Mullins v. State

355 Ga.App. 452

844 S.E.2d 519

MULLINS

v.The STATE.

A20A0365

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 10, 2020

Jessica M. Sully, for Appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, David D. Mapp, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Doyle, Presiding Judge.

Following a traffic stop, Danzel Mullins was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of tools for the commission of a crime. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop on multiple grounds, and the trial court denied the motion following a hearing. Mullins appeals, arguing that: the investigatory stop of the vehicle was unreasonably delayed and evolved into an arrest; officers did not have probable cause to arrest him before the search of the vehicle; and impoundment of the vehicle was not reasonably necessary because he was not under arrest and the inventory search violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court sits as the trier of fact and its findings are analogous to a jury verdict. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and will not disturb its factual findings in the absence of clear error. And when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings and judgment. Additionally, as a general rule, an appellate court must limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court. An appellate court may, however, consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape. Finally, although we defer to the trial court's fact-finding, we owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Instead, we independently apply the law to the facts as found by the trial court.¹

So viewed, the record shows that on August 28, 2018, a license plate reader ("LPR") identified a car that was involved in a vehicle break-in involving three black males the previous day. The officer initiated a traffic stop of the car, and Mullins – the driver, who was one of three black males in the car – stopped the car immediately, and produced his driver's license, which the officer found to be valid, with no outstanding warrants. When the officer returned to the car, the front passenger advised that his sister's boyfriend had rented it the day before, although he did not have the rental agreement. Mullins told the officer that he "got the vehicle earlier that day" to take the front passenger to traffic court, after which he had picked up the back seat passenger. Approximately five or six minutes after the traffic stop began, Mullins turned off the car and gave the officer his car keys, at the officer's request. The officer checked the passengers’ identities and found no outstanding warrants. According to the officer, Mullins and the other two men were "being detained" at that time and were not free to leave.

An investigator who responded approximately 38 minutes after the traffic stop began also questioned the three occupants. Following that questioning, the investigator sent yet another officer to watch a surveillance video recording of the prior day's vehicle break-in to determine whether the faces of the perpetrators were visible. The investigator advised the initial officer that if the video did not show the faces of the suspects, police would not have probable cause to arrest Mullins and the other two men being detained.² Approximately 20 minutes later, that officer reported that no faces could be seen in the video recording, although one of the men in the recording was wearing grey pants and white shoes, which purportedly matched clothing worn by the back seat passenger.³ When the occupants denied consent to search the car, the investigator told them that if they did not consent, they would have to wait while she tried to obtain a search warrant.

The officer testified that the investigator subsequently contacted an unidentified representative of the car rental company, who "advised" the investigator to impound the vehicle because none of its occupants was an authorized driver on the rental agreement. As a result, approximately one hour and fifty-two minutes after the traffic stop began, the investigator told other officers at the scene to impound the vehicle. The three occupants were then removed from the car and placed in handcuffs, although, according to the officer who testified at the hearing, they were not yet under arrest.⁴ Officers then conducted an inventory search of the car, during which they found, among other things, four Xanax pills and several items that had been reported as stolen from another car earlier that day. At that point, police considered the car's occupants to be "in custody" and advised the men of their Miranda⁵ rights and further questioned them. No search warrant ever was obtained. The officer who testified did not personally attempt to contact any of the drivers authorized by the rental agreement, nor did he know if any other officers did so.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Mullins's motion to suppress, stating in its order:

[An officer] testified that an LPR hit was raised for the vehicle containing the [d]efendants because it had allegedly been involved in several car thefts. He further explained that the [d]efendants were detained during the stop while ownership information about the car was verified. The [d]efendants could not produce any documentation to show that they either owned the vehicle or, as they alleged, rented the vehicle from Enterprise Rent-A-Car. After officers were able to speak with Enterprise about the rental agreement associated with the car, they were instructed to impound it. While conducting a routine inventory search of the vehicle, [the officer] testified[,] ... his team recovered illegal drugs, tools used for the commission of crimes, and reported items stolen from other vehicles.... This [c]ourt finds that officers had probable cause to arrest [Mullins,] and ... the subsequent physical evidence found was not fruit of an illegal search.⁶

The court subsequently certified its order for immediate review, and this Court granted Mullins's application for an interlocutory appeal.

1. Among other arguments, Mullins contends that, during the traffic stop that led to his arrest, officers failed to diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel the suspicion giving rise to the stop, and thus unreasonably prolonged the stop beyond the time needed to effectuate its purpose. We agree.

Once a valid traffic stop has been effected [by a law enforcement officer], the Fourth Amendment prohibits the officer from unreasonably prolonging the stop beyond the time required to fulfill the purpose of the stop without a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. But a reasonable time to conduct a traffic stop includes the time necessary for the officer to run a computer check on the validity of the driver's license and registration[ ] and to check for outstanding warrants and/or criminal histories on the driver and other occupants. The law further allows the officer to question the vehicle's driver and/or its occupants during the course of the stop, and even to lawfully ask questions unrelated to the purpose of a valid traffic stop, so long as the questioning does not unreasonably prolong the detention.⁷

Thus, "[a]n investigative detention must last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available."⁸ "[I]n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, [it is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."⁹ Although "no bright line rule or rigid time limitations can be imposed in determining whether detention of a person constitutes a mere investigative stop requiring only an articulable suspicion or an arrest requiring the existence of probable cause at its inception," this Court has held that "it would stretch the imagination to say that a 30-minute [investigatory] detention was justifiable ... when the officer waited for the arrival of a drug dog and magistrate and the defendant was not free to leave."¹⁰

Here, assuming that the initial traffic stop was justified by the LPR alert, the State has not met its burden of showing that officers reasonably and diligently sought to confirm or dispel their suspicions as to the purpose for...