Moore v. Hillsborough County Bd. of County Com'Rs.

544 F.Supp.2d 1291

Rose Ann MOORE, Plaintiff, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant.

No. 8:06-CV-1319-JDW-EAJ.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

January 8, 2008.

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Rose Ann Moore, pro se.

ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Hillsborough County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.24), and Plaintiffs pro se response in opposition (Dkt.36).¹ Upon consideration, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Background

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from 1974 to 2006. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 10; Dkt. 24) At all relevant times, she held the position of Senior Treatment Counselor for the Children's Services Department Emergency Shelter Care (ESC) Program. (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 26) Specifically, Plaintiff supervised the Emergency Shelter Care (ESC) Program, a residential facility located on a 32-acre campus which houses abused and neglected children. (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 45, 53) As a Senior Treatment Counselor, Plaintiff was responsible for "perform[ing] supervisory duties pertinent to the intake, evaluation, diagnosis, treatment and case management of troubled children and their families which includes the clinical review and supervision of client files." (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. Ex. 3).

In January 2006, Defendant terminated Plaintiff for what it claims were numerous allegations of misconduct, including failing to report allegations of child abuse, ignoring an incident involving a child inserting a battery into his rectum, failing to report her consulting business to the County for review of potential conflicts of interest, and allowing a worker who had been convicted of felony child abuse to remain employed as a child care worker. (Dkt.24) Plaintiff contends that many of these allegations are unsubstantiated, false, or misrepresented. (Dkt.36) She contends that her termination and Defendant's alleged failure to accommodate her alleged disabilities caused by a knee and a neck injury were in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 52; Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 72) Plaintiff also contends that she was retaliated against, including being terminated, for complaining about discrimination and for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Dkt.1, ¶¶ 52, 57)

a. Plaintiffs injuries and requests for accommodation

In January 2004, Plaintiff fell while on the job and suffered a knee injury. (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo at 35, 54) She underwent surgery on her knee in June 2004. (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 55) Plaintiff also suffered a neck injury in 2004. (Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 59) In 2004, presumably after her injuries, Plaintiff requested and was granted permission to change the meeting rooms for staff meetings to her building. (Dkt.24-2, p. 16) In February 2005, Plaintiff submitted a written request for use of one of three golf carts, which were used by the maintenance staff, to traverse the campus. (Dkts. 24; 26, Moore Depo. at 46-47, 49; Moore Depo. Ex. 4)² Following her written request, Plaintiff was granted use of a golf cart. However, Plaintiff was not granted exclusive use of the golf cart. When she needed to use it, she was required to sign up for it. (Dkts. 24-2, p. 16; 26, Moore Depo. at 61, 62) Plaintiff contends that she was penalized for failure to attend meetings that she could not attend when the golf cart was unavailable. (Dkt.36, p. 3) Plaintiff also requested a motorized scooter but her request was denied. (Dkt. 24-2, pp. 16-17; Dkt. 26-2)

In September 2005, Plaintiff was relocated to another building on the campus. Plaintiff requested that the maintenance staff pick her up daily from the campus parking lot and transport her to the building by golf cart. Plaintiffs request was denied. (Dkt.24-2, pp. 16-17) Plaintiff then requested permission to park near the building instead of in the campus parking lot. (Dkt. 24-2, p. 17; Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 62-63) Defendant allowed Plaintiff to park in the grass near the building, but required her to park on the southwest corner of the building near the steps rather than on the northwest corner of the building near the handicapped ramp. (Dkt. 24-2, p. 17; Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. at 64)

The office to which Plaintiff was relocated lacked a working phone, a computer, a computer desk and "an adequate chair." Plaintiff requested an "ergonomically safe and adequate office space." Plaintiff alleges that her requests were initially ignored. Plaintiff contacted Risk Management and requested an inspection of her work area. In October 2005, a risk manager inspected Plaintiffs work area and recommended certain changes to the work space. By October 28, 2005, "the office was reasonably accommodated" and Plaintiff received "the appropriate chair." (Dkt.24-2, p. 17)

c. Plaintiffs Termination

In early 2005, there was a change in administration within the Children's Services Department. Tom Papin became the new Director of the Children's Services Department in January 2005, and Terri Balzer became the new Manager of the ESC Program in March 2005. (Dkts.25, 27) According to Plaintiff, she "had basically no problems until after the new manager Terri Balzer arrived on March 14, 2005." (Dkt.1, ¶ 15) Papin and Balzer claim that starting at the beginning of their tenure, they received numerous complaints about Plaintiffs work performance. (Dkts.25, 27) Papin and Balzer attempted to counsel Plaintiff but contend that she was not receptive to counseling. (Dkts 25, 27) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the County's Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) on August 23, 2007. (Dkts.25, 27, 36-2, p. 14)

On September 3, 2005, after being placed on the PIP, Plaintiff requested a meeting with Balzer and Papin to "review this P.I.P. status and the expectations you have set forth." (Dkt.36-2, p. 11) She requested advance notice of the meeting and to have a witness present. (Dkt.36-2, p. 11) On September 15, 2007, Balzer and Papin entered Plaintiffs office to have the meeting, but did not provide Plaintiff with advance notice and did not honor her request for a witness. (Dkt.36-2, p. 12) Plaintiff refused to participate in the meeting. (Dkt.36-2, p. 12) Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to exit the office but was physically blocked by Papin for several minutes before being permitted to leave. (Dkt.36-2, p. 12) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that when Papin entered her office, he "pull[ed] a chair back blocking the door entrance" and, as she attempted to exit, he "placed his hand in the doorway." (Dkt.36-2, p. 12) Plaintiff reported that she was "held hostage" to the Sheriffs office. An officer from the Sheriffs Office concluded that no criminal misconduct had occurred. (Dkt.36-2, p. 14) Defendant contends that based on this incident it made the decision to commence termination proceedings. (Dkt.25, 27) Plaintiff contends that on December 23, 2005, Balzer informed her that she was recommending Plaintiffs termination due to the failure of the PIP, Plaintiffs refusal to meet, and Plaintiffs incompetence in work assignments. (Dkt.36-2, p. 50) Following a hearing, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff appealed her termination to the Hillsborough County Civil Service Board but her termination was upheld. (Dkt. 23; Dkt. 26, Moore Depo. 79-80)

Standard

Summary judgment is proper if following discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. "An issue of fact is `material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). "An issue of fact is `genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id. at 1260. All the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir.2004).

Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Plaintiffs evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The Court will not weigh the evidence or make findings of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court's role is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party. Id.

Discussion

Plaintiff brings her discrimination claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. Because federal case law interpreting the ADA is applicable to claims arising under the FCRA, Plaintiffs claims arising from both statutes are analyzed simultaneously. Reis v. Univ. City Develop. Partners, Ltd., 442 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1243 (M.D.Fla.2006) (citing Wimberly v. Sec. Tech. Group, Inc., 866 So.2d 146, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant retaliated against her, including terminating her, for complaining of...