Murphy v. Brown

178 A.D.3d 832

111 N.Y.S.3d 869 (Mem)

Sharon MURPHY, Respondent,

v.Gary BROWN, et al., Defendants,Town of Brookhaven, Appellant.

2018-13687

Index No. 604235/15

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—September 3, 2019

December 11, 2019

Annette Eaderesto, Town Attorney, Farmingville, N.Y. (John W. Doyle of counsel), for appellant.

Gruenberg Kelly Della, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Zachary M. Beriloff of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendant Town of Brookhaven which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she fell on a sidewalk in the Town of Brookhaven. She subsequently commenced this personal injury action against, among others, the Town. The Town moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In an order dated October 18, 2018, the Supreme Court denied that branch of the Town's motion. The Town appeals.

Where a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it cannot be held liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition which comes within the ambit of the law unless it has received such notice (see Amabile v. City of Buffalo , 93 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 693 N.Y.S.2d 77, 715 N.E.2d 104 ). However, the courts have recognized an exception to the prior written notice requirement in circumstances where "the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence" ( Yarborough v. City of New York , 10 N.Y.3d 726, 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873 ; see Groninger v. Village of Mamaroneck , 17 N.Y.3d 125, 127–128, 927 N.Y.S.2d 304, 950 N.E.2d 908 ). This exception is limited to work performed by the municipality that immediately resulted in the existence of a dangerous condition (see Yarborough v. City of New York , 10 N.Y.3d at 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873 ).

"[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp. , 76 A.D.3d 210, 214, 905 N.Y.S.2d 226 ). In the present case, the plaintiff alleged in her pleadings that the Town created the alleged dangerous condition by virtue of improper repairs and resurfacing. Thus, to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Town was required to demonstrate, prima facie, both that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defect, and that it did not so create the alleged defect (see Gutierrez–Contreras v. Village of Port Chester , 172 A.D.3d 1333, 1334, 101 N.Y.S.3d 149 ; Trela v. City of Long Beach , 157 A.D.3d 747, 750, ...