Middleton v. United Church of Christ Bd.

483 F.Supp.3d 489

Waltrina MIDDLETON, Plaintiff

v.UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST BOARD, et al., Defendants

Case No. 1:19 CV 1899

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed August 26, 2020

David T. Ball, Rosenberg & Ball, Granville, OH, Matthew T. Hurm, Hurm Law Firm, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

Amy L. Kullik, Mansour Gavin, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

ORDER

SOLOMON OLIVER, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case is Defendant United Church of Christ Board ("UCC") and Defendant Local Church Ministries’ ("LCM") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"). (ECF No. 4.) For the following reasons, the court grants the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In November 2010, Defendants hired Plaintiff Waltrina Middleton ("Plaintiff" or "Middleton") as their Minister for Youth Advocacy and Leadership Formation. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Over the next few years, Middleton alleges, she experienced several incidents of gender and racial harassment. First, a constituent told Middleton: "I thought you only got the job because you are young, black and from Trinity [United Church of Christ in Chicago]." (Id. ¶ 12.) Second, a supervisor called Middleton a "sassy, young, African American woman." (Id. ¶ 15.) Third, another employee refused to communicate with Middleton and spread false information about Middleton's work. (Id. ¶ 16.) Fourth, when Middleton complained about biases and stereotypes among Defendants’ managerial staff, Middleton's supervisor advised her to "work harder to get along with persons holding racist, sexist and discriminatory views because of the money they give to Defendants." (Id. ¶ 17.) Finally, Middleton alleges that her supervisor engaged in "rude, unprofessional, and insensitive conduct" during a meeting regarding Middleton's advocacy at the 2015 General Synod. (Id. ¶ 18.) When Middleton stated she wanted to report her concerns to Defendants’ human resources department, her supervisor allegedly responded: "Go right ahead. You take everything else to HR." (Id. ) Middleton claims she reported these issues to the human resources director and LCM's executive officer, but Defendants did nothing to address them. (Id. ¶ 19.)

In August 2015, over objections from a group of UCC leaders across the country, Defendants demoted Middleton to Minister of Faith Formation: Generational Ministries Curator—Youth and Adults. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.) When discussing the demotion, Middleton's supervisor stated: "To relieve any unnecessary anxiety upfront, you have a job here. This conversation is not leading to a notice of a RIF or termination." (Id. ¶ 25.) Yet Defendants demoted Middleton again a month later, this time to Associate for National Youth Event Programming, a temporary position slated to end in August 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 29.) Defendants also cut short Middleton's sabbatical, which had been scheduled to begin on October 1, 2015. (Id. ¶ 24.) Though Defendants previously approved two months of leave, they required Middleton to return to work after just two weeks. (Id. ) Then, on June 27, 2016, Defendants terminated Middleton's employment. (Id. ¶ 30.) The parties’ filings do not provide additional detail regarding the timing of Defendants’ decision to terminate Middleton or their reasons for doing so. (See id. ; Mot. at PageID #23, ECF No. 4.)

In addition, Middleton alleges that, throughout her employment, Defendants consistently hired or promoted white employees over Middleton despite their lack of experience and qualifications. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 26, 28, ECF No. 1.)

B. Procedural History

On January 26, 2017, roughly seven months after her dismissal, Middleton filed a dual administrative complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. ¶¶ 2, 5.) The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter in May 2019. (Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1.) Middleton then filed a Complaint in this court on August 21, 2019, alleging three causes of action: (1) race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. , and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112; (2) breach of contract; (3) and promissory estoppel. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 34–50, ECF No. 1.) In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) on October 21, 2019. Middleton filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 7) on November 20, 2019, and Defendants filed their Reply (ECF No. 8) on December 4, 2019.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court examines the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court clarified the law regarding what a plaintiff must plead to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To determine whether the plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plaintiff's obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. While a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true." Id. A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). In Iqbal , the Supreme Court further explained that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This "plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Assessing plausibility is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Generally, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must limit its analysis to the allegations in the complaint. See Weiner v. Klais & Co. , 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Matters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."). Thus, if a defendant attaches materials outside of the pleadings, the court must exclude those materials or treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 after giving the parties "a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; see also Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. , 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999). However, documents attached to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion are considered part of the pleadings—which makes conversion to a summary judgment motion unnecessary—if the documents are referenced in the complaint and central to the plaintiff's claim. See Amini v. Oberlin College , 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). This prevents "a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim" from "surviv[ing] a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied." Weiner , 108 F.3d at 89.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants ask the court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, Defendants argue that the ministerial exception articulated in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC , 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), constitutes a complete bar to Middleton's claims. (Mot. at PageID #23, 25–31, ECF No. 4.) Alternatively, Defendants assert that dismissal is required because, even if the ministerial exception does not apply, the Complaint otherwise fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. at PageID #31–35; Reply at PageID #65–68, ECF No. 8.) The court addresses these arguments in turn.

A. Ministerial Exception

The Supreme Court has recognized a "ministerial exception" that shields religious employers from employment discrimination lawsuits brought by their ministers. Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 188–89, 132 S.Ct. 694. Rooted in the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, this exception "ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church's alone." Id. 194–95, 132 S.Ct. 694 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am. , 344 U.S. 94, 119, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) ) (cleaned up). The courts of appeals had already widely embraced the ministerial exception before the Supreme Court adopted it in Hosanna-Tabor. 565 U.S. at 188, 132 S.Ct. 694 ("Since the passage of Title VII ... and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers."). But while lower courts had extended the ministerial exception to other contexts beyond federal employment discrimination statutes, Hosanna-Tabor expressly declined to do so. Id. at 196, 132 S.Ct. 694 ("We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.").

For the ministerial exception to apply, "the employer...