Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Cuomo

480 F.Supp.3d 404

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v.Andrew CUOMO, both individually and in his official capacity; New York State Department of Economic Development d/b/a Empire State Development; Eric Gertler, both individually and in his official capacity; New York State Department of Labor; and Roberta Reardon, both individually and in her official capacity, Defendants.

1:20-CV-385 (MAD/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed August 14, 2020

OF COUNSEL: SARAH ROGERS, ESQ., WILLIAM A. BREWER, III, ESQ., PETER BACH-Y-RITA, ESQ., BREWER, ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS, 750 Lexington Avenue, Floor 14, New York, New York 10022, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

OF COUNSEL: ANDREW W. KOSTER, AAG, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224, Attorneys for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff National Rifle Association of America (the "NRA") commenced this action on April 2, 2020, asserting two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of the issuance of Executive Order 202.8. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 27, 2020, and the first amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff was deprived of its rights under the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when non-essential employers, including gun retailers and ammunition manufacturers not fulfilling orders for law enforcement had to reduce their in-person workforce by 100% no later than 8:00 PM on March 22, 2020 pursuant to Executive Order 202.8 (the "Executive Order"). See Dkt. No. 8.

On June 22, 2020, Defendants New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, both individually and in his official capacity, the New York State Department of Economic Development d/b/a Empire State Development, Acting Commissioner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the New York State Department of Economic Development Eric Gertler, both individually and in his official capacity, the New York State Department of Labor, and New York State Department of Labor Commissioner Roberta Reardon, both individually and in her official capacity (collectively "Defendants") moved pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff filed a response on July 6, 2020, opposing Defendants’ motion and cross-moving for leave to amend the first amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 22. As set forth below, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend the first amended complaint is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that Defendants violated several provisions of the United States Constitution. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint dated April 27, 2020. See Dkt. No. 8. The amended complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights stemming from Executive Order 202.8, issued on March 20, 2020, by which Defendant Cuomo indefinitely shut down gun stores in New York by designating them as "non-essential" businesses. See id. at 2. Plaintiff's causes of action claim violations of the Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See id. at ¶¶ 53-65. Plaintiff seeks the following relief:

a. A declaration that firearm and ammunition product manufacturers, retailers, importers, distributors, and shooting ranges constitute essential businesses and services under the Executive Order and are allowed to operate or, alternatively, that Defendants’ prohibition of the operation of firearm and ammunition product manufacturers, retailers, importers, distributors, and shooting ranges violates the Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

b. A temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of such order or injunction, from enforcing the Executive Order to prohibit the operation of firearm or ammunition product manufacturers, retailers, importers, distributors, and shooting ranges.

c. Nominal damages against Defendants on behalf of members of the NRA who are consumers and that have been prevented by Defendants’ actions from purchasing ammunition or firearms.

d. Attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law.

Dkt. No. 8 at 21.

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend the first amended complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 22.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "after the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When a party makes a Rule 12(c) motion, the court applies the same standard as when a party files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hayden v. Paterson , 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark , 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal , 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) ).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." ’ " Id. (quoting [Twombly , 550 U.S.] at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 ). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court may consider "documents attached to, or incorporated by reference in the Complaint, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken[.]" Thomas v. Westchester Cty. Health Care Corp. , 232 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York , 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) ) (other citation omitted). "Documents that are integral to plaintiff's claims may also be considered, despite plaintiff's failure to attach them to the complaint." Id. (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P. , 949 F.2d 42, 46-48 (2d Cir. 1991) ).

B. Standing

Defendants allege that Plaintiff's first amended complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing, as it brought these claims only on behalf of its members. See Dkt. No. 18-1 at 3–4.

" ‘[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’ " United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc. , 517 U.S. 544, 553, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (quotation omitted).

" ‘[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought.’ " Bano v. Union Carbide Corp. , 361 F.3d 696, 714 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). In Warth , the Supreme Court held that an association seeking to recover damages on behalf of its members lacked standing because "whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof." Warth , 422 U.S. at 515–16, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The Warth Court stated that

[i]f in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing in associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind.

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