Vinson v. Department of Corrections, Florida

672 F.Supp.2d 1247

Jancie VINSON v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of FLORIDA.

Case No. 1:08-cv-00181-MP-AK.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Gainesville Division.

July 13, 2009.

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Marie A. Mattox, Marie A. Mattox PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Jancie Vinson.

Frank Damon Kitchen, Constangy Brooks & Smith LLC, Jacksonville, FL, for Department of Corrections State of Florida.

JUDGMENT

MAURICE M. PAUL, Senior District Judge.

This action came before the Court with the Honorable Maurice M. Paul presiding, The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered. Summary Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STATE OF FLORIDA and against Plaintiff, JANCIE VINSON.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 65 and 66), Plaintiff's response in opposition thereto (Doc. 73), and Defendant's reply to Plaintiff's response in opposition thereto (Doc. 83). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs second amended complaint (Doc. 24) alleges that Defendant, Department of Corrections ("DOC" or "DC"), retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The alleged retaliation occurred in the course of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant as a Correctional Probation Specialist ("CP Specialist"). Plaintiff has held her current position with Defendant since November 30, 2001, and has worked for Defendant in its Gainesville West Office since March 2006. That office is one of four Community Corrections Offices within Florida's Eight Judicial Circuit. As a CP Specialist, Plaintiff does not supervise any other employees or staff. The Eighth Judicial Circuit is one of seven judicial circuits within Region I Community Corrections.

Community Correction operations in each judicial circuit are overseen by a Circuit Administrator ("CA") who reports to the Regional Director ("RD") and Deputy Regional Director ("DRD") in its assigned region. At all times relevant and material to Plaintiffs present lawsuit, the CA of the Eighth Judicial Circuit has been Shelia Smalls. Between April 7, 2006, and August 1, 2008, John Walkup was the Deputy Circuit Administrator ("DCA"), who is directly below the CA in the chain of command. Doc. 68-52 at ¶ 3. Between April 2005 and April 2006, Walkup was a Correctional Probation Senior Supervisor ("CPSS") in charge of the Gainesville West Office. Id. The position of CPSS is directly below the DCA in the chain of command. On August 1, 2008, Walkup became the CA for the Second Judicial Circuit. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Smalls and Walkup unlawfully retaliated against her by denying her requests to be promoted and transferred on June 12, 2006, and July 21, 2006, respectively, which is during the time that Walkup was the DCA under Smalls.

Directly below the position of CPSS in the chain of command is the position of Correctional Probation Supervisor ("CPS"), which is not to be confused with Plaintiffs position of CP Specialist, which is not a supervisory position. Plaintiffs position of CP Specialist, though not a supervisory position, was once on the same pay grade and considered to be a lateral rank as the CPS position. As of 2007. however, the CPS position is ranked above the CP Specialist position in the chain of command. Plaintiff once served as a CPS; however, as discussed below, CA Adam Thomas administratively reassigned her from CPS to CP Specialist on November 30, 2001. Thomas claims to have done this because he determined that Plaintiff was not fit to be a supervisor, which Plaintiff disputes. This reassignment was one of the subjects of a 2002 lawsuit filed by Plaintiff against Defendant, which ended when this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Case Number 1:02-cv-000090-MP. It is not, however, a subject of the instant case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Once a movant for summary judgment successfully discharges his or her burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).

In determining whether a genuinely disputed fact is material, the Court looks to the substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action and examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all justifiable inferences in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The purpose of the Court in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether such issues exist to be tried. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir.1990). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant is entitled to summary judgment upon showing that the non-movant cannot prove an essential element of his or her cause of action through the admissible evidence in the record. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee or applicant because that person "has opposed ... an unlawful employment practice ... or because he has made a charge ... under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that "(1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir.2008). The elements for establishing a claim of retaliation under the FCRA are identical. See Parris v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir.2000). "Florida courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are applicable when considering claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act, because the Florida act was patterned after Title VII." Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.1999). Direct evidence is "evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption. Evidence that only suggests discrimination, or that is subject to more than one interpretation, does not constitute direct evidence." Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.1997); see also Masso v. Miami-Dade County, 465 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1264 (S.D.Fla.2006) ("Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to retaliate on the basis of an impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of retaliation.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Where the non movant presents direct evidence that, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial, summary judgment is not appropriate even where the movant presents conflicting evidence." Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1189.

In cases where a plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, Title VII's burden shifting standard applies. Under that standard, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation, establishing a presumption of retaliation. The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of retaliation by providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, which would then require the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered reasons for taking adverse action were merely pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If a plaintiff fails to offer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's reasons were pretextual, then summary judgment in favor of the employer is proper. Cuddeback v. Florida Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir.2004).

In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that she has established a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation through both direct and circumstantial evidence. In order to address the merits of Plaintiff's argument, the Court must first identify the statutorily protected activities and adverse employment actions at issue. If Plaintiffs activities are not statutorily protected, then direct evidence that her employer took adverse employment action against her in retaliation for those activities would not preclude summary judgment. Likewise, if the employment action in question is not an adverse employment action under Title VII, then direct evidence that the employer took the action in retaliation for Plaintiff's statutorily protected activities would not preclude summary judgment.

A. Plaintiff's...