Montoya v. Shelden

898 F.Supp.2d 1279

David MONTOYA and Michael Montoya, Plaintiffs,

v.Gerald SHELDEN, an Officer Employed by the Albuquerque Police Department, a Subsidiary of the City of Albuquerque, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Angelo Lovato, an Officer Employed by the Albuquerque Police Department, a Subsidiary of the City of Albuquerque, Individually and in his Official Capacity, and the City of Albuquerque, Defendants.

No. CIV 10–0360 JB/WDS.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Oct. 12, 2012.

Timothy M. Padilla, Ignacio V. Gallegos, Timothy M. Padilla & Associates, P.C. Louren M. Oliveros, Gorence & Oliveros P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs.

David J. Tourek, City Attorney, Stephanie M. Griffin, Benjamin I. Sherman, Assistant City Attorneys, City of Albuquerque, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Introduction of Evidence from Other Cases or Claims Brought Against Defendants and any Evidence of Allegations of Prior and Subsequent Bad Acts and Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed September 4, 2012 (Doc. 56). The Court held a hearing on September 19, 2012. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court should admit evidence of other unrelated cases in which Defendant Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) Officer Gerald Shelden ¹ and Defendant Angelo Lovato have been named as defendants; (ii) whether the Court should allow the Defendants to inquire about the false statements that Lovato made to Anna Chavez, a citizen involved in an accident with him, and false statements of fact that he made to an internal-investigation board investigating the accident, because they are evidence of his character for truthfulness; (iii) whether, if Lovato does not admit to making false statements while being cross-examined in court, the Court should allow the Plaintiffs David Montoya and Michael Montoya to prove his past false statements extrinsically; and (iv) whether the Court should admit evidence that the Montoyas saw signs posted in the back of Shelden's police car, one of which misrepresented and made light of a suspect's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court will grant in part and deny in part the Defendants' motion. Because the unrelated cases are not probative of any material issues in the Montoyas' claims, the Court will exclude evidence of unrelated civil rights cases against Shelden and Lovato. Lovato's past false statements, both to Chavez during the automobile accident and to the internal-affairs investigation board, are probative of Lovato's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and therefore the Court will allow the Montoyas to inquire about them during their examination of Lovato. If Lovato makes false statements in regards to the Montoyas' inquiry, the Court will allow the Montoyas to prove the prior false statements extrinsically through testimony of a police officer with knowledge of the prior statements. Because the Montoyas are demanding punitive damages from the Defendants, an element of which requires proof of Shelden's intent, the Court will allow the Montoyas to testify about the signs which Shelden posted in the back of his police car.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court has explained the facts of this case in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed October 7, 2012, 286 F.R.D. 602, 2012 WL 5353493 (D.N.M.2012) (Doc. 83), and incorporates by reference those facts here. The Court will add here additional pertinent facts for this motion. After Shelden and Lovato arrested M. Montoya and Plaintiff David Montoya, the Montoyas observed signs in the back of Shelden's police car, that Shelden has since taken out, at least one of which misrepresented, and/or joked about, a suspect's Fifth Amendment Rights. At Shelden's deposition, he stated that one of the signs read: “If you don't like the police, then call a crackhead the next time you need help.” See Deposition of Gerald Shelden 94:12–14 (taken March 1, 2011), filed September 17, 2012 (Doc. 67–1) (“Shelden Deposition”). He admitted to having “[t]he Miranda one ... in there,” at the time that he arrested the Montoyas. Shelden Deposition 94:19–20.²

Unrelated to the incident in this case, Shelden and Lovato are defendants in other § 1983 civil rights cases. At least one of those cases ended in a judgment against Lovato for excessive force, awarding the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. See Canizales v. Armendariz, No. CIV 07–0198 JB/RHS, Final Judgment, filed August 11, 2008 (Doc. 117).³

Lovato is also a defendant in a criminal case, charged with leaving the scene of an accident. That criminal charge arose from an accident involving Anna Chavez, while Lovato was off-duty in his police vehicle. At the accident, he represented to Chavez that he was on-duty and provided other false statements to her, including providing her with a fake report number and false Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) number.⁴ Subsequent to the accident, the APD internal-affairs investigated Lovato's involvement in the accident, during the course of which Lovato made false statements of fact to the investigation board.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 15, 2010, the Montoyas filed their Complaint asserting claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against the Defendants, including claims of false imprisonment and arrest, excessive force, and unlawful detention. See Plaintiffs' Complaint for Civil Rights Violations ¶¶ 37, 41, 44, 47, at 6–8, filed April 15, 2010 (Doc. 1) (“Complaint”). In Count V, the Montoyas assert a malicious-prosecution claim. See Complaint ¶ 48, at 8.

On August 12, 2011, the Montoyas filed a motion seeking to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of allowing them to submit discovery requests to Lovato about a criminal charge he faces regarding leaving the scene of an accident. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, filed March 20, 2012 (Doc. 39) (“MOO”). The Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. See MOO at 1. The Court did not permit the Montoyas to serve any requests for admission or requests for discovery to inquire into Lovato's conduct in relation to the alleged incident where he left the scene of an accident. See MOO at 1. The Court also did not permit the Montoyas to conduct their requested deposition of Lovato, because discovery is closed, the information the requested appears collateral to the case here, and the requested discovery is related only to the issue of Lovato's credibility. See MOO at 1–2. The Court conducted an in camera review of the internal-affairs-investigation file into Lovato's conduct to determine whether the Defendants should disclose any of the documents underlying that investigation to the Montoyas. See MOO at 2.

On September 4, 2012, the Defendants filed the Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Introduction of Evidence from Other Cases or Claims Brought Against Defendants and any Evidence of Allegations of Prior and Subsequent Bad Acts and Memorandum in Support Thereof. See Doc. 56 (“Motion in Limine”). They move to exclude from evidence other claims or cases against the Defendants pursuant to rules 104, 401, 403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Motion in Limine at 1. The Defendants state that, although they are unsure what specific information the Montoyas wish to introduce, they assume that, because Shelden and Lovato are defendants in other ongoing cases, the Defendants “seek to ensure to Plaintiffs' counsel does not attempt to introduce any such evidence.” Motion in Limine at 1–2. In addition to seeking to exclude Shelden and Lovato's other unrelated cases, the Defendants seek to exclude other improper character evidence, including: (i) reference to “ ‘New Miranda Rights' ⁵ & other signage from Officer Shelden's [sic] police vehicle”; and (ii) investigations from “Internal Affairs/Citizen Complaints against any of the Defendants.” Motion in Limine at 2.

The Defendants contend that the other lawsuits, investigations, and the signage in Shelden's vehicle are not relevant under rule 401, because the evidence is not probative of any of the Montoyas' claims, as none of these prior or subsequent “bad acts” are alleged to have involved the Montoyas. See Motion in Limine at 3. Because the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that the Montoyas are bringing do not include a municipal liability claim, the Defendants assert that the prior bad acts are also not probative of the Montoyas claims against the City of Albuquerque or APD.⁶SeeMotion in Limine at 3 (citing Calusinski v. Kruger, 24 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir.1994); Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1006–07 (8th Cir.1990)). The Defendants argue that the Court should exclude evidence of the prior bad acts as not relevant to the excessive use of force claim on the grounds that, because the Supreme Court of the United States requires the “reasonableness” of the extent of force used to be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” rather than by hindsight, any correlation between prior bad acts and the use of force here is not probative of the reasonableness of the force in this particular situation. See Motion in Limine at 4 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The facts and circumstances from these other, unrelated bad acts are not probative of the reasonableness inquiry, they contend, because the Montoyas “must show that Defendants' actions were not ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to underlying intent of motivation.” Motion in Limine at 4 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865).

The Defendants argue that the Court should also exclude the evidence under rule 404, because “the only thing the internal affairs investigations and...