Mitchell v. Roberts

469 P.3d 901

Terry MITCHELL, Plaintiff,

v.Richard Warren ROBERTS, Defendant.

No. 20170447

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard May 14, 2018

Supplemental Briefing Submitted September 25, 2019

Filed June 11, 2020

Rehearing Denied July 13, 2020

Ross C. Anderson, Walter M. Mason, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff

Brian M. Heberlig, Linda C. Bailey, Washington D.C., Neil A. Kaplan, Shannon K. Zollinger, Troy L. Booher, Salt Lake City, for defendant

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Himonas, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case is before us on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In the underlying federal case Terry Mitchell asserts civil claims against Richard Warren Roberts. The claims arise out of allegations that Roberts sexually abused Mitchell in 1981 when she was sixteen years old. Mitchell alleges that the abuse took place in the course of interactions she had with Roberts related to a pending criminal action in which Roberts was a prosecuting attorney and Mitchell was a witness.

¶2 Mitchell concedes that each of her claims against Roberts had expired under the original statute of limitations. But she contends that her claims were revived when the legislature enacted Utah Code section 78B-2-308(7) in 2016. That statute provides that certain civil claims against perpetrators of sexual abuse may be asserted, even if "time barred as of July 1, 2016," if they are "brought within 35 years of the victim's 18th birthday, or within three years of the effective date of this Subsection (7), whichever is longer." Id. And Mitchell asserts that her claims against Roberts were timely filed under this statute because they were brought within three years of its effective date.

¶3 Roberts has responded by challenging the legislature's authority to enact a statute reviving time-barred claims. And that response raises important questions of Utah law. Our case law has long questioned the authority of the legislature to revive a time-barred cause of action,¹ but the nature and basis of any such limitation has not been clearly delineated. With that in mind, the federal court (Magistrate Judge Furse) certified this case to us, asking us to clarify (1) whether the legislature had the authority to "expressly revive time-barred claims through a statute," and (2) whether "the language of Utah Code section 78B-2-308(7), expressly reviving claims for child sexual abuse that were barred by the previously applicable statute of limitations as of July 1, 2016, make(s) unnecessary the analysis of whether the change enlarges or eliminates vested rights."

¶4 In the initial briefing and at oral argument it appeared to us (and to the parties) that the certified questions went only to the legislature's authority as a matter of statutory interpretation (as informed by our case law). On reflection, however, it became clear that the certified questions could not meaningfully be answered without addressing an embedded constitutional issue—as to the effect of due process limitations on the scope of the legislature's power in this area. Because our role in addressing certified questions is to facilitate the disposition of a specific case by the federal district court,² we requested supplemental briefing on the constitutional dimension of the questions certified for our decision.³ The parties submitted careful, extensive briefs on the constitutional question. And we now clarify our law in light of this briefing.

¶5 We hold that the Utah Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving a time-barred claim in a manner depriving a defendant of a vested statute of limitations defense. This principle is well-rooted in our precedent, a point meriting respect as a matter of stare decisis .⁴ It is also confirmed by the extensive historical material presented to us by the parties in their supplemental briefs, which shows that the founding-era understanding of "due process" and "legislative power" forecloses legislative enactments that vitiate a "vested right" in a statute of limitations defense.

¶6 We resolve the questions certified to us on this basis. We do not do so lightly. We respect and consistently defer to the legislature's judgment on the broad range of policy matters committed to its discretion. And we acknowledge the reasonable policy basis for the judgment the legislature made in seeking to revive previously time-barred claims asserted by victims of child-sex abuse. The devastating effects of child-sex abuse can span a lifetime. And as the legislature has indicated, it may take "decades for children and adults to pull their lives back together and find the strength to face what happened to them"—particularly where (as is too often the case) "the perpetrator is a member of the victim's family" or a friend or confidant. UTAH CODE § 78B-2-308(1).

¶7 We would thus uphold the legislature's decision if the question went merely to the reasonableness of its policy judgment. But that is not the question presented for our review. We are asked instead to interpret and apply the terms of the Utah Constitution (in particular, the Due Process Clause). We take a solemn oath to uphold that document—as ratified by the people who established it as the charter for our government, and as they understood it at the time of its framing. That understanding is controlling.

¶8 The original meaning of the constitution binds us as a matter of the rule of law. Its restraint on our power cannot depend on whether we agree with its current application on policy grounds. Such a commitment to originalism would be no commitment at all. It would be a smokescreen for the outcomes that we prefer.

¶9 Our laws are written down for a reason. And a key reason is to establish clear, fixed limits that the public may rely on—unless and until the law is repealed or amended by established procedures for doing so. The people of Utah retain the power to amend the Utah Constitution to alter the legislature's authority in this area if they see fit. But the document as it stands (and as originally understood) forecloses the legislature's power to enact legislation that retroactively vitiates a ripened statute of limitations defense.

¶10 We expand on these points below. First we show that the legislature's power to vitiate a vested right in a ripened limitations defense is foreclosed by our precedent. Then we establish that the principles set forth in our precedent are consistent with the original understanding of due process. And we close by reinforcing our conclusion that the limits on the legislature remain despite the reasonable basis for its policy judgments in this field.

I. UTAH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

¶11 Beginning in 1897 and continuing for over a century, this court has repeatedly stated that the legislature lacks the power to revive a plaintiff's claim in a manner that vitiates a "vested" right of a defendant. Our cases have been less than crystal clear in identifying a constitutional basis for this principle. But the "vested rights" limitation on the legislative power is firmly rooted in our case law. This limitation, moreover, has long been extended to the specific vested right asserted by Roberts—the right to retain a statute of limitations defense after a plaintiff's claim has expired under existing law. And we conclude that our precedent merits respect as a matter of stare decisis .

A. Our Case Law

¶12 Our first articulation of the "vested rights" limitation on the legislative power came in In re Handley's Estate , 15 Utah 212, 49 P. 829, 832 (1897). That case arose out of a conflict regarding the distribution of a polygamist father's estate among his children through both his legal marriage and his polygamous marriage. Id. at 829. Following the father's death, the children through the polygamous marriage did not receive any portion of the father's estate. Id. And they unsuccessfully sued to be recognized as heirs. Id. In 1896, several years after the final judgment against the children of the polygamous marriage, the Utah Legislature enacted a statute purporting to allow the polygamous children to relitigate the dispute and inherit a portion of the father's estate. Id. at 829–30. In relevant part, that statute clarified that "the issue of ... polygamous marriages" were "entitle[d] ... to inherit" under the preexisting inheritance statute. Id. at 829. And it said "[t]hat in all cases involving the rights of such issue to so inherit, heretofore determined adversely to such issue in any of the courts of the territory of Utah, a motion for a new trial or rehearing shall be entertained ... and the courts shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine said motion, and if granted to proceed to hear and determine said case or cases without prejudice from the lapse of time since the former hearing or any prior determination of a like motion." Id. at 829–30.

¶13 We struck this statute down as an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power by the legislature. Id. at 830–31. In so doing, we concluded that the legislature lacked the power to override a judicial interpretation of law reflected in a final judgment. See id. at 830 (explaining that the legislature lacks the power to override a judicial judgment "by a declaratory or explanatory law, giving the law under which the decree was rendered a different construction"). We also framed our separation of powers concerns in terms of "vested rights." We held that the legislature lacked the power to "attempt[ ] by a retrospective act to furnish a method by which vested rights could be divested, and to compel the courts to employ it." Id. at 831. Once "[t]he rights of the children of the lawful wife to the estate in question were ascertained and settled by the decree," we held that they were "vested, and beyond the reach of any remedy ... the legislature could invent." Id. Any...