Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale

76 Cal.App.5th 43

291 Cal.Rptr.3d 250

David MEINHARDT, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CITY OF SUNNYVALE, Defendant and Respondent;

Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

D079451

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed March 9, 2022

Messing Adam & Jasmine and Gregg McLean Adam for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Suzanne Solomon, San Francisco, and David A. Urban, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

AARON, Acting P. J.

I.INTRODUCTION

"California cases have uniformly held that a trial court's complete denial of a petition for administrative mandamus is a final judgment that may be appealed by the petitioner." ( Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1113, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 394 P.3d 1048 ( Dhillon ).) And, as the Supreme Court in Dhillon explained, a ruling nominally denominated as an "order" on a petition for writ of administrative mandate¹ may, in fact, constitute a "final judgment" when such order has the effect of a final judgment. ( Id. at p. 1115, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 394 P.3d 1048.) That is because it is " ‘ "not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative." ’ " ( Ibid. )

In addressing whether a ruling has sufficient finality to constitute a judgment, the Dhillon court stated, " ‘ "As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory." ’ " ( Dhillon, supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 394 P.3d 1048.) The Dhillon court applied this test in concluding that the trial court's "order" on the plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandate in that case "was an appealable final judgment." ( Id. at p. 1116, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 394 P.3d 1048.)

Dhillon is consistent with numerous published cases that have concluded that an order denying a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment for purposes of an appeal. (See, e.g., Sandlin v. McLaughlin (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 820, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 874 ( Sandlin ) ["Although the trial court never entered a formal judgment on the petition for writ of mandate, its order denying the petition in its entirety ‘constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal’ "]; Molloy v. Vu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 746, 753, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 679 ( Molloy ) [" ‘[A]n order granting or denying a petition for an extraordinary writ constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal, even if the order is not accompanied by a separate formal judgment,’ " quoting Public Defenders' Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 ( Public Defenders' Organization )]; Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 481–482, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 ( Tomra Pacific, Inc. ) ["We note that the order denying the petitions for a writ of mandate is not termed a judgment and does not explicitly address the declaratory relief causes of action. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the order before us constitutes an appealable final judgment as it left no issue for further consideration"].)

Published authority also reveals an important consequence that follows from this case law. In a case in which a court has entered a ruling on a writ petition that constitutes a final judgment, any party seeking appellate review of that ruling must timely appeal from that final judgment—and the time to file a notice of appeal is not restarted by the trial court's subsequent entry of a document styled as a "judgment" that merely reiterates the prior final judgment. (See City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 182–183, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 ( City of Calexico ) [dismissing cross-appeal where party failed to timely appeal from September 24 ruling denying two petitions for writ of mandate that constituted a final judgment and stating, "[t]he mere fact that the trial court entered a subsequent judgment after issuing the September 24 ruling is irrelevant, because the September 24 ruling was itself a final judgment" ( id. at p. 192, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 )]; Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 582–583, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 ( Laraway ) [concluding that an order that "completely resolved all issues between all parties" on petitioner's writ petition was a final judgment from which no timely appeal was taken and stating that the "[r]ules of [c]ourt do not provide, once a judgment ... has been entered, ... the time to appeal can be restarted or extended by the filing of a subsequent judgment ... making the same decision"]; accord Valero Refining Co.—California v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. Hearing Bd. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 618, 633, fn. 10, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 ( Valero ) ["Contrary to the suggestion by the [defendants], the appealable judgment was the court's order granting a writ of mandate, not a ‘judgment’ that it subsequently entered"].)

In this case, plaintiff Officer David Meinhardt failed to timely appeal from a trial court ruling that denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety, completely resolved all of the issues in the matter, and contemplated no further judicial action. Although the ruling was denominated an "order," (boldface & capitalization omitted) it was, under the case law outlined above, a final judgment. Instead, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from a document that the trial court subsequently entered, which was styled as a "judgment," but merely restated the prior judgment.

In light of the case law described above, we solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the timeliness of Officer Meinhardt's appeal. In his supplemental brief, Meinhardt contends that to dismiss his appeal would contravene applicable statutory language, conflict with certain case law, and be "patently inequitable." (Boldface & italics omitted.) He further contends that City of Calexico is distinguishable and that this court "should resist the impulse to extend Laraway's questionable logic further."

While we have carefully considered Officer Meinhardt's arguments, Laraway and City of Calexico are directly on point and mandate dismissal of his appeal. We publish our opinion to explain how Dhillon supports the conclusion that Laraway and City of Calexico were correctly decided, and to reiterate the critical importance of determining whether a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment in seeking appellate review of such a ruling.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Officer Meinhardt's petition for writ of administrative mandate

In May 2019, Officer Meinhardt filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to section 1094.5,² naming the City of Sunnyvale, Sunnyvale Personnel Board (Board) as a defendant and the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety as the real party in interest.

In his petition, Officer Meinhardt sought "to rectify the ... Board's abuse of discretion and misapplication of law in upholding a forty-four (44) hour suspension against [him] for engaging in speech that was critical of policies implemented by the new Department Chief .... "

After the Board filed an answer to the petition and lodged the administrative record, the parties filed briefs on the petition.

B. The trial court's August 6, 2020 ruling denying Officer Meinhardt's writ petition and the clerk's service of that ruling

In May 2020, the trial court held a telephonic hearing on Officer Meinhardt's writ petition.³ On August 6, 2020, the trial court issued a signed ruling titled "ORDER " denying Meinhardt's petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety.

At the outset of the ruling, the trial court described the telephonic hearing on the petition and stated, "After consideration of the pleadings, the exhibits (including the administrative record), the authorities cited by counsel in their briefs and the arguments made by counsel at the hearing, and no party having requested a statement of decision, the Court issues the following order." The court proceeded to address the merits of the petition for several pages, and concluded its ruling by stating, "Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is DENIED."

That same day, the clerk of court served the August 6 ruling denying the petition for writ of mandate on the parties by mail. The clerk's service of the ruling is memorialized in the record by a proof of service.⁴

C. The Board's August 14 notice of entry

On August 14, the Board electronically served Officer Meinhardt with a document titled "Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order," together with a file-stamped copy of the August 6 order.

D. The September 25 "judgment"

On September 25, 2020, the clerk filed a document signed by the trial court on September 17 titled "JUDGMENT ," that states:

"On August 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Petitioner David Meinhardt's Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against Petitioner David Meinhardt, who shall take nothing by this action.

"IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED."

The August 6 ruling denying Officer Meinhardt's petition for writ of administrative mandate was attached to the September 25 "judgment."⁵

E. Officer Meinhardt's appeal

On October 15, 2020, Officer Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal that stated that he was appealing from the September 17, 2020⁶ "judgment" denying his petition for writ...