McQuarters v. Superior Court

42 Cal.Rptr.3d 292

138 Cal.App.4th 1357

Elton McQUARTERS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Alameda County, Respondent The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. A112669.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

April 27, 2006.

Diane A. Bellas, Public Defender, Harold Friedman, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Charles M. Denton, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, René A. Chacón, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.

SIGGINS, J.

Petitioner Elton McQuarters was convicted in 1991 of a felony violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(2)¹ and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. He remains in state custody, ostensibly pursuant to the provisions of section 2970 et seq., that provide for the continued involuntary treatment of prisoners with a "severe mental disorder [which is] not in remission or cannot be kept in remission if the person's treatment is not continued, and that, by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (Ibid.) The law provides that a mentally disordered offender (MDO) may be recommitted. "Prior to the termination of a commitment under this section, a petition for recommitment may be filed to determine whether the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and whether by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 2972, subd. (e).) Notwithstanding this provision, in this case, no petition for recommitment was filed until 13 days after petitioner's previous term expired. Moreover, the People concede that there is no good cause that could excuse the tardy filing of the petition. Thus, the issue before us is whether the state can legally continue to hold an MDO whose term of commitment has expired when, absent any showing of good cause, no timely petition to extend the recommitment was filed. As explained below, we conclude that under these circumstances there is no valid authority to continue petitioner's MDO status. Consequently, we issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its October 28, 2005, order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition and demurrer and to enter an order sustaining the demurrer and granting the motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After he was at first found mentally incompetent to stand trial, petitioner was subsequently found competent, and on July 12, 1991, pled guilty to assault with a firearm, a felony pursuant to section 245, subdivision (a)(2). He was sentenced to 13 years in state prison. He was first committed to the State Department of Mental Health as an MDO in 2000, and that commitment was extended annually thereafter in 2001 through 2004. In both 2003 and 2004 petitioner stipulated to his MDO status, and thereby extended his most recent commitment through September 22, 2005. No petition to extend this most recent commitment was filed until October 5, 2005, 13 days after it had expired. The district attorney conceded that there was no good cause that could excuse the tardy filing of the petition to extend the commitment, and offered in explanation that the case "fell through the cracks." Petitioner demurred to the recommitment petition and moved to dismiss on October 28, 2005. The trial court denied petitioner's demurrer and motion "[f]or the protection of the public" and because there was no prejudice to petitioner. The judge stressed that the failure to file a timely petition was promptly remedied when discovered by the district attorney and that the intervening period when the petitioner was held after the expiration of the prior commitment was only 13 days. The court reasoned that the time limits in the statute fell "somewhere between directory and mandatory," and, recognizing the need for guidance, encouraged petitioner to seek a writ. This petition seeking a writ of prohibition and mandate was filed on January 13, 2006. After reviewing the Attorney General's informal opposition we issued an order to show cause on February 2, 2006.

Petitioner suffers from schizophrenia, polysubstance dependence, and mild mental retardation. Over the course of eight hospitalizations at Atascadero he has at times been actively psychotic with auditory hallucinations and persecutory delusions. At other times (including most recently) he shows negative schizophrenic signs such as poor self-care, minimal use of language, social withdrawal, disorganized behavior, and disorganized speech. He attempts to light cigarettes through an electric socket and as recently as April 2005 he physically assaulted another patient.

Petitioner's long criminal history begins when he was a juvenile and includes convictions for receiving stolen property, loitering, second degree burglary, four convictions for burglary, and two for petty theft.

The most recent clinical assessment we have of petitioner is a June 2005 report from the medical director for Napa State Hospital, requesting that a petition be filed for petitioner's continued involuntary treatment. The report, signed by five different clinicians and mental health administrators, finds the petitioner has made no progress towards his discharge criteria. It concludes that he "clearly suffers from a severe mental disorder . . . Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type. His illness is not in remission as evidenced by his continued disorganized speech and thought processes, severe social withdrawal, and lack of basic self care. By reason of the severe mental disorder, Mr. McQuarters represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others as evidenced by several assaults he provoked in the past year and most recent one on April 14, 2005. In addition, he is at increased risk of starting an accidental fire . . . ."

DISCUSSION

A. This Issue is Worthy of Writ Review

As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General urges us to deny the petition because "[p]etitioner does not demonstrate why the normal presumption that an appeal is an adequate remedy does not lie." In making this argument, the Attorney General minimizes the fundamental issue raised by this case: whether or not there is any legal basis to detain petitioner. If there is no legal basis for petitioner's detention, it is imperative that the issue be dealt with promptly — without waiting for the delay attendant to proceedings below and the perfecting of an appeal. If a detention is illegal an appeal process that can only give relief months or years later is necessarily inadequate.²

B. The Mentally Disordered Prisoners Act

Petitioner has been confined, and the state suggests that he should continue to be confined, subject to the provisions of the Mentally Disordered Prisoners Act (MDPA). (§ 2960 et seq.) The MDPA reflects the Legislature's determination that some prisoners have a treatable, severe mental disorder that caused or was an aggravating factor in the crime for which they were committed, that the state has a compelling interest to protect the public from those prisoners who are not in remission, and that in order to protect the public, it is necessary to provide those prisoners continuing mental health treatment until the underlying condition can be kept in remission. (§ 2960.) For prisoners who meet specified criteria (§ 2962), based on the appropriate clinical recommendation, the district attorney may file a petition to extend their involuntary treatment for one year. (§ 2970.) The MDPA contains three deadlines for the formal process of extending an MDO commitment: (1) the appropriate clinician must submit an evaluation of the prisoner to the district attorney "not later than 180 days prior to the termination of parole, or release from prison if the prisoner refused to agree to treatment as a condition of parole . . . unless good cause is shown for the reduction of that 180-day period" (§ 2970); (2) "[t]he trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown" (§ 2972, subd. (a)); and (3) "[p]rior to the termination of a commitment under this section, a petition for recommitment may be filed to determine whether the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and whether by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 2972, subd. (e).) It is the failure to file a timely petition for recommitment and comply with this third deadline that is the issue in this case.³

We readily accept that the "fundamental purpose of the MPDA [is] to protect the public." (People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 451, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 1; People v. Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 129, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 ["The fundamental purpose of the MDO provisions is . . . to protect the public from dangerous mentally disordered prisoners"]) and if public safety were the only concern, the most prudent course of action would be to keep MDO's confined automatically and indefinitely at the state's pleasure. Rather, commitment and confinement must be imposed in a way that will also "protect a defendant's rights to liberty and procedural due process." (Williams, supra, at p. 457, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Indeed, absent appropriate safeguards, the law would not survive constitutional challenge. Fortunately, the MDPA was intended to and does safeguard individuals' liberty and due process. For example, unless waived, the defendant has the right to a unanimous jury verdict and the right to counsel. (§ 2972,...