and any covering thereon to the operator of the vehicle or a person primarily responsible for loading. "No person" is an expansive term, and the background law generally provides that those who assist others in violating a statute can be held individually liable for their actions. See OCGA §§ 16-2-20 (establishing party to a crime criminal liability); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk , 305 Ga. 558, 572-574 (2), 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019) (discussing "concerted action" as the basis for tort liability). Contrary to Sam's East's argument, OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) does not contain any language restricting the duty it sets out only to those who have "control" over the operation of the vehicle. And no such language appears in the case principally relied on by Sam's East, which considered only whether the operator – a person who undoubtedly does have at least some control over the vehicle – violated the statute. See Semones v. State , 200 Ga. App. 3, 406 S.E.2d 483 (1991). Rather, the statute imposes the duty to securely fasten loads and coverings on any person who "operate[s]" a vehicle on a public road or "load[s]" a vehicle for operation on a public road. People who assist one another in loading items onto a vehicle that will be operated on a public road are all engaged in loading the vehicle, and therefore would all have a duty to secure the load and any covering thereon under the statute. That duty is owed to "other users of the public road." OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) (providing that such duty is "to prevent such covering or load from becoming a hazard to other users of the public road").

Sam's East and its amicus contend that interpreting the statute to impose on individuals who lack complete control a duty to secure a load on a vehicle will result in liability for well-meaning and helpful neighbors who assist operators in loading their vehicles or companies that offer such assistance with loading as a "courtesy." As an initial matter, we note that it is not for this Court to expand or contract the scope of the General Assembly's legislative enactments, unless the policy choices it makes by enacting statutes exceed its constitutional authority. See Woodard v. State , 296 Ga. 803, 814 (3) (b), 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015) ("If a law enacted by the General Assembly is not unconstitutional[,] ... the obligation of this Court is to apply the law by its terms, whether we like it or not."). Accordingly, the policy concerns raised by Sam's East and its amicus about the extent to which liability may be imposed by OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) are properly addressed not by this Court exceeding its constitutional authority to impermissibly limit the duty imposed by the plain language of the statute, but by petitioning the General Assembly and advocating for a change in the law. Moreover, as discussed further in Division (2) (b) below, Sam's East and its amicus's concerns about the practical consequences that may flow from the plain text of the statute enacted by the General Assembly may be mitigated by application of traditional tort principles of proximate cause.

(b) The remaining questions posed by the district court asked whether OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) is a "strict liability" statute such that the occurrence of a load becoming loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to other users of the public road necessarily means that the load was not securely fastened, and whether a person who assists in loading or securing a load to a vehicle but who is not operating the vehicle would be liable to a third party who is injured as a result. We conclude that because ordinary principles of negligence apply to this civil tort case, a load becoming loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to other users of the public road does not necessarily mean in every instance that the load was not...