McKally v. Perez

87 F.Supp.3d 1310

Carlton McKALLY, Plaintiff

v.Officer Richard PEREZ, Defendant.

Case No. 14–22630–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed Feb. 5, 2015.

Filed Feb. 6, 2015.

Wendell Terry Locke, Locke Law, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff.

Annery Pulgar Alfonso, Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, Officer Richard Perez (“Perez['s]”) Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice ... (“Motion”) [ECF No. 12], filed October 29, 2014. On November 9, 2014, Plaintiff, Carlton McKally (“McKally”) filed a Response Opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ... (“Response”) [ECF No. 17]. On November 20, 2014, Defendant filed a Reply ... (“Reply”) [ECF No. 18].

The only count in the Complaint [ECF No. 4] is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging Perez violated McKally's civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by falsely arresting McKally. (See Compl. 5). In his Motion, Perez seeks an order dismissing the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief and on the basis of qualified immunity. (See generally Mot.). The Court has carefully reviewed the Amended Complaint, the parties' written submissions, and applicable law.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 28, 2013, McKally was washing clothes at the Swifty Coin Laundry (the “laundromat”), located at 13500 West Dixie Highway in North Miami, with his daughter, a minor. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9). The laundromat is bounded by three streets: to the north is 136th Street, on the west is NE 10th Avenue, and on the southeast side is West Dixie Highway. (See id. ¶ 7). McKally was at the laundromat for over an hour, during which time his car was parked with its front facing forward in one of the parking spaces on the southeast side of the laundromat building. (See id. ¶¶ 8, 10). McKally's car had a paper tag with the tag numbers written on it, along with the words “LOST TAG.” (Id. ¶ 16).

After finishing his laundry, McKally opened the trunk of his car to place his clothes inside. (See id. ¶ 11). While loading his laundry, McKally had observed a Miami–Dade Police Department (“MDPD”) vehicle drive by him, traveling south on West Dixie Highway. (See id. ¶ 11). McKally saw the police vehicle slow down as it drove by, and he saw a MDPD officer, Defendant Perez, look in his direction. (See id. ). According to McKally, while he was loading his laundry and his car trunk was open, Perez could not visibly see the car's temporary tag because the tag faced vertically toward the sky. (See id. ¶ 12).

After McKally placed his clothes in the trunk, closed the trunk, and secured his daughter in her car seat, he backed his car out of the parking space and drove around the corner of the laundromat building to the north exit on 136th Street. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 14). As McKally was leaving the laundromat parking lot, he saw what appeared to be the same MDPD vehicle accelerate toward him, traveling eastbound on 136th Street, and stop in front of McKally's car, causing McKally also to stop. (See id. ¶ 14). McKally backed up his car so the MDPD vehicle could have access to the laundromat parking lot, at which point the MDPD vehicle turned in to the laundromat parking lot and pulled directly in front of McKally's car. (See id. ¶ 15). Perez exited the MDPD vehicle and walked to the rear of McKally's car, saw the paper tag, and accused McKally of having a fraudulent tag. (See id. ¶ 16). McKally told Perez he had recently reported the tag as stolen to the North Miami Police Department and produced “documentation to that effect.” (Id. ¶ 17). At this time, multiple MDPD officers arrived on the scene. (See id. ).

Perez asked McKally for his license, registration, and proof of insurance, all of which McKally provided. (See id. ¶ 18). After a few minutes, Perez returned to McKally and advised him his driver's license was suspended and accused McKally of knowing his license was suspended. (See id. ¶ 20). In response, McKally told Perez “he had a D6 clearance in his possession showing that any issue he may have had concerning a suspended driver's license was resolved on September 10, 2013.” (Id. ¶ 21). But “[u]nbeknownst to McKally, his driver's license was suspended again on September 23, 2013, as a result of an insurance cancellation.” (Id. (alteration added)).

Perez told McKally he was having McKally's car towed. (See id. ¶ 22). McKally told Perez his father was on his way to the laundromat and asked if his father could drive McKally's car and take McKally's daughter with him. (See id. ). Perez responded, “ ‘I'm not trying to hear it. Since you want to ask questions, you're getting in the back of my police car—you're being arrested.’ ” (Id. ¶ 23). McKally was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of Perez's police vehicle. (See id. ).

When McKally's father arrived, Perez refused to allow him to drive McKally's car, saying he was having it impounded. (See id. ¶ 24). McKally's father was permitted to remove McKally's belongings from the car and to take McKally's daughter. (See id. ¶ 25). McKally was arrested for possession of a fraudulent tag. (See id. ¶ 26).¹

Plaintiff's Complaint raises a single count against Perez, brought pursuant to section 1983, claiming Perez violated McKally's civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by falsely arresting McKally.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (alterations added). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (alteration added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration added) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997).

III. DISCUSSION

“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc )). In the Motion, Perez argues he is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Once the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is asserted, “unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Absent such allegations, it is appropriate for a district court to grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. (alterations, ellipses, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); see also Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 Fed.Appx. 867, 872 (11th Cir.2012) (noting “a defense of qualified immunity may be addressed in a motion to dismiss, which will be granted if the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). For government officials sued in their individual capacities, “[q]ualified immunity offers complete protection” so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir.2004) (alteration added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To be entitled to the qualified-immunity defense, a government official must demonstrate “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A government official proves he acted within his discretionary authority by showing “objective circumstances which would compel...